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Making lifelines from frontlines1 
After the horrors of the Napoleonic wars, France was never to touch the 
Rhine again. At least that is how German contemporaries felt. ‘One only 
needs to consider the European freedom of commerce to understand that 
France’s borders cannot be extended until the Rhine; because the Rhine 
allows it to gain supremacy, a preponderance, which would eternalise the 
French yoke and the slavery of other peoples,’2 reads an 1814 pamphlet, 
written by the German professor of political economy, agriculture, and 
forestry, Johann Jakob Trunk (1745–1816).3 
Trunk drew from real-life experience. In 1800 he retired to the Rhine near 
Worms, where he, as it turned out, would spend the final 16 years of his life. 
After the First Napoleonic War, Worms lost its independence and was, like 
all the formerly German cities on the left bank of the Rhine, seized by the 
French. In comparison to roads, waterways guaranteed a more secure, 
easier, and cheaper way of transport. Yet in those years Trunk observed how 
the Rhine became a commercial frontier, where navigation and trade were 
obstructed on a daily basis by a ‘hateful Customs army … as often as it 
occurs to the variable, astute and treacherous French.’4 In a private trave-
logue of 1811, the Dutch legal expert and diplomat, Anton Reinhard Falck 
(1777–1843), also pointed to the problem of the French treatment of the 
Rhine as a strict commercial border. Since the Continental Blockade in 
1806, the Rhine had been shut off to British commerce and had fallen victim 
to the repressive forces of the Napoleonic customs regime:5 ‘who liberates us 
from the Customs officers? That wonderful product of modern-day govern-
ment, much more damaging to industry and honesty than medieval mon-
asticism to true virtue and enlightenment, shows itself to the Rhine in 
full glory.’6 
After 1798, when France’s tariff barrier was extended to the Rhine, Napo-
leon established three directions des douanes in Mainz, Bonn, and Cleves. 
From here, 3,200 ‘paramilitary brigades,’ as Michael Rowe calls them, guar-
ded the river closely.7 The French surveillance system was aimed against 
smuggling, thereby ensuring the exclusion of British commerce and protecting 
the tax revenues which were to finance the ongoing war. However, the strict 
customs quickly managed to suffocate the once vigorous international Rhine 
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trade too. Falck noted that days passed by without observing a Rhine ship 
carrying cargo. ‘Miserable system! Miserable fate of a stream which the 
beneficent nature had intended for a means of communion and of reciprocal 
civilization, for the multiplication of the enjoyment of twenty peoples.’8 
Clearly, contemporaries found the causes of the unnavigability of the Rhine in 
human activity, rather than in natural phenomena. By turning the Rhine into 
a strict commercial border, the regional economic interests along the river 
had fallen victim to the empire’s foreign policies of waging an expensive 
expansionist war on the Continent and a commercial war against Britain. 
When these wars had finally finished, disengaging France from the Rhine 
was in the commercial interest of the lands along the river, Trunk concluded. 
In addition, it was nothing less than a matter of cultural survival for 
Germany as a whole, as the writer and nationalist Ernst Moritz Arndt 
(1769–1860) warned in his 1814 pamphlet The Rhine, Germany’s River, but 
not Germany’s Border. In his far more radical, but widely distributed 
pamphlet, Arndt passionately opposed the French idea of the Rhine being a 
‘natural frontier.’ According to him, the only natural frontier between people 
and countries was language. To protect the honour and freedom of the German 
people, the entire German-speaking left-bank territories were to be reconquered 
from the French: 
Napoleon can die, all his marshals and counsellors may be buried; a very 
different dynasty may give orders from the Tuileries palace – if the Rhine 
remains French, then Germany will be freely accessible to France, then 
Germany will be dependent on France. 
Ultimately, these circumstances would have severe implications for Germany. 
So-called ‘silent dangers’ lay waiting. Arndt warned that, as part of a profane 
and despotic cosmopolitanism, the French language and customs would 
spread, even in times of peace: ‘[these] dangers are nothing else but the 
gradual extinction and extermination of the German nature and peculiarity.’9 
Besides local commercial interests and German cultural survival, the poli-
tical strategic interest of Europe as a whole would benefit from France’s 
withdrawal from the Rhine, Arndt added. If France kept the Rhine and its 
lands, then it not only retained its ‘all balance-of-power revoking pre-
ponderance’ over Germany, but also over the rest of Europe. France already 
had significant influence in Switzerland and northern Italy, as it controlled the 
mountain ranges through which important supply routes crossed. A German 
Rhine would counterbalance French dominance, whereas a French counter-
weight would in turn offset too much German pressure.10 Clearly Arndt, the 
founding father of German nationalism and intimate friend of the Prussian 
reformer Heinrich Friedrich Karl vom und zum Stein (1757–1831), empha-
sised the cultural argument and the German interest with regard to the Rhine, 
yet he undergirded his plea with these geo-political arguments which touched 
on the political viability of Europe as a whole. Just as the German professor 
Introduction: Making lifelines from frontlines 3 
in political economy had done the year before, Arndt wanted the Allied 
Powers to separate France from the Rhine. 
Trunk simply did not believe that the restoration of a European balance of 
power, as advocated by Britain and Austria, would secure peace over the 
longer term. While it was difficult to weigh all those forces and faculties 
which constitute a state’s power against those of other states, it was just 
impossible to foresee any possible changes in these variables in the future. 
Besides, as Napoleon had shown, sometimes it might take only one person, 
one leader of genius, to overturn an existing political balance completely. 
Therefore, the European powers should constitute a preponderance of ‘the 
good ones against the evil neighbour, the right ones against the wrong.’11 It was 
time to restore Europe’s most important commercial route to the European 
alliance, free it from despotic oppressors, and employ it as an economic 
counterweight. How? By safely embedding the river in the territories 
surrounding the entire north-eastern flanks of the country. In this way, the 
Rhine and its basin would be transformed from a frontline into an economic 
bulwark against France. 
These statements reveal how by 1814 the intelligentsia regarded rivers and 
river politics as vital to the commercial wellbeing and the future security of a 
continent blown to pieces. In pamphlets such as these, the Rhine, but also 
other transboundary rivers such as the Danube and its tributaries, was rarely 
absent, as rivers touched on commercial, military, cultural, and political 
affairs, which together constituted not only the essence and viability of states, 
but also the essence and viability of Europe. 
European rivers also remained a matter of concern in the correspondence 
of Europe’s main statesmen. In a confidential letter in October 1814 to the 
Prussian Chancellor Karl August von Hardenberg (1750–1822), for example, 
the Austrian diplomat and chairman of the Congress of Vienna, Klemens von 
Metternich (1773–1859), stated that his emperor would never give up the only 
important city that could counter a speedy attack of an enemy army on the 
Lower Danube. Likewise, the emperor demanded his armies be permanently 
stationed in Mainz on the Rhine, as he could not ‘give up the only direct 
commercial outlet left to him towards the northern seas.’12 Other European 
statesmen shared military and economic concerns for the protection of 
navigable routes. Yet it has often been overlooked in historiography that the 
Rhine was, and indeed remained, one of the central concerns of the post-
Napoleonic system of collective security, although not in the sense proposed 
by Trunk and Arndt, that is, by withdrawing France from its banks 
altogether. 
By proclaiming the principle of ‘freedom of navigation’ for the major 
international rivers in the Paris Peace Treaty in 1814, the allies reset the con-
figuration of Europe’s main communication lines. In principle this meant that 
rivers, which in their navigable course separated or crossed different states, 
should be free to navigate and should not be prohibited to anyone with 
respect to commerce. The four Great Powers of Austria, Britain, Russia, and 
4 Introduction: Making lifelines from frontlines 
Prussia were determined to turn European rivers into the Continent’s main 
corridors of transnational commerce and communication, thereby rendering 
the European nations ‘less strangers to each other’ as the same Peace Treaty 
of Paris promised. 
Thus, instead of excluding states from rivers and employing river basins as 
bulwarks against European powers, the four Great Powers strictly adhered to 
the principle of including France in a new Rhine regime based on the modern 
principle of freedom of navigation on international rivers. In practice, how-
ever, the four Great Powers were sailing in uncharted waters. It was far from 
clear how the ideas and theories of freedom of navigation would actually 
work in practice, let alone on the Rhine. No less than seven countries stret-
ched along its navigable course. However, by proclaiming the principle as one 
of the few articles in the Paris Peace Treaty not dealing with territorial issues, 
and by putting the Rhine on the agenda of the upcoming peace congress in 
Vienna, the allies demonstrated their resolution to end once and for all the 
imperial and fragmentary scenarios which had beset the Continent’s rivers 
with difficulties for far too long. The four Great Powers invited the Rhine 
states to embark on a European adventure to transform the river from a 
source of conflict into a source of prosperity: making lifelines from frontlines. 
Renewed relevance 
In Vienna the Powers established the first international organisation in 
modern history: the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine 
(CCNR). This was a semi-permanent diplomatic platform consisting of one 
representative from each of the seven riparian states. From its seat in Mainz, 
the Commission was to secure the principle of freedom of navigation and to 
resolve all disagreements or conflicts among the riparian states concerning 
Rhine navigation. By the end of the nineteenth century, efficient adminis-
trative cooperation on the Rhine had resulted in an almost fully channelised 
river, freely navigable for everyone. Secured freedom of navigation had turned 
the river into the commercial highway for north-western Europe. Its cheap-
ness and safety were vital for the development of the German manufacturing 
industry and the Dutch port economy at large.13 Moreover, the principle of 
freedom of navigation had spread all over the world, while the Rhine 
administration itself had served as a prime example for international (river) 
regimes globally. 
The CCNR in the nineteenth century has been studied before, but the his-
toriography mainly focused on the outcomes of this organisation in terms of 
international norms, standards, and laws. The CCNR was one of the first 
international organisations which also functioned as an international court of 
appeal. Therefore, many studies from the end of the nineteenth century 
focused specifically on this novelty of jurisdictional practice in matters of 
Rhine navigation. Ex-Commission members with a juridical background 
wrote most of these studies, which they intended for an expert public of 
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international jurists.14 It was only after the First World War that the CCNR 
as such became the focal point of new historical research that acknowledged 
the vital importance of the coordinated regulation and administration of 
international rivers and went beyond the juridical aspects. The two most 
important studies here are W.J.M. van Eysinga’s Die Zentralkommission für 
die Rheinschiffahrt 15 and Joseph Chamberlain’s The Regime of the Interna-
tional Rivers. The authors (one Dutch, the other American) were both pro-
fessors of law with a special interest in international law, particularly in 
matters of peace and international governance. 
Willem Jan Mari van Eysinga (1878–1961) held the first chair in interna-
tional law in the Netherlands. In 1907 he was part of the Dutch delegation 
during the Second Peace Conference in The Hague and in 1919 he became the 
delegate to the General Assembly of the League of Nations. Furthermore, from 
1910 he was the Dutch delegate to the Central Commission for the Navigation 
of the Rhine.16 His urge to record the history of the institute had previously 
been satisfied in another form. During the First World War, with nothing to do 
at the office, he had taken the initiative to make all legally valuable doc-
umentation of the CCNR accessible for posterity in two dense volumes.17 Later, 
after he left the Commission in 1930, Van Eysinga wrote, with the Commis-
sion’s full consent and support, the first monograph on the history of the 
CCNR. The study was based on the Commission’s archives. The general con-
clusion was that the Central Commission as supervisor, legal authority, and 
legislator played a major role as a defender of international navigation on the 
Rhine after the issuing of the Rhine Navigation Act in 1831. He pictured the 
Commission, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century, as a power 
of its own with respect to national governments, since it had built up expertise 
which provided its authority. Remarkably, Van Eysinga claimed that the Com-
mission had been able to function so well because it was not affected by poli-
tical influence and simply paused its activities in events of great international 
political turmoil, such as war. It is questionable, however, whether the Com-
mission was truly immune to political influence, or if this conclusion might 
partly be considered the result of a biased observation.18 
Immediately after the First World War the American legal scholar Joseph 
Perkins Chamberlain (1873–1951) became part of one of the research teams 
at the United States Department of State. Such teams were established with 
the objective of gathering and critically reflecting on all possible information 
which might be of help to American diplomats in settling the many ongoing 
international disputes during the Versailles Peace Negotiations. Crucial to 
international society, Chamberlain observed, was the erection of institutions 
which were able to reconcile the national interest of territorial sovereignty 
with the common interest of international commerce and communication.19 
In his eyes the CCNR and the European Commission of the Danube were 
rich historical examples of regimes that were worth studying ‘as a likely 
avenue of future international progress.’20 Despite his honest plea for such 
international regimes, he did not turn a blind eye to their limitations. 
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In contrast to Van Eysinga, Chamberlain attributed much influence to 
political developments and power relations on the functioning of the Com-
mission. After all, no riparian state had ever considered the Rhine issue in a 
broader perspective than that of its own national interests. This principle was 
also reflected in the institutional set-up of the Commission. In 1815 it was 
decided that the Commission would be a gathering of representatives rather 
than a governing body. Chamberlain’s study shows that although the Central 
Commission had a technical committee and an international court that 
checked compliance with the rules, it was consistently sidelined in important 
matters such as toll collection, transit taxes, and the physical improvement of 
the river for navigation. In these instances it was the riparian countries which 
would reach agreements on the basis of bilateral negotiations, not the 
Commission members.21 
Moreover, Chamberlain observed that the political power of these members 
was not equally divided. With the economic integration of the country into 
the German Customs Union, and the political integration in 1871, the power 
of Prussia, or Germany, increased vis à vis the Netherlands.22 Chamberlain 
noted that the existence of a Central Commission may have evoked the feel-
ing of an international river community and was unique and important in 
international justice, but 
It was the individual interest of particular states as that interest was 
developed by the change in means of navigation and in the character of 
commerce as well as by political ends, which was the motive factor in the 
abolition of man-made obstacles to the free use of the great artery of 
23commerce. 
Inasmuch as these two contributions paved the way for a first institutional 
oversight of the workings of the CCNR, their focus on the legal outcomes 
made them blind to the more political historical developments that pushed 
the CCNR on its course to further cooperation. They also did not pay much 
attention to the practicalities of the CCNR’s workings on the ground, nor did 
they fully delineate the autonomy, the leeway, and the limits of the CCNR 
versus the powers of Europe. This study, therefore, offers the first analysis of 
the formation and dynamics of the CCNR as a security community that 
negotiated shared interests and imagined threats and shaped administrative 
and regulative practices for those that used or interacted with the Rhine as a 
transport resource.24 
The debate about the political agency of the CCNR indeed raises a couple 
of questions that have not been answered extensively before. What was the 
intrinsic significance of the Commission as a political actor over the course of 
the nineteenth century?25 And what explains and justifies its ongoing exis-
tence as an international organisation?26 Most of all, did the Commission 
consider itself an agent to secure peace, prosperity, and security? Monographs 
on the CCNR are scarce, mostly outdated, and often commissioned by the 
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Commission itself. None of them are based on international multi-archival 
research. Despite the obvious relations that contemporaries observed (in 1815 
as well as 1919) between the principle of freedom of navigation and the 
common interest, or between rivers and European security and prosperity as 
such, the CCNR has never been studied as part of the broader security 
system which the European powers jointly established after the end of the 
Napoleonic wars. Moreover, no study has ever focused on the Commission’s 
own motives regarding, and its reflections on, security and prosperity during 
the nineteenth century.27 
The Rhine as part of a post-Napoleonic security system 
After 1815 the Rhine became part of a new European-wide security system. 
Vienna brought about a new territorial composition of Europe and the con-
struction of a ‘bulwark system’ to restrain possible French aggression. Addi-
tionally, the Congress resulted in the installation of an Allied Council, putting 
in place effective military, administrative, and financial control over France, 
the former aggressor.28 
With a similar aim, but on a European level, the Powers institutionalised 
plurilateral conferences with follow-up conferences during which the major 
European powers decided on existing issues and imposed their decisions by 
force.29 For the purpose of maintaining the balance of power and the new 
order they had jointly designed, the individual countries were to adhere to the 
outcomes of the conferences, sometimes at the expense of their direct national 
interests. This Congress System, which depended upon the multilateral reg-
ulation of potential conflicts, has been studied extensively by historians. It is 
understood as a form of security or peace management, since it helped create 
new forums for decision making and diplomatic negotiation in peacetime, 
which transcended the bilateral diplomacy of previous centuries.30 What has 
largely been forgotten and not taken into account in the historiography of the 
post-Napoleonic European security regime is that rivers were an integral part 
of this project to bring back security to the Continent. All Allied Powers 
recognised the Rhine as a potential source of (in)security within the European 
balance of power. 
First and foremost, the Rhine can be seen as part of the European security 
project after 1815 as the development of its commerce and navigation was 
regarded as an essential prerequisite for increasing prosperity on the Con-
tinent. The Rhine was the largest underused international trade route in 
Europe. Contemporaries travelling the Rhine, such as the Dutch diplomat 
Anton Falck in 1811, were astonished by the impoverished state of once 
flourishing cities like Cologne and Mainz, let alone the villages and agrarian 
communities between them. By making the Rhine work, not only in its indi-
vidual pieces, but in its entirety, the European powers wanted to provide the 
European people with new perspectives on developing the river’s resources to 
a degree that would enable them to gain wealth and secure a long-term 
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livelihood. In addition, increasing communication and commerce would have 
beneficial consequences for the respective state treasuries through taxing eco-
nomic activities. And finally, a free Rhine, or any international European 
river, so the Allies argued, would ‘facilitate the communications between 
nations, and continually to render them less strangers to each other.’31 
The principle of freedom of navigation was a concrete measure which 
benefited the common interest by creating wealth. Additionally, the measure 
allowed the European riparian states to take equal advantage of the river’s 
transport resources, enabling them to share the subsequent economic pros-
perity. Thus, besides wealth creation, the measure was to result in a redis-
tribution of wealth, which was equally important in terms of creating 
European stability and security. This logic also explains the remarkable dif-
ference among the other European security measures in terms of international 
cooperation and inclusivity. The ‘bulwark system’ and the Allied Council 
were established among the Allies to contain and counter French aggression. 
The former foe could only accede to the Congress System in 1818, during the 
Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Things were different when it came to European 
rivers. In matters of river policy, there were provisions for the immediate 
participation of France. A secured long-term livelihood and steady state rev-
enues for France were thought to be beneficial consequences for European 
stability and security. In fact, for the European people and for the European 
state system as a whole, there could be little security without some level of 
prosperity in each individual country. 
This becomes even clearer when looking at the flip side of the security per-
spective of the measure. The introduction of the principle of freedom of navi-
gation was not only to benefit vital common interests, but also to protect 
Europe from political threats. Throughout Roman times the source of conten-
tion with regard to international rivers stemmed from the situation in which a 
hegemon took control over them, thereby endangering a just distribution of 
the river’s resources. During the Middle Ages, the source of controversy lay 
in the fact that the many individual interests hampered the very development of 
the river’s resources (more on this follows in Chapter 1). By establishing the 
principle of freedom of navigation of international rivers in 1815, the European 
powers united both in their battle against hegemonic ambitions and the ‘terror’ 
of arbitrariness and unpredictability on international rivers. 
An international policy which connects economic development with peace 
in general or the freedom of navigation with security in particular is mainly 
known from its twentieth-century examples. After the First World War, US 
President Woodrow Wilson considered wealth creation and distribution a 
prerequisite to peace and security.32 Robert Schuman launched his plan for a 
European Coal and Steel Community out of a similar logic in 1950.33 Just as 
after both world wars, in 1815 security in Europe was inseparable from 
prosperity.34 
The relation between the two concepts, security and prosperity, is a com-
plex one. We can distinguish a mutual causality, as security is needed to 
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generate prosperity, but prosperity is equally essential for creating security. It 
also goes the opposite way: insecurity results in hardship, while hardship 
generates insecurity in turn. Furthermore, political scientists regard both 
concepts as essentially contested and normative, with an intrinsic orientation 
towards the future.35 This conceptual vagueness makes both terms malleable 
and especially handy in political discourse.36 This study goes along with this 
understanding of security and prosperity, and adds that their meanings are 
constituted by a process of interaction and negotiation – also in reference to 
each other. This linkage between security and prosperity I call the security-
prosperity nexus: that is, the notion that modern security thinking and secur-
ity practices cannot be understood without accounting for the prosperity 
considerations and prosperity policies of the concerned parties. 
For a good understanding of the performative qualities of these constructed 
concepts, it is necessary to situate them in their historical contexts. This book 
uncovers how contemporaries used, and reflected on, the corresponding 
functional qualities of the concepts as well as on the mutual causal relation-
ship between them. That causal relationship makes prosperity and security, as 
discursive notions, key components in the study of the European security 
culture after 1815. What makes it even more interesting is to understand how 
the relationship between the two concepts differed over time. This study, 
therefore, engages with the tradition of Werner Conze’s and Reinhart Kosel-
leck’s geschichtliche Grundbegriffe and aims to trace the historical semantics 
of fundamental concepts in political-societal language. Within the Grundbe-
griffe series, Mohammed Rassem shows that the terms ‘security’ and ‘pros-
perity’ have historically been very close friends. In Roman imperial 
vocabulary, salus could mean three things: ‘well,’ ‘welfare,’ and ‘security.’ In 
addition, it could refer both to a private person or to the state as a whole. 
This was why ‘prosperity’ became increasingly equated with the concept of 
‘common good.’37 Between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, pros-
perity and security became the key objectives of states. After 1815, I argue, 
these objectives were adopted by various condominiums of European powers 
as well. 
In order to historicise security, Beatrice de Graaf ingeniously suggests 
incorporating the subjective notion of security within its definition: ‘the 
organised anticipation of being unharmed in the future.’38 Correspondingly, 
I will historicise prosperity by defining it as ‘the organised anticipation of 
maintaining livelihood in the future.’ How the CCNR materialised the prin-
ciple of freedom of navigation seems an overly simple question. However, 
most literature on this topic is concerned solely with the legal history and 
omits investigating the men on the ground, such as the commissioners, the 
extended administration of the CCNR, the experts, and the politicians 
involved. 
Thus, The Rhine and European Security in the Long Nineteenth Century: 
Making Lifelines from Frontlines explores how the most fundamental change 
in the history of international river governance – that is, the proclamation of 
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the principle of freedom of navigation and the establishment of the CCNR – 
arose from European security concerns. In addition, this research shows how 
the CCNR created a Rhine regime that in turn produced, enabled, and 
influenced a collective security culture as an open, contested process of com-
munity formation on the basis of shared interests, threat perceptions, and 
ensuing practices.39 It aims to do so by first looking at how the relationship 
between security and prosperity (the security-prosperity nexus) explicitly 
emerges in the discussions among the commissioners and between the com-
missioners and third parties that were involved, such as governments, experts, 
and local stakeholders, and how by these exchanges the agenda was set and 
practices, norms, and standards serving the freedom of navigation of the 
Rhine in the long nineteenth century took shape. Second, it demonstrates how 
the CCNR can be understood as a forum for communication able to reconcile 
or depoliticise conflicting interests between the riparian states, thereby prevent-
ing the escalation of conflicts, creating common ground, and providing a soft 
compliance mechanism able also to restrain the more powerful riparian states 
within the Commission. Third, it shows how the CCNR secured its own posi-
tion in the course of the nineteenth century by adapting its organisation, 
working method, and scope in a timely fashion. This research focuses on the 
long nineteenth century, ending in 1919, when the Versailles Peace Treaty 
enforced a major institutional modification of the CCNR. This modification 
also ensued from a European security concern, but it implied a very different 
approach to making Europe safe again: by securing Great Power involvement 
in what until then had been exclusively riparian affairs.40 
Rowing back along the paper trail 
For this study, I was fortunate to be able to use the recently unlocked archives 
of the CCNR in the Archiv Départemental du Bas-Rhin.41 The archive is 
extremely rich as it contains all protocols from the Commission since its very 
first meeting in 1816. For the early period, the archive also contains helpful 
alphabetically arranged indices, drafted by the Chief Inspector of the Com-
mission, in order to navigate quickly and efficiently through the thousands 
and thousands of pages of protocols. In addition, the saved agendas of the 
sessions between 1832 and 1916 provided me with a concise overview of the 
issues discussed. What needs to be taken into account here is that the proto-
cols merely reflect the diplomatically approved minutes of the official sessions, 
which means that they do not give insight into what took place at a less offi-
cial level. Correspondence and negotiations outside the Commission’s offices 
are not on file in these archives. It also means that the protocols sometimes 
reflect the decisions taken, rather than the process of how the decisions were 
reached. Finally, it means that the files are rather self-effacing, gracious, and 
polite, rather than open, passionate, and revealing, although, very occasion-
ally, the protocols culminated in bitter tirades when decisions could not be 
reached for years. 
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In this study, I counter this problem by complementing the official CCNR 
files with materials from various national archives. All delegates in the CCNR 
had a rather active correspondence with their respective governments and 
relevant ministries. These files are not necessarily (and sometimes even far 
from) diplomatic. They are very revealing in setting out how decisions were 
reached and what different interests were at play. Unfortunately, the CCNR 
archives lack any records concerning the permanent authority of Rhine navi-
gation inspectors. However, the protocols do integrally incorporate the most 
important letters from the Chief Inspector. Therefore, the study of these pro-
tocols, complemented with the files from the national archives, not only gives 
us an excellent insight into the first international organisation as such, but 
also explains how security-prosperity considerations were a driving force in 
history. 
To facilitate this exploration the book is organised into six chapters. 
Chapter 1 shows how in the early 1800s the principle of freedom of naviga-
tion of international rivers emerged as a moral appeal and an international 
legal practice under French hegemony. Contemporaries understood the prin-
ciple as a political answer to the age-old problem of anarchic river exploita-
tion and as a measure to protect the political economy of France’s ever-
expanding empire. Thus, by organising the removal of the threat of arbitrary 
taxations and regulations to navigation and commerce on the Rhine, France 
instantly produced a new threat, namely that of shaking up the European 
balance of power, especially by excluding Britain from the benefits of a 
prosperous Rhine. 
Chapter 2 explains that before and during the Congress of Vienna in 1815 
the Great Powers emphasised the significance of freely navigable rivers for 
European prosperity and lasting peace. However, the majority of the Rhine 
states were wary of impairing their recently regained sovereignty by the estab-
lishment of a powerful international executive body governing the navigable 
Rhine. These conflicting perspectives were clearly reflected in the ultimate result 
of the Congress: the proclamation of the freedom of navigation as a European 
principle and the establishment of the Central Commission for the Navigation 
of the Rhine, which consisted merely of the respective riparian states. 
Chapter 3 turns to the initial phase of the CCNR in Mainz. It develops the 
argument that the riparian representatives established a semi-diplomatic forum 
that was intended to protect the ‘common good.’ However, the concept of 
‘common good’ was understood and defended in such conflicting ways that it 
almost heralded the end of this unprecedented experiment of international 
cooperation. Despite the enormous challenge, the riparian condominium even-
tually found common ground in its aversion to the threatening interference of 
the Great Powers that clung to the CCNR as a European prosperity project. 
Chapter 4 then shows that after the rules and regulations for the Rhine 
regime had been established, the Commission was confronted with the pro-
blem that keeping the river safe for navigation required a continuous flow of 
reliable, standardised, and up-to-date information on the geophysical 
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character and the navigable conditions of the Rhine. In the 1830s, the politi-
cised reports from the respective national authorities and the observational 
data from its administrative machine were therefore supplemented with the 
input from external technical experts. The discussion of what safety of navi-
gation actually entailed led to the formation of a new range of norms such as 
transparency, reciprocity, predictability, and an increasing confidence in the 
human ability to govern a river in accordance with technological laws. 
Chapter 5 shows how the end of the 1840s turned out to be a decisive 
period for the (mal)functioning of the CCNR. With an international crisis 
concerning the Rhine and a democratic and technological revolution of steam 
shipping unfolding in its basin, it became uncertain whether the new Rhine 
regime would actually bring prosperity and security to all the inhabitants of 
its banks. The failed experiment of the CCNR to resolve a violent dispute 
between radical sailors and steam shipping companies redetermined the pro-
tection of the freedom of navigation, rather than the security of livelihood, as 
the main mandate of the CCNR. It also reconstituted the CCNR as an elite 
organisation that tried to depoliticise inter-riparian conflicts on the navigability 
of the Rhine by establishing an ad hoc Technical Commission consisting of 
hydraulic engineers. 
Chapter 6 argues that in the context of Prussia’s power play and the grow-
ing competition of the interregional railway network after 1860, the full 
institutionalisation of the Technical Commission and the abolition of the 
figure of the Chief Inspector proved essential moves in successfully mitigating 
the political tensions within the Commission, and in keeping the Rhine safe. 
The Technical Commission generated a coherent set of norms and became 
responsible for a wider range of assessment activities. Thereby it increased its 
potential to steer the convergence of riparian politics regarding the freedom 
of navigation of the Rhine. By the turn of the century the protection of the 
freedom of navigation on the Rhine had been completely depoliticised, and 
the river had turned into the most prosperous waterway in Europe. 
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1 Securing freedom of navigation 
A revolutionary fight against a barbaric past 
(1789–1813) 
Introduction 
‘This is not solely about … the rivalry of some towns on the Rhine,’ a 
Koblenz merchant protested in 1800, criticising poisoned relations between 
commerce and politics in the old merchant towns of Cologne and Mainz. 
It is about several nations, crying out against two cities; it is about the 
nineteenth century, a civilised century, crying out against the barbarism 
of the thirteenth century; it is about a principle acknowledged today by 
all the civilised nations, crying out in favour of commerce and industry, 
and against an odious privilege, which gives rise to the ignorance of 
nations, and which will infuse the abuse of power.1 
The poisoned relations between commerce and politics on the Rhine had 
their origin in the Middle Ages. Lords and towns like Mainz and Cologne 
received privileges such as staple rights, benefiting their treasuries, but affect-
ing trade and traffic. This chapter immerses itself in the troubled waters of 
sharing international rivers and distinguishes two archetypical scenarios of 
rivalry, i.e. an ‘imperial’ and a ‘fragmentary’ scenario, both of which have 
harmed the allocation of rivers’ resources for hundreds of years. The chapter 
then shows how, after 1789, Revolutionary France attempted to solve this 
age-old problem of river rivalry by imposing the principle of freedom of 
navigation on the international rivers that crossed its territory, and justified 
the imposition of the principle by presenting it as a measure against the bar-
baric, feudalist past. However, other European powers regarded French river 
policies as a measure to protect the political economy of its ever-expanding 
empire, thereby harming the European balance of power. Indeed, before the 
imperial scenario in revolutionary disguise could be fully realised on the 
Rhine, Napoleon was losing terrain. Nevertheless, the institution of an inter-
national Rhine authority, and the principle of the freedom of navigation 
would survive the emperor’s downfall. This chapter shows how in the early 
1800s the principle of freedom of navigation of international rivers emerged 
as a moral appeal and an international legal practice in revolutionary Europe. 
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The imperial Roman army of rivers 
For centuries the Rhine, and international rivers in general, had been as much 
a source of prosperity as a source of rivalry. Rivers are a source of life; in 
fact, they were the settling places of the first civilisations, providing water for 
irrigation for agriculture, for drinking and sanitation, and for generating 
energy from water mills. Moreover, navigable rivers connect people with 
markets in other villages, other cities, or other states. Rivers are part of an 
infrastructure that determines the economic viability of states. This makes 
controlling rivers and navigation a policy of existential importance and shar-
ing international rivers a tricky business as a state depends on the reciprocal 
willingness of another state or authority it does not control. In fact, the very 
word ‘rival’ originates from the Latin rīvālis and means ‘one who uses the same 
stream.’2 
The urge to control the river’s resources when states have similar interests 
can lead to two ‘rivalry’ scenarios, with two very different outcomes for the 
river’s allocation. One scenario I call the ‘fragmentary’ scenario. In this 
situation rival authorities manage to claim and maintain control over part of 
the river’s resources. This leads to a fragmentation of the river’s resource 
regime and ultimately to an underdevelopment of the river’s resources, such as 
navigation. In the second scenario, one of the riparian authorities manages to 
incorporate the entire river within its borders. This ‘hegemonic’ scenario can 
result in full development, but simultaneously will lead to an unequal dis-
tribution of the river’s resources. A brief review of 2,000 years of history 
demonstrates that both the fragmentary and the hegemonic scenarios had 
wide-ranging consequences for the development of navigation on European 
rivers and for threatening power disparities. 
The way the Roman Empire dealt with navigable rivers can be best descri-
bed, not surprisingly, as the imperial scenario. Incorporating and controlling 
rivers was an important part of the expansionist policies of the empire. It is a 
truism to state that Romans found the rivers in their empire important. This 
was either because they constituted a natural border that could protect the 
empire from foreign invasions, or because waterways were used as roads or 
‘bridges,’ that fostered interaction and stimulated trade and traffic along their 
course.3 As the words of the Roman historian Tacitus seem to indicate, pos-
sibly both qualities of water systems, i.e. demarcating the borders of, and 
fostering interaction within, the empire were an integral part of the opera-
tional strategy of securing the Pax Romana: ‘the empire was fenced in by the 
ocean and rivers far remote, the legions, the provinces, the navy, and all things 
were systematically connected,’ he wrote somewhere around 110 AD.4 
Indeed, the Danube, the Rhine, but also the Euphrates constituted the most 
important militarised frontier zones of the Roman Empire. From the first to 
the second century extensive river fleets were built, such as the Classis Ger-
manica for the Rhine. Initially these fleets executed offensive movements, but 
it is doubtful whether these were successful in the long run. Rather, the fleets 
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became important in a defensive way, most of all by securing the freedom of 
navigation within the empire. This was necessary to supply the frontier garri-
sons, and move animals, building materials, and troops, but also to patrol the 
river course and deter hostile or illegal river crossings.5 One shouldn’t forget 
the importance of logistics when it comes to supplying a Roman legion. In 
early imperial times, economically poorly developed frontier zones could not 
supply the troops sufficiently. To carry the 225 tons of grain and 13.5 tons of 
fodder that was needed each month to supply a legion of 5,000 men, the 
Romans depended on the navigable waters of the Rhône, the Saône, and the 
Moselle, leading towards the Rhine frontier.6 Up to the third century AD 
legions constituted the backbone of the Roman army and practically all 
important legionary bases in continental Europe were located by a river, 
primarily the Rhine and the Danube.7 
The use of rivers as defence lines and transport roads was enhanced artifi-
cially by manipulating the natural aquatic environments. For example, Tacitus 
mentions the construction of significant waterworks under the command of 
general Drusus on the Rhine in 12 BC. The waterworks of Drusus, if they 
really existed, consisted of a dam and some canals that were meant to redis-
tribute the water from a southern to a more northern river in the Rhine-
Meuse delta, thereby creating a better natural line of defence against the 
Germanic tribes and improving the navigability of the north–south route for 
transports of commodities and troops.8 The Romans could not solve all pro-
blems of navigability. The few existing rivers in the Mediterranean zone suf-
fered from droughts in the summer and turbulence and floods in the winter, 
and remained therefore far less navigable. Nevertheless, one can state that, 
overall, rivers were essential to the Roman imperial peace, or, as a renowned 
author on the topic likes to put it, the Roman army was an army of rivers.9 
The central importance of rivers in the Roman Empire for peace and 
security not only resulted in the physical adaptation of the rivers themselves, 
but also in institutional innovations. To work as efficient channels of commu-
nication it was mandatory to keep tariffs low and secure safe navigation. By 
law, Romans could freely navigate the rivers provided that they were a member 
of a boatmen’s association and paid tolls in certain places. River navigation was 
a highly organised trade, and boatmen’s associations were very influential in the 
empire, yet freely accessible to all qualified skippers. The tolls were kept low 
and were merely intended to finance the maintenance of the waterways and to 
construct towpaths along the rivers, so as to facilitate upstream traffic. The 
right of freedom of navigation also meant that no one could be banned from 
the river or could be forced to load or unload his goods. Constructing artificial 
obstacles for navigation was prohibited along the entire watercourse, and offi-
cial managers were installed to supervise the condition of the stream and its 
shores and to enforce the principle of freedom of navigation.10 Alternatively, 
Rome could issue or withdraw a right of free navigation at will to the non-
Roman peoples living on the opposite shore such as the Germanic tribes, 
making the river far less of a secure commercial road for them. 
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Controlling entire watercourses was functional for the internal prosperity 
and external security of the empire, but also demonstrated Roman superiority 
to foreign peoples. Tacitus wrote that Julius Caesar’s decision in 55 BC to 
cross the river was highly motivated by his desire to demonstrate to his 
adversaries that the Romans ‘had the power and the will to cross the Rhine.’ 
Such symbolism also emerges in Roman artefacts. On coins the Rhine is often 
depicted as a figure with a long beard and hair, horns, or crab claws, 
demonstrating two main themes: the Rhine as the source of opulence and as a 
waterway under Roman control.11 
During Roman hegemony rivers were enhanced to work as internal roads 
of transportation. After the disintegration of the Western Empire in the 
fourth century AD, the Rhine was untouched by grand politics for centuries 
and could develop into the largest international trade route in north-west 
Europe, harbouring many important trading centres along its banks. Long-
distance trade over land remained insignificant as the poor state of the roads 
made them inefficient and dangerous.12 By the fourteenth century, most of the 
important European trade centres were located by a river. Along the Rhine, 
merchants organised in the Hanseatic League and were active in overseas 
trade with the Baltic states, England, and Scandinavia.13 Yet, it was during 
this Dark Age that the Rhine’s function as a highway came to a standstill. 
Disintegrating river regimes in the Middle Ages 
With the disappearance of the Roman Empire, Europe became politically 
fragmented. Moreover, the feudal constellation of authority had resulted in a 
total diffusion of property, including land and the water streams and rivers 
that flowed through it. Henceforth, it was an emperor, a king, a local lord, or 
a free city that possessed a water stream, and as such held the associated 
rights for that specific stretch of the river. Such rights included tolling, sta-
pling, fishing, or ferrying and sometimes comprised the right to incorporate 
emerging islands or land extensions into one’s dominion. Still another privi-
lege of local authorities that was applied to water streams was the right to 
issue letters of safe conduct.14 In the eleventh and twelfth centuries landlords 
perceived it as their task, even by entering into agreements with each other, to 
provide merchants, pilgrims, and other travellers, in exchange for a small 
payment, with the guarantee of safe passage through their respective terri-
tories.15 Soon, however, the merchants discovered that safe navigation came at 
a much higher price. 
Initially tolls and taxes were levied on the basis of reasonableness, but this 
changed during the late Middle Ages. Lords or monarchs increasingly gave 
river-related rights in loan, in return for the vassals’ loyalty or ready money. 
Soon these vassals introduced additional taxes for unsolicited services such as 
accompanying guards, making the already existing taxes more of a burden 
than a payment for an actual service.16 Along the Rhine, a prime trading 
route in Europe, this was no different. As a major source of revenue, the Holy 
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Roman Empire depended on the customs and tolls levied on this river. The 
right of tolling was farmed out to the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and 
Koblenz. In addition, Mainz and Cologne received the ‘rights of staple,’ 
which compelled all passing merchants to unload their commodities and offer 
them for sale for several days, to the benefit of the local market. 
The Holy Roman Empire had an interest in increasing navigation and 
executing the correct administration of the tolling. However, from the twelfth 
century onwards the already disintegrating empire lost authority and could no 
longer guarantee its control over the Rhine. The archbishops and lower-
ranking nobility grabbed the opportunity to increase their tolls or installed 
their own ‘tolling booths’ and started randomly charging illegal tolls at sky-
high rates. Rates of between 53 and 67 per cent of the cargo’s value were not 
uncommon,17 and even stealing cargos or entire ships was not unheard of. 
Contemporaries observed the destructive force of these practices for trade and 
traffic and baptised the newcomers in the tolling business ‘robber barons.’ 
Foreign contemporaries condemned the Rhine tolls, calling them the ‘raving 
lunacy of the Germans.’ In 1254, after a coalition of cities, princely members, 
and knightly members called the Rhenish League proclaimed peace among 
each other and war against the robber barons, unjust tolls were supressed, and 
robber castles were destroyed. Security on the Rhine returned.18 However, the 
problem was not permanently solved as long as the political fragmentation of 
the Rhine facilitated conflicts of interest. Indeed, the cooperative behaviour 
for the good of all shown by the German authorities was more of an exception. 
The Rhenish League resisted for only three years. Moreover, in order to fund 
the fight against the robber castles, the league introduced so-called peace-tolls 
on the Rhine, thus unfortunately substituting some of the illegal tolls with legal 
ones. Between the twelfth and the fourteenth centuries the number of tolling 
stations exploded again from 12 to 62.19 In the context of a decaying empire, 
illegal tolls could not be extirpated and violent robber barons continued 
endangering the lives and property of the skippers. Emperors tried to regain 
control over the rivers and did not hesitate to use force against illegal toll levi-
ers.20 Yet, due to the further disintegration of the empire, these interludes of a 
free Rhine never lasted long. This became especially clear in Cologne. 
Once it had been among the most prominent commercial towns in Europe, 
but Cologne was weakened by the Thirty Years’ War of the seventeenth cen-
tury. During this war the German electors had multiplied the toll charges, two, 
three, or even four times. Wine and wheat trebled in price when sent over the 
Rhine from Mannheim to the Dutch border. ‘The devastating effect of the tolls 
on river trade,’ the Swedish political economist Eli Heckscher (1879–1952) 
wrote in his classic work Mercantilism in the early 1930s, ‘may, perhaps best be 
inferred from the fact that traffic was driven away from the best trade routes in 
Europe and forced on to the unsatisfactory land routes.’ Rhine shipping 
declined, while on some stretches it even disappeared completely.21 
It was exactly this collapse of Rhine traffic during the Thirty Years’ War 
that produced strong public agitation against the ongoing particularistic and 
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self-enriching behaviour of petty despots along its course. In order to stimu-
late trade and prosperity, the Peace of Westphalia abandoned all tolls and 
other obstacles to free navigation on the Rhine in 1648. However, the peace 
treaty was, in this regard, nothing but a dead letter. Like later treaties, such as 
Ryswick (1697), Rastatt, and Baden (both 1714), although containing stipu-
lations of the most liberal kind,22 it was an acknowledgement of public opi-
nion, but it completely failed to firmly secure the freedom of navigation of the 
Rhine or international rivers in general. 
Revolutionary France versus deadlocked international rivers 
Local privileges rooted in the ‘barbarism of the thirteenth century,’ as the 
Koblenz merchant noted in 1800, continued hampering commerce and 
industry far into the age of revolutions. Merchants were probably the first to 
protest when taxes, local privileges, or other political measures threatened to 
hamper free trade and traffic. Nevertheless, the consequences of a politically 
fragmented Rhine were also a cause for concern to other, less interested par-
ties, such as travellers. During a journey on the river a few years earlier in 
1791, the English medic and philosopher Thomas Cogan (1736–1818) was 
appalled by the state of the commercial towns along the Rhine. When he 
entered the city of Cologne, desolation and beggars featured almost in every 
alley. Streets and squares had turned into vineyards and kitchen gardens. 
Two-thirds of the city had fallen into ruin. And even though the forced 
transshipment of merchandise, due to the staple rights, gave an appearance of 
entrepreneurial activity, it was of no great advantage to the city. It merely 
hampered trade and traffic to a great extent, causing foreign merchants to 
shift supply routes away from the Rhine. Besides, none of the transshipped 
articles, nor the ships themselves, were produced within Cologne. Only a few 
vessel owners, who were usually also the merchants of the goods, were doing 
all the shipping and they were not even residents of the free city. With the 
Rhine in chains, Cologne, like Babylon, Cogan wrote, had fallen.23 
Continuing his trip up the Rhine through the vitiferous riches between 
Bonn and Mainz, Cogan again noticed poverty behind the veil of entrepre-
neurial splendour. Overall, despite the picturesque scenes, viticulture was by 
no means a blessing to the country. This was not the result of recurring crop 
failures, but mostly because ‘Bacchus … had not the benevolence of Ceres.’ In 
other words, where fields were occupied with grapes, grain could not grow. 
Locals depended for the real necessities of life on the more expensive 
import of grain and clothing: ‘poverty,’ Cogan observed ‘is most prevalent 
where the vine is most cultivated.’24 
The limited commerce in Mainz, although favourably positioned at the 
intersection of the Rhine and the Main, was certainly the result of the 
oppressive tolls which, as Cogan was informed, accounted for 600,000 florins 
of a total annual revenue in the Electorate of 1.8 million florins.25 High tolls 
benefited the state coffers, but together with the staple rights they also 
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resulted in unpredictable navigation that did not stimulate commerce. How-
ever, Cogan noted, things were changing: ‘a spirit of commerce begins to be 
more diffused through Germany, and there are many cities where Ein Kauff-
mann possessing property begins to be respected almost as much as a Prince 
who has none.’26 This increased commercial spirit resulted in growing dis-
content with the impositions on the Rhine.27 Yet, Cogan doubted whether the 
protests against the tolls would ultimately make a difference: 
That they are exorbitant is universally acknowledged; that they are very 
injurious to commerce is the general complaint: but as they are so knea-
ded with, and moulded into the system of finance; as potentates will not 
be disposed to relinquish the present schemes of their wealth, without 
some substitute; and as no substitute can be devised that would not be 
unpopular, by oppressing the subject in order to relieve strangers, this is 
an abuse which we are not to expect will be speedily removed.28 
Cogan was right that the removal of the anarchic system on the Rhine 
implied a removal of the feudal system at large. But he was wrong that this 
would not happen any day soon. In fact, French revolutionaries had already 
started contemplating the future regime of European rivers ‘based on the just 
and liberal principles that the French government professed,’ and the public 
call for change became increasingly louder.29 Only months after Cogan had 
returned from his trip on the Rhine, Revolutionary France dismantled with 
great fanfare the blockade of the Scheldt. Ironically, it was this revolutionary 
manifestation of the principle of freedom of navigation that brought Britain, 
Cogan’s motherland, to the brink of war with France. 
Supported by ideological motives, but certainly driven by economic and 
strategic concerns, Revolutionary France vigorously addressed the issue of 
deadlocked international rivers at an early stage. Protests such as those by the 
Antwerp elite in 1787 against the arbitrary limitations of navigation on 
the Scheldt by the Dutch were embraced to pursue revolutionary goals.30 
On the basis of natural law, the French publicly rejected the national appro-
priation of shared rivers such as the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine. 
Rivers, the revolutionaries stated, were the collective property of all riparian 
states. Therefore, the authority of international agreements and sovereign 
rights should be subordinated to the natural right of free international navi-
gation for all who were in need of free passage. The revolutionaries reiterated 
the Dutch legal theorist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) who advocated that such 
a free passage on rivers was legitimate in cases of migration and commerce, 
or even to wage just wars.31 First and foremost, excessive toll systems, forced 
staple markets, shipping monopolies, and other privileges were a vestige of the 
feudalistic past that did not fit with the revolutionary principles of freedom, 
equality, and fraternity. 
In 1792, after the Revolutionary army had occupied the Austrian Nether-
lands, the French used the principle of freedom of navigation as the moral 
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and legal justification for the opening of the Scheldt. For more than a century 
the Netherlands had isolated Antwerp, their most dangerous rival port, from 
global commerce by closing off the Scheldt. Several international agreements 
recognised this lock-off as a Dutch privilege. Yet, on 16 November the French 
unilaterally declared the so-called Scheldt Decree and introduced the principle 
of freedom of navigation. This decree laid the foundations for the application of 
international river law.32 The decree forbade ‘the right of occupying the channel 
of a river, to the exclusion of others’ and promised the Belgians every measure 
necessary to re-establish the freedom of navigation on both the Meuse and the 
Scheldt. With the arrival of two French gunships on the Scheldt a couple of 
weeks later, freedom of navigation on the Scheldt was actually enforced.33 
Apart from an ideological motivation, the opening of the Scheldt was also 
politically inspired. The French aimed at winning the hearts of the Belgian 
people for the Revolutionary cause. In fact, in the years of French domination 
no issue was emphasised more often in official communication to the Belgian 
public than the opening of the Scheldt. It was the symbolic end of despotism 
and a return to the natural state of freedom in which the Belgian people 
could prosper.34 With the Edict of Fraternity of 19 November 1792, the gov-
ernment of the French Revolution once more underlined its determination to 
restore the laws of nature by assisting all peoples who wished to recover their 
liberty. 
With its armies on the march, France would not limit its river politics to 
the Scheldt and the Meuse alone. Already in 1791 the Army of the Rhine was 
established to bring the revolution to the German states along the Rhine.35 In 
September 1792, a year after Cogan had returned from his trip, the first 
German town on the left bank was captured. One month later the important 
city of Mainz followed, while Frankfurt, on the Rhine’s tributary the Main, 
was occupied too. By 1795 the United Netherlands capitulated and turned 
into the French vassal state of the Batavian Republic. The principle of free-
dom of navigation was officially promulgated for the first time in the Treaty of 
The Hague.36 It postulated that navigation on the Rhine, the Meuse, and the 
Scheldt up to the sea would be free. Shortly thereafter, the Treaty of Campo-
Formio ended the War of the First Coalition in 1797 and a similar regime 
was imposed on the rivers and canals between Austria and the new French 
client state of the Cisalpine Republic.37 
In the Congress of Rastatt that followed, France demanded a far-reaching 
reform of the commercial regime on the Rhine, such as the abolition of tolls, 
staple rights, and boatmen’s guilds. Moreover, it called for free navigation of all 
German rivers, including the Danube. However, in March 1799 Russia and 
Austria resumed war against France and the Congress was interrupted, leaving 
the river issues undecided.38 After the French had defeated the Austrian army 
again, the Treaty of Lunéville confirmed the agreements of Campo-Formio and 
consolidated peace between France and Austria in 1801. With the Treaty of 
Amiens one year later, France also came to terms with Britain and for the first 
time in ten years Europe entered a brief period of general peace. 
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Figure 1.1 Habsburg and French forces fight for the control of the Rhine crossing 
between Kehl and Strasbourg during the Rhine Campaign of 1796 
Source: J. Gottfried Gerhardt. Bibliothèque nationale et universitaire de Strasbourg. 
Reference number NIM01558 (www.numistral.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b10201277b). Public 
Domain. 
A British perspective on France’s grand river policies 
The French imposition of the principle of freedom of navigation on the rivers 
it controlled was a serious problem for the British. The very opening of the 
Scheldt in 1792 brought the country to the brink of war with France, while 
the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens ten years later were highly con-
troversial; as a contemporary wrote ‘there can be little security in [this] peace 
either for the commerce of Great Britain, or for the tranquillity of the Con-
tinental powers.’39 What could the problem of the implementation of the lib-
eral principle be for a country that highly depended on international 
commerce? 
The occupation of the Austrian Netherlands, the opening of the Scheldt, 
and the annexation of Savoy had put Britain, pledged to neutrality and part-
nering with France in the commercial treaty of 1786, in a difficult position. 
The opening of the Scheldt was a grave violation of the law of nations. It was 
contrary to the treaties Britain had concluded with its ally Holland, and 
which it had guaranteed. ‘France can have no right to annul the stipulations 
relative to the Scheldt, unless she have also the right to set aside all the other 
treaties between all the powers of Europe,’ Prime Minister William Pitt 
(1759–1806) warned France in a statement on 31 December 1792; ‘England 
will never consent, that France should arrogate the power of annulling at her 
pleasure, and under the pretence of a natural right, of which she makes her-
self the only judge, the political system of Europe.’ Whereas the sudden 
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application of a ‘natural right’ was in principle a violation of the law of 
nations, it was how the opening of the Scheldt facilitated the establishment of 
a French arsenal so close to Britain that really frightened the British.40 
In January 1793 the French Foreign Minister Pierre Henri Lebrun 
(1754–1793) explained to the British Foreign Secretary Lord Grenville 
(1759–1834) that the opening of the Scheldt was France’s duty to assist the 
general will of a people: ‘It is to restore to the Belgians the enjoyment of so 
precious a right, and not to offend anyone, that France declared herself ready 
to support them in the exercise of so legitimate a right.’41 Yet the British 
remained suspicious and the execution of King Louis XVI by means of the 
guillotine the same month further aroused public opinion in Britain against 
the French revolution. On 28 January the king announced the augmentation 
of his forces: 
for maintaining the security and rights of his own dominions, for support-
ing his allies, and for opposing views of aggrandisement and ambition on 
the part of France, which would be at all times dangerous to the general 
interest of Europe, but are particularly so, when connected with the pro-
pagation of principles which lead to the violation of the most sacred duties, 
and are utterly subversive of the peace and order of all civil society. 
It was after France declared war against Britain and Holland in February 
1793 that Britain engaged in a military campaign against the revolution-
aries.42 Thus the opening of the Scheldt, which in itself was technically a 
casus belli, was not followed by a British declaration of war. Yet imposing 
such principles on conquered land was explained as a threat to the ‘sacred-
ness’ of international treaties, while the French territorial expansion could not 
otherwise be seen as a threat to the general balance of power in Europe. 
It was this final point that was critical to the conservative elite when France 
and Britain made peace in 1802. Again rivers, or at least their control, played 
a central role in the perceived threat. Britain’s new prime minister, Henry 
Addington (1757–1844), took less of a hard line against Napoleon than his 
predecessor. This meant, however, that he had to endure harsh criticism from 
the anti-Jacobin faction inside and outside the House of Commons. In terri-
torial terms, Amiens paid off well for France, both in the colonies and on the 
Continent. In an open letter in the Political Register, a popular conservative 
Whig-supported magazine, the controversial political writer and pamphleteer 
William Cobbett (1763–1835) attacked his prime minister on these peace 
terms. Cobbett was himself disillusioned with the French Revolution after he 
experienced the most horrible atrocities during his stay in France in the 1890s. 
After his return to Britain, he rarely lost an opportunity to spread a message 
of anti-Jacobinism and anti-peace. His attack on the peace terms was one of 
many warnings against France.43 
According to Cobbett the effect of the peace would be a total breakdown of 
British commerce that would ruin the country. After all, 90 per cent of state 
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revenue arose directly or indirectly from commerce: ‘we have no choice. Our 
wants are created; and they must be satisfied, or we cease to exist as an 
independent nation.’44 Cobbett, who would become one of the most influen-
tial anti-Jacobins in the country, argued that Napoleon’s possessions in 
Europe allowed him to abridge British commerce ‘by every means that the 
ingenuity of a rival can invent, and that the malice of an enemy can employ.’ 
Most threatening in this respect, he argued, was France’s control over the 
Continental rivers and the ports of Flanders, Holland, and Germany: ‘By 
your recognition Sir, of the right of France to hold the keys of these countries, 
to retain the command of the Rhine, the Meuse and the Scheldt, you have 
banished for ever from the heart of Europe, the commerce and the influence of 
England.’45 
Cobbett relied heavily on the writings of navy purser John McArthur 
(1755–1840).46 One year before the peace, McArthur had warned against 
France’s ambition to secure the freedom of navigation on the Meuse, the 
Rhine, and the Scheldt. Controlling these rivers, in combination with the 300 
existing navigable rivers and canals in France, would improve the internal 
communication of the country to such an extent that it would be able to 
exclude British trade and manufactures. Furthermore, it was to be expected, 
McArthur continued, that on the return of peace France would start the 
construction of new canals all over the empire. ‘It will give many years of 
employment to at least 50,000 disbanded soldiers.’ 
In fact, rumour had it that the construction of a canal between the Rhine 
and the Danube was already being contemplated. Napoleon was about to 
accomplish what Charlemagne had attempted in vain: bringing the Rhine, the 
Danube, and the whole of the central European riverine basins between the 
North Sea and the Black Sea under his hegemonic control. Such an extended 
inland waterway network would enable the French in times of war to trans-
port, without interruption, ammunition and provisions from one place to 
another. It would connect the hinterland with their ports, allowing them to 
supply their docks with the necessary goods and materials to build a navy.47 
‘In short,’ McArthur warned: 
France would acquire such a gigantic preponderance in the scale of 
nations, that she might, on a future day, become more formidable to the 
liberties of all Europe than she was when in the zenith of her glory and 
prosperity, in the reign of Louis the Fourteenth, or than tyrannical Rome 
in her best times. Indeed the strength of France would become too great 
for any power to resist.48 
William Cobbett agreed and remarked that investors’ confidence in the 
Scheldt becoming the rival of the Thames had increased noticeably, as houses 
in Antwerp had doubled their value since the peace was signed.49 
The explicit reference of McArthur in 1801 to the Roman Empire is telling. 
British conservatives like him regarded the French incorporation of rivers into 
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the Republic as not unlike the practices of the Roman Empire some 1,500 
years before. River systems functioned as natural frontiers that served the 
military defence system. Moreover, the implementation of the principle of 
freedom of navigation for citizens of the riparian states improved internal 
transport and trade conditions. This would stimulate prosperity, but it also 
consolidated French military power by opening internal supply routes to 
naval bases. British conservatives regarded this a security threat, in so far as 
the French would possibly be enabled to develop a navy force. For European 
powers, this development of French self-aggrandisement was a looming threat 
and an imminent economic disaster. 
Economic weight within the European balance of power 
The claim that French river policies were primarily motivated by international 
economic strategic considerations was a British conservative concern that was 
not totally unfounded, given the example of Roman imperial history and, 
more importantly, a 1794 report of the National Convention on fixing the 
Republic’s borders at the Rhine. Theoretically, the project had far-reaching 
strategic and commercial implications.50 With France annexing the entire left 
bank, Austria would be left with the less fertile and geographically less 
advantageous right bank of the river. This would greatly injure Austria’s 
military capacity in the event of a future attack.51 But apart from this strate-
gic consideration, the report paid much more attention to the economic 
benefits and implications of fixing the border at the Rhine. 
Controlling the Rhine provided France with a potentially efficient transport 
road that would benefit commerce. Consequently, increased commercial rela-
tions with the northern countries would consolidate the Republic’s economy. 
To be sure, the report reads, these relations were: 
founded on the circumstance of the free navigation of the Rhine, the 
slightest restriction on which would make the parts of this river which are 
secured to us, of no effect, while the liberty of its entire course renders 
incalculable the profits of its navigation.52 
The Rhine was ‘the most interesting of rivers, the most proper for commu-
nication.’ It flowed through large, fertile, and industrious countries, ‘touching 
with one extremity the soil of liberty,’ i.e. France, ‘and with its principal 
mouth the Ocean.’53 Yet local economic benefit was not to be the sole moti-
vation for France to incorporate the Rhine. The report explicitly pointed out 
that increased commercial relations consolidated the Republic’s commercial 
and political balance within Europe: ‘one of the grand causes which ought to 
induce us to take the Rhine for our frontiers, is, that we should thereby 
appropriate to ourselves the branches of commerce, which are now possessed 
by England.’ France’s main enemy, so the report argued, excited a spirit of 
hatred and rivalry among the electors and princes along the Rhine, in order 
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to maintain and multiply the existing export duties. As long as these duties 
prevailed, mutual exchange and production could not increase. By uniting the 
duchies to France and abolishing the export duties, this problem could finally 
be solved: ‘the Republic will directly enjoy this branch of commerce, to the 
exclusion of her enemies.’ 
Therefore, France’s first objective, according to the 1794 report, should be 
to consolidate the Republic: ‘The happiness and prosperity of France are 
connected with this government. What nations will dare to make an attempt 
upon our safety, or our territory, while we possess such powerful means of 
resistance?’54 The report connected the idea of liberating river navigation with 
increasing internal prosperity. Moreover, since this liberty would be limited to 
citizens of the riparian states only, the rivers would de facto be closed to non-
riparian states, that is, Britain. Incorporating the entire river within the 
French customs zone would be at the expense of British economic dominance. 
When looking closely at the Treaty of The Hague of 1795 it is important to 
note that the principle of freedom of navigation deviated in one essential 
point from Grotius’s understanding of natural law. While Grotius stated that 
freedom of navigation should apply to all people, including those from non-
riparian states, the Treaty stipulated that it would apply to France and the 
Batavian Republic only. In following treaties, such as Campo-Formio, France 
stuck consistently to this adapted version of natural law. This pragmatic 
adaptation reveals that not moral, nor political motives, but economic-stra-
tegic concerns were at the core of French river politics as it excluded com-
mercial nations such as Britain to the benefit of the local traders in the 
riparian states. Around the turn of the century, the revolutionary fight against 
the barbaric past had become as much a strategic imperative to improve 
France’s economic weight within the European balance of power. 
The failed attempt of a ‘liberal’ Rhine regime under Napoleon 
Just after the turn of the century the French Revolutionary principles, though 
recognised on paper, had not yet been brought into practice and merchant 
complaints about the limitations of Rhine navigation increased. The tradi-
tional staple rights of Cologne and Mainz came under severe attack. On both 
banks of the river pamphlets appeared that insisted on a thorough reform of 
the regulations of commerce and navigation.55 Part of the problem was that 
now that the French border ran parallel to the Rhine’s, the customs border 
had shifted accordingly. In practice this meant that skippers paid customs on 
the left, French, bank of the river, whereas they did not on the right bank. 
Furthermore, on the right bank new towpaths were under construction. 
Consequently, the right bank towns had an advantage that the left bank 
towns on French territory did not. Poverty, inactivity, and mendicancy were 
already everyday business, but if nothing changed, one of the pamphleteers 
urged, the larger cities of Koblenz, Mainz, and Cologne would also lose their 
industries and their prosperity.56 
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A toll administrator in Trier on the Moselle acknowledged that the toll 
system along the Rhine needed to be reformed.57 He observed that tolls were 
levied to provide lords along the Rhine with an income, instead of enabling 
the improvement of shipping by maintaining the towpaths and the channel in 
good condition. In addition, tolls should be moderate and levied in a simple 
way that prevented chicanery and arbitrariness.58 The large number of tolls 
and the inefficient mode of levying them hampered business. The commercial 
committee of Strasbourg complained about the lack of uniformity: ‘it is on 
the number, or weight, or species, or quantity, that toll collection is based, 
and often on all four at once. The political opinion, known or presumed, of 
the boatman, determines in certain respects the determination of the right.’59 
If nothing changed, the new French departments would not only lose more 
than 1.5 million francs of tax income annually, but it would mean the loss of 
the means of existence for many families, the pamphleteer warned. Rhine 
commerce was the only means of survival for boatmen, caulkers, ropers, loa-
ders, wheelwrights, marshals, and innkeepers, to name just a few. The French 
Republic, ‘mistress and absolute sovereign of the left bank of the Rhine,’ 
60could never allow such a sacrifice. 
The return of peace in 1801–1802 enabled the pamphleteers to take up the 
pen, but they wanted to make themselves heard mostly in view of a new 
French-German trade agreement that was to follow upon the mediatisation 
and secularisation of a large number of imperial domains along the Rhine. 
The pamphleteers clearly shared an interest in, and underlined in similar 
ways, the urgency of liberating Rhine navigation. With the objective of put-
ting the issue on the political agenda, they all referred to the system not 
merely as not belonging to the current enlightened and civilised times, but 
also as an anarchic organisation, based on arbitrariness and abuse of power. 
If the two countries would not pick up the fight against this medieval bar-
barity, Rhine commerce would almost certainly be destroyed and it would 
bring cities, societies, and countries down with it into the abyss. 
This frightful image was a neat reproduction of how the Revolutionaries 
pictured their fight, as a struggle against the feudalistic past. As a result, the 
demands were not only listened to, but also given due attention. After the 
enforced territorial and political restructuring of the Holy Roman Empire in 
1803, France and the Empire finally came to a definite reorganisation of the 
Rhine administration. The Rhine Octroi Convention of 1804 imposed a 
complete reorganisation of the toll system on the Rhine from the Swiss to the 
Dutch border, the part of the river that came to be called the ‘conventional 
Rhine.’61 It entailed a far-reaching simplification of the toll system. The 
number of toll stations was reduced from 30 to 12, and tariffs were fixed. In 
addition, it eliminated the historical ‘rights of staple’ of Mainz and Cologne. 
Furthermore, the German and the French riparian states were obligated to 
keep the towpaths on their territories in good conditions and an independent 
police force supervised the navigation. Two juridical bodies, an annually 
convening court of appeal, and a permanent commission consisting of a 
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General Director and two inspectors settled disputes regarding levies and 
police regulations. Finally, in a most revolutionary act, the French govern-
ment and the archchancellor established an independent and neutral Central 
Octroi Administration, with its seat in Mainz, that supervised toll collection 
and the navigability of the river and issued regulations that were legally 
binding for all.62 Never before had the organisation of a river running 
between several sovereign countries been based on such a high level of coop-
eration. And never before had such an organisation culminated with the 
creation of a supranational institution that had the means to impose the 
principle of freedom of navigation by force. Quickly the advantages of free-
dom of navigation became clear as traffic rose by up to 400 per cent of the 
pre-Revolutionary norm.63 
Yet Napoleon quickly substituted the moral determination to settle the 
accounts with the feudal ‘barbaric’ past on the Rhine with a pragmatic incli-
nation to secure the political destiny of his empire within Europe. In 1805 
Napoleon suffered an embarrassing naval defeat at the Battle of Trafalgar. 
After 15 years of war he concluded that the conflict could not be ended on 
the battlefield. Napoleon took the radical decision to sacrifice the interests of 
trade and to conquer the British by means of an economic war. Therefore, he 
returned in 1806 to the core of the 1794 project of the National Convention: 
that is, capturing commerce to the disadvantage of Britain. Yet this time the 
objective was not to implement French control over the rivers alone. This 
time Napoleon would bring into effect a large-scale embargo by shutting off 
all the Continental seaports he controlled to British trade. He targeted the 
heart of the British Empire: the resource that paid for the troops, the navy, 
and the subsidies for its allies. By hitting the foundation of Britain’s power, its 
commercial prosperity, Napoleon attacked Britain’s position within Europe’s 
balance of power. 
Consequently, the Continental System played havoc with international 
trade, and Rhine trade collapsed. With regard to France’s strategy of (eco-
nomic) warfare, inland waterways still functioned as roads that could ease 
internal trade and traffic. Yet with all the Continental seaports blocked, not 
much trade was going on. Moreover, there was no money for improving the 
inland waterways, and the construction of canals was discontinued. By 1807 
river policy was pushed to the background and river governance was put on 
the back burner. In 1810, after the annexation of the Netherlands and the 
transfer of the German Octroi rights to Napoleon, the emperor officially 
proclaimed the Rhine a domestic river. For several years its entire course was 
subject to one national administration, albeit it in a dormant condition. 
After Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig in 1813 rivers became increasingly sub-
jected to military as well as economic warfare. That year the Franco-German 
part of the river was placed under German authority and the Rhine Octroi 
was restored. From the same year the Dutch part of the Rhine fell under the 
authority of the new sovereign ruler of the Netherlands, Willem I. One of his 
first political acts was to reintroduce the old Rhine tolls. Local taxes also 
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returned in several German regions, as did the staple rights in Mainz and 
Cologne. By 1814 France was losing the war. Even before the start of the peace 
talks, the Rhine regime was on the brink of falling back into the anarchic 
constellation of pre-Revolutionary Europe.64 
Once again European statesmen faced the negative consequences of an 
abusive river regime. Yet this time they had the internationally acknowl-
edged legal principle of freedom of navigation to fall back on. What is more, 
the Octroi Administration functioned as a valuable example of how to 
establish an international organisation that was able to operationalise such a 
legal principle. More than anything, European statesmen were determined 
to end once and for all the cycle of fragmentary and hegemonic scenarios 
that had generated conflict and poverty along their international rivers for 
too long. 
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2 The balance of power and the system 
of commerce before and after Vienna 
(1814–1815)1 
Introduction 
The strategic role that rivers and the principle of freedom of navigation had 
played in the French expansionist policies did not result in an unambiguous 
rejection of the principle after the Napoleonic wars had ended; quite the 
contrary, the victorious nations embraced it – albeit under totally different 
conditions. Freedom of navigation on international rivers became part of a 
broader Allied plan for peace and security in post-Napoleonic Europe. This 
plan found its practical origins in a resolute rejection of the imperial rivalry 
scenario that had frustrated the efficient allocation of Europe’s largest river’s 
resources. By looking at the (non-revolutionary) philosophical origins of, and 
the contribution of non-state actors to, the new European river policy, this 
chapter shows how, despite the very different national interests among the 
Great Powers and the riparian states, the negotiations during the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815 resulted in a revolutionary form of multilateral cooperation 
and the formal establishment of the Central Commission for the Navigation 
of the Rhine. 
A pushy appeal 
It must have felt as if he were back in the game. When, in early January 1814, 
Johann Joseph Eichhoff (1762–1827) heard that allied forces under Prussian 
leadership had crossed the Rhine, he did not hesitate to have his son in 
Cologne reach out to the new rulers and offer his services. Eichhoff himself 
was still in Paris, where he had retained the title of General Director of the 
Octroi Administration. Although he had not been able to execute his duties 
over the past years for a number of reasons, he hoped the arrival of the allied 
forces might get him back in the saddle. 
Eichhoff was an intriguing and talented man. In the 1780s, while holding 
the position of chef for the prince-elector Max Friedrich in Bonn, he mana-
ged to study law and economics, and learned to speak French fluently when 
he was sent multiple times to Paris to get acquainted with French cuisine. In 
addition, he appreciated the fine arts. Ludwig van Beethoven was one of his 
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closest friends, and it is probably through him and his mentor in the fine arts, 
Eulogius Schneider, professor of literature at the University of Bonn, that he 
became familiar with Enlightenment ideas and the cause of the French 
Revolution. But it was only after a violent dispute in 1789 that the French 
discovered his talents. Reportedly, Eichhoff had stabbed one of his colleagues 
with a kitchen knife, and escaped to Strasbourg and Paris, where he even-
tually was appointed supervisor of the administration of the Electorate of 
Cologne on the left side of the Rhine. At the turn of the century his career in 
the administration of the Rhineland under French rule accelerated. He first 
became municipal councillor, then mayor, and in 1802 even vice prefect of the 
arrondissement of Bonn. In 1804, however, he was suddenly discharged from 
this position because Napoleon himself had received a poor impression of 
him while visiting the city that year, disliking the way Eichhoff put on airs, 
given he had been merely a simple chef. That he fell off his horse during a 
joint ride certainly did not increase Napoleon’s esteem for the man. In 1805 
the French appointed him inspector on the left side of the Rhine of the newly 
established Rhine Octroi Administration. That was a position challenging 
enough for his talents to flourish, while humble enough to keep his 
pretentious behaviour in check, at least for the time being.2 
In the final years of Bonaparte’s reign Eichhoff held the highest position of 
General Director of the Octroi, controlling the entire navigable Rhine, yet he 
witnessed his big plans for the Rhine river go up in smoke. Napoleon had 
turned the river into an exclusively French asset. Rhine toll revenues went 
straight to the treasury and little was allocated to keeping the conditions for 
navigation sufficient. Towpaths on the non-French side were simply left to 
decay. Imperial customs hampered the free movement of goods among the 
riparian states, while contraband only slightly made up for this loss of tran-
sit.3 On top of that, the Continental System was slowly but effectively suffo-
cating international commerce and navigation. The Rhine was a mere shadow 
of what it once was, while Eichhoff sat in Paris and could not do anything. 
In addition to the miserable maritime conditions of the Rhine, Eichhoff 
himself faced charges of self-enrichment and mismanagement that seriously 
complicated his work. Once again, his authoritarian and arrogant behaviour 
had led to strong animosity, this time from the merchant class along the Rhine. 
Instead of promoting the interests of commerce and navigation, the mayors and 
chambers of commerce of Mainz and Cologne argued that Eichhoff merely 
advanced his own interests by introducing regulations that enabled him to rule 
in an absolutist way over the Rhine skippers.4 The reports of irregularities were 
serious enough for the French government to intervene and it twice sent an 
investigating commissioner to Mainz and other Rhine cities. In 1812, Eichhoff 
was even suspended from his position, but with the Russian campaign in full 
swing the investigations against him were temporarily suspended. The crossing 
of the Rhine by the allied forces at the end of 1813 thus not merely ushered in 
the downfall of the French Empire, but also nullified all investigations and 
allegations made against Eichhoff in the previous years.5 
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His first approach via his son to the Prussians in January 1814 failed. The 
Prussian and allied authorities had other, more urgent, matters on their minds 
and probably did not even reply to Eichhoff’s call. Still, that did not dis-
courage him from presenting himself once again three months later. Only days 
after Paris had fallen, none other than the Prussian reformer Baron vom Stein 
himself, head of the temporary allied administration of the liberated areas, 
and Chancellor Karl August Hardenberg received extensive letters.6 In these 
letters Eichhoff emerged as a true advocate of a liberal Rhine regime. He 
explained that local authorities were starting to take advantage of the current 
circumstances. They erected new tolling stations or abused in other ways their 
sovereign powers to generate extra income. Eichhoff drew a threatening pic-
ture of the Rhine deteriorating to its medieval regime, describing a patchwork 
of local regulations, privileges, and toll collection systems: ‘In short, what was 
called the Rhine supervision was really only a bizarre and disgraceful assem-
blage of the old feudal anarchy.’ Eichhoff warned Hardenberg that shutting 
down the central Rhine authority of the Octroi, as it had existed under his 
leadership between 1809 and 1813, would be fatal both to Rhine commerce 
and to the treasuries of the future ‘princes who own the Rhine.’ Finally, he 
requested the installation of a commission, consisting of representatives of the 
riparian states, to have a new regime designed on the basis of the existing 
Octroi, and to be submitted for approval to the high contracting parties.7 
Targeting the Prussians was a tactical move. In view of its war efforts and 
its current military positions along the river, Eichhoff expected that Prussia 
could count on becoming an important Rhine state after the future peace 
settlement.8 Furthermore, Stein and Hardenberg had been the illustrious 
minds behind the liberal reform of the Prussian economy after Prussia’s 
defeat against Napoleon in 1806. If Eichhoff could persuade these two men to 
support his plans, there might be a chance that a new liberal wind would 
empower the administration of this mighty river. Not unimportantly, Eichhoff 
was truly ambitious for the prestigious and undoubtedly well-paid position of 
General Director of a future Rhine administration. Perhaps Eichhoff had one 
other reason to contact Stein. He was not a real Prussian. In fact, he was 
born and raised in an old family of Imperial Knights along the Rhine and the 
appendicular Lahn. Whether it was Stein’s special connection with the river 
or not, it was him, and not Hardenberg, who wrote back to Eichhoff, albeit in 
a concise and resolute manner. On 20 May he replied that the nature of the 
future administration of the Rhine was still to be determined. For the time 
being it was placed under the authority of Count Friedrich Christian Solms-
Laubach (1769–1822), and therefore Eichhoff’s services were not required.9 
Only ten days later, on 30 May 1814, the Allies ended the Sixth Coalition 
War against Napoleon with the Paris Peace Treaty. Most articles of the treaty 
dealt with territorial issues, but remarkably article V postulated that ‘The 
navigation of the Rhine, from the point where it becomes navigable unto the 
sea, and vice versa, shall be free, so that it can be interdicted to no one.’10 
What is more, it stipulated that at the upcoming Congress in Vienna, the 
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Figure 2.1 Portrait of Johann Joseph Eichhoff 
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European powers were to decide on everything regarding the navigation of 
the Rhine and ideally would also figure out how to introduce the principle of 
freedom of navigation on all other European rivers that crossed borders. At 
this point Eichhoff left Paris and withdrew to his cottage. There he enter-
tained a certain optimism regarding the upcoming Peace Congress and turned 
to writing a memorandum on the navigation of the Rhine that was not merely 
addressed to the Great Powers, but to the people of Europe as a whole.11 
Freedom of navigation as a European principle 
In the run-up to Vienna, two distinguished views of the political economy of 
Europe existed. One perspective is what David Hume called, back in 1758, 
‘jealousy of trade.’12 It is a view in which the economic progress of neigh-
bouring states is considered in suspicious terms, especially because it is 
believed that their development comes at the expense of one’s own. In addi-
tion, commercial competition could also be a stepping-stone to war, as the 
Dutch-English wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had clearly 
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shown. The ‘jealousy of trade’ view was developed as an argument against 
British global dominance that depended on its maritime commerce between 
the colonies, and between the colonies and Europe. 
The ‘jealousy of trade’ perspective relates to theories of international 
market competition in which the success of a state in international trade 
becomes a matter of its military and political survival.13 The conviction that 
international commerce was the fundament of the nation’s power was wide-
spread, and when France seemed to extend its control over the most impor-
tant European rivers around the turn of the century or when it implemented 
the Continental System in 1807, British pamphleteers considered this a real 
threat to the nation and to Europe; as McArthur wrote on the Peace of 
Amiens: ‘there can be little security in peace for the commerce of Great 
Britain, or for the tranquillity of the continental powers.’ 
In opposition to this view, a more optimistic understanding of trade within 
the European political economy developed in the years around the turn of the 
century. A type of economic liberalism became increasingly mainstream, espe-
cially among those who benefited from the industrialisation process that ensued 
in Britain. Back in 1776 the Scottish economist and philosopher Adam Smith 
insisted, in what would become his most famous work The Wealth of Nations, 
on the abolition of monopolies and other restraints on the transportation of 
goods.14 Rather than being a threat, Smith believed that growing commerce 
contributed to the improvement of the country. Wherever it could prosper: 
commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good gov-
ernment, and with them the liberty and security of individuals, among the 
inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual 
state of war with their neighbours and of servile dependency upon their 
superiors.15 
Rivers, Smith explicitly noted, played a not unimportant part in providing 
societies with prosperity, also historically speaking. After all, ‘inland naviga-
tion was probably one of the principal causes of the early improvement of 
Egypt.’ The Nile had provided ancient Egypt with an infrastructure that 
connected large towns with villages and farmhouses in the country, ‘nearly in 
the same manner as the Rhine and the Maese do in Holland at present.’16 
Yet Smith also believed that order and tranquillity were essential require-
ments for commerce to prosper: ‘In all countries where there is tolerable 
security, every man of common understanding will endeavour to employ 
whatever stock he can command in procuring either present enjoyment or 
future profit.’17 In other words, Smith used the term ‘security’ both to indicate 
the environment in which commerce can develop and to signify the societal 
consequence of well-developed commerce. Even though Smith’s reasoning is 
not clear when it comes to cause and effect, it is evident that he equated 
security, or the sense of security, with personal freedom, and believed that 
personal freedom depended on order and good government.18 
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It is doubtful whether Smith actually saw increasing economic connections 
between peoples as a pacifying force within the international realm, such as 
the French philosophers Montesquieu and Jean-Francois Melon had argued 
earlier in the eighteenth century.19 Whereas theoretically this might be the 
case, in practice Smith saw that economic interests could not fully restrain the 
passions of men, nor of nations. Within nation-states the social institution of 
the market and supporting public institutions might guide men’s passions 
towards virtue. However, considering the mercantilist spirit of his times, 
Smith was pessimistic about the establishment of institutions in the interna-
tional realm: ‘Commerce, which ought naturally to be, among nations, as 
among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most 
fertile source of discord and animosity.’20 In his mind, international affairs 
would always be driven by ‘the skill of that insidious and crafty animal, vul-
garly called a statesman or politician, whose councils are directed by the 
momentary fluctuations of affairs.’21 
In fact, when Smith mentioned the contemporary situation along the Rhine 
in the above quote, he consciously referred to the associated benefits for 
Holland and Holland alone, as he could clearly observe that the intended 
advantages were not transmitted to the riparian states higher up the Rhine. 
Smith did not fail to observe that international river transportation depended 
on the whims of rulers: 
The commerce besides which any nation can carry on by means of a 
river … which runs into another territory before it reaches the sea, can 
never be very considerable; because it is always in the power of the 
nations who possess that other territory to obstruct the communication 
between the upper country and the sea.22 
In the course of the French Revolution other thinkers came to a more opti-
mistic conclusion when it came to the pacifying qualities of free international 
commerce. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) concluded in Project for a Perpetual 
Peace that ‘It is the spirit of commerce that sooner or later takes hold of 
every nation, and is incompatible with war.’23 Expanding trade relations, so 
Kant believed, increased interdependence among nations, as it created a basis 
for the ‘interest in the security of peaceful relations through mutual gain.’24 
Likewise, in 1791 the British-American philosopher and revolutionary 
Thomas Paine (1737–1809) noted in his book The Rights of Man in a chapter 
called ‘Ways and Means of Improving the Condition of Europe’ that free 
international commerce would simply ‘extirpate the system of war’25 and 
could ‘unite mankind by rendering nations, as well as individuals, useful to 
each other.’26 
According to these thinkers, international trade was not to be understood 
as a zero-sum game. It provided prosperity for all trading nations, as there 
was no cheaper way (not even by waging war) to procure for oneself the 
required materials for manufacturing and commerce. On the one hand, Paine 
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observed that peace enabled commerce to take its natural course and prosper, 
but on the other hand, he also believed that prospering commerce reinforced 
peace among nations. Quite explicitly he seems to have believed that free 
trade would automatically result in a rightful distribution of wealth among 
the nations, as he wrote: ‘The great support of commerce consists in the 
balance being a level of benefits among all nations.’27 
A position strikingly similar to those of Paine and Kant in this specific 
regard, albeit from a strict anti-revolutionary point of view, was the one taken 
by Friedrich Gentz in 1800. Gentz had been a student of Kant and would 
become an important Prussian diplomat, secretary to Metternich, and ‘vir-
tually the spiritus rector’ of the Vienna Congress.28 In On the State of Europe 
Gentz pictured the British as an example to the rest of Europe. It was not 
British maritime power but the revolution that had brought the European 
state system into danger. It was true that commerce was more beneficial to 
some states than to others. Britain, Holland, and France profited particularly, 
while Germany, Russia, and Poland had done much less so. Ultimately, 
commerce would not lead to an absolute equality among nations, Gentz 
stated. Such inequalities also affected the general balance, as other social 
improvements would have done. Yet it was not the case that commerce had 
remained the exclusive property of one or a few states. Neither was it the case, 
therefore, that it had brought only to these privileged states a higher degree of 
civilisation and wealth, which allowed them to rule in a despotic way over the 
left-over countries that were eventually thrown back into barbarism, poverty, 
and relative weakness. Instead, every nation had participated in commerce. 
Again, Gentz noted, not every state had benefited from it in the same degree, 
but ‘it is not possible that this system should have been a cause of the general 
decay, or total dissolution of the federative constitution.’29 
This was, according to Gentz, also true for France: ‘We have … often seen 
her rise quickly from the severest blows received from England, and reclaim 
with successful energy what she had for a moment been deprived of.’ Free 
trade, therefore, could be a means to establish peaceful interstate relations. 
Commerce, Gentz claimed implicitly, contributed to some sort of automatic 
counterbalancing effect, as there were always several countries endowed with 
good government, a native industry, and a ‘good and civil character’ that 
were in the running for dominance. This competition ensured variety and 
activity in trade relations and guaranteed the other nations the absence of one 
abusive power. The system of commerce, Gentz wrote, added a distinct bal-
ance of maritime and commercial states within the general balance of 
Europe.30 Pamphleteers differed in their opinion as to whether the system of 
commerce was a threat to Europe (or to individual states) or a blessing, but 
they agreed that trade had become part of a power struggle, part of what set 
‘the great machine of government’ in motion.31 
In the Treaty of Paris in 1814 the European powers decreed that the navi-
gation of the Rhine should be free, and could be interdicted to no one. This 
meant that the ancient staple rights and the shipping monopolies would be 
42 Power and commerce before and after Vienna 
abolished. It also stipulated that the future Congress in Vienna was to reg-
ulate the dues to be levied by the riparian states ‘in the mode the most 
impartial, and the most favourable to the commerce of all nations.’32 Finally, 
the future Congress in Vienna should also examine and determine how the 
principle of free navigation could be extended to other European rivers with a 
view to ‘facilitate the communications between nations, and continually to 
render them less strangers to each other.’33 Clearly, the contracting parties 
aimed at establishing the norm of equal treatment for the trade of all nations. 
The latter clause appears to indicate that the European powers understood 
the facilitation of increasing economic connections between peoples as a 
further pacifying force in the international realm. The last phrase even seems to 
evoke Kant’s and  Paine’s free-trade theories on peace. It resonated with Paine’s 
belief in the soothing force of intensified international communication during 
which countries lost ‘the awkwardness of strangers, and the moroseness of 
suspicion,’ and learned ‘to know and understand each other.’34 
The future Congress in Vienna was to result in ‘a system of a real and 
sustainable equilibrium in Europe.’35 And, in the spirit of Thomas Paine, a 
natural distribution of wealth and a dense international network of inter-
dependencies established by new norms and regulations that secure equal 
treatment might, like the territorial rearrangements, contribute to this Eur-
opean equilibrium. The articles on the freedom of Rhine navigation and the 
freedom of navigation on international rivers as such were already fully 
completed in one of the earlier drafts of the Paris Peace Treaty. This indicates 
that the European powers needed little time to finalise these stipulations.36 Yet 
it would be too straightforward to conclude that such a swift Great Power 
agreement on the measures that were to be taken on the Rhine reflected 
a consensus on the projected goals, let alone the interests at play of the 
individual Powers. 
Allied cooperation and Dutch ambivalence to opening up the 
European rivers 
Most surprising perhaps was the British stance with respect to free navigation 
on international rivers such as the Scheldt in 1814. According to the British 
Foreign Secretary Castlereagh (1769–1822), the opening of the Scheldt was a 
matter of course as ‘[u]pon no rational principle ought such a noble river as 
the Scheldt to be shut to the blessings of commerce.’37 The British statesman 
justified this liberal objective with an appeal to reason and common law as 
structuring principles of the new European order. This was strikingly different 
from the position taken by his predecessors who always had been ‘on the side 
of an unjust commercial restriction, viewing the question entirely from a 
political, not an economic, point of view,’ as a legal scholar observed more 
than 100 years later.38 At the same time, the position was remarkably similar 
to the justifications of the French revolutionaries for breaking open the 
Scheldt 22 years earlier, justifications that had technically constituted a casus 
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belli for Britain. What had happened? Had Britain’s opinion changed so 
radically? 
In 1792 the opening of the Scheldt had been advertised as a violation of the 
‘sacredness of international treaties.’ It is true that the British regarded and 
continued to regard international treaties as the foundation of the political 
system of Europe. Their neglect resulted in unpredictability and thus insecur-
ity. Yet by 1814 the effects of the Industrial Revolution became manifest and 
the British increasingly advocated for the liberalisation of international navi-
gation.39 It is also true that the issue of the Scheldt had always been a rather 
ambiguous threat to Britain. The problem back in 1792 was not the intro-
duction of the principle of freedom of navigation as such, but the fact that the 
French applied it to the riparian states only. This was an attempt to gain 
exclusive navigation rights on the rivers within the empire, to the commercial 
exclusion of Britain. Moreover, French control of the river was ultimately a 
military move enabling Antwerp to become a naval base in close proximity to 
Britain. It is in this light that Britain backed free navigation of international 
rivers and had the words ‘for all nations’ explicitly included in the first clause 
of article V of the Treaty of Paris. Free Rhine navigation should contribute to 
increasing commerce, including British commerce. To stipulate the principle 
in this sense could prevent British exclusion on Continental rivers for good 
and safeguard their commerce and influence in the heart of Europe.40 
In addition, the French were much involved when it came to the stipula-
tions on freedom of navigation. In fact, it had been the French minister 
Talleyrand who had insisted on their insertion in the Paris Peace Treaty. His 
initial proposal had in part been even more far-reaching, reflecting Hugo 
Grotius’s understanding, as ‘the above provisions [free navigation on trans-
boundary waterways] can be extended to all navigable streams and rivers in 
all the countries of Christendom in Europe.’41 For the other contracting par-
ties this stipulation was a bridge too far, as it opened their internal rivers to 
foreign vessels and demanded equal treatment of foreign goods as well, 
thereby reducing the sovereign powers of a nation over its internal navigable 
waterways. Nevertheless, France could live with the final formulation of the 
article. In fact, when King Louis XVIII wrote to his representatives in Vienna 
a few months later the instructions were clear: 
As to the rights of navigation on the Rhine and the Scheldt, as they 
ought to be the same for all, France has nothing to desire, except that 
they should be very moderate. By the free navigation of the Rhine and 
the Scheldt, France will acquire the advantages that it also enjoyed when 
it possessed the countries through which these rivers flowed, and to which 
she has renounced, and will not have the burdens of possession. She will 
therefore no longer reasonably regret it.42 
In April 1814 the Prussian Chancellor Hardenberg envisioned in his ambi-
tious memorandum ‘Plan for the future arrangements of Europe,’ among 
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other things, the annexation of both Westphalia and the Rhineland to Prus-
sia. To breathe new life into these territories along the Rhine, it was essential 
to connect them with distant markets by establishing liberal regulations for 
Rhine navigation. Prussia, therefore, was greatly interested in the introduction 
of a moderate toll system as well, and it was more than happy to sacrifice the 
ancient privileges of the city of Cologne for increased commerce and naviga-
tion.43 Yet in March the Prussian statesman and administrator of the liber-
ated territories, Stein, noted that, as gatekeeper of the Rhine, Dutch 
cooperation was essential to open up the river. Without their cooperation, a 
renewed regime on the conventional Rhine would bring little benefit to com-
merce. In fact, if the Netherlands continued levying tolls on their part of the 
Rhine, free navigation on the German parts would merely lead to major dis-
advantages for Germany. Stein therefore insisted on a quick arrangement with 
the Dutch sovereign ‘to encourage him to adopt a corresponding toll system 
44on the Lower Rhine.’ 
However, the Netherlands was not an official participant in the negotia-
tions in Paris. Its government had not ratified the peace treaty and was never 
asked about the principle of freedom of navigation on international rivers. At 
this point the Dutch sovereign was not at all enthusiastic about the enforce-
ment of such all-embracing European measures. In a memo the Dutch gov-
ernment addressed the common-law argument of the Allies that justified the 
opening of the Scheldt rather sneeringly:45 ‘we hope that, in the spirit of jus-
tice that drives them, the Allies will be equally willing to allow to the Pro-
vinces of Holland to fully take advantage of their natural position which 
assures them of good commerce.’ ‘Today,’ the memo goes on, 
the Allies seem to think that it is something against reason and against 
common law to see a country profit in its own interest from the means 
that were provided by nature to impede the commerce of others … But is 
that really the case? Isn’t it the local situation in Denmark that allowed 
the kingdom to establish a right to toll in the Sond that is recognised by 
the foreign powers? Was the closure of the Black Sea by the Turks 
regarded as such a violation of the rights of nations that the entire 
Christian world believed it to be its duty to oppose it?46 
Moreover, neither Austria nor the other countries on the Danube profited 
from free commerce. ‘And did Prussia ever have, or even demanded, freedom 
of navigation on [the Dutch part of the Rhine] the Waal?’ the memo asked. 
The Dutch called the Allied demand for free navigation as a matter of natural 
law into question and challenged the claim of its healing effects for Europe. 
Instead, they claimed that it was justified for any sovereign state to protect its 
national advantages, even if these did not align with a collective plan for the 
new European order. The new Dutch nation clearly hoped for some kind of 
compensation for the inevitable lifting of the blockade on the Scheldt, but it 
also wanted to make a point of its newly acquired sovereign power. 
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The instructions to the Dutch representative in Vienna reveal that the 
Netherlands was not against a reorganisation of the Rhine regime at all. 
‘Article 5 … will undoubtedly elicit highly interesting discussions for Hol-
land,’ the Foreign Secretary Anne Willem Carel Van Nagell (1756–1851) 
wrote in August 1814. He welcomed the proposed standardisation of the 
duties on navigation and agreed that such a measure could be beneficial for 
the development of trade, not the least of all for the Netherlands. ‘Everything 
that makes the Rhine more expensive, enhances the attractiveness of the 
Weser and the Elbe, and that might result in a significant reduction of 
the current expedition [in the Netherlands].’ Therefore, Van Nagell argued, 
the riparian states should introduce a fairly low, uniform, and fixed rate that 
improved the competitiveness of Rhine navigation. In addition, the con-
centration of the tolling stations into a single office could yield significant 
timesaving. Yet the transit duties, Van Nagell warned, should be excluded 
from any agreement in Vienna. They should remain subject to the rule of the 
national sovereign exclusively, because any state should be able to intervene 
when, as a result of fluctuations in the dimension of expedition, revenues of 
the transit duties declined.47 
The special position of the Netherlands as a bulwark and pivot within the 
new collective security system was clear to the Allied Powers. This also had 
consequences for their share in the deliberations on the future of the Rhine. 
In December 1814 the Allied Powers appointed in Vienna an ad hoc River 
Congress Committee that was charged with the implementation of article V of 
the Paris Peace Treaty. The representatives of Prussia, Britain, France, and 
Austria were asked to prepare the deliberations, but on the initiative of 
Russia, and with the approval of the rest, the other riparian states, including 
the Netherlands, were asked to join. In this period the Netherlands was con-
sidered one of the larger powers of the Continent. Apart from the so-called 
first-rank powers, Prussia, Russia, Austria, Britain, and potentially France, 
the Netherlands would rank as the largest of the secondary powers.48 Conse-
quently, the Prussian delegates in Vienna regarded the Netherlands as a far 
more important business partner than France, especially when it came to the 
Rhine. In a confidential note the Prussian representatives documented that if 
a central authority to secure the freedom of navigation on the Rhine was to 
be installed after the Congress, it was more important to include the Nether-
lands in such a body than France, a country that controlled only a tiny stretch 
of the navigable Rhine.49 
The Dutch representative accepted the invitation to join the ad hoc River 
Congress Committee, in line with the instructions to get involved in the reor-
ganisation plans.50 Yet his superiors in The Hague expected him to act cau-
tiously. Free navigation on the Rhine sounded like a great idea, Van Nagell 
wrote in January 1815, but no one knew whether these ‘theories’ would actually 
work out well; they were, after all, without precedent. Be that as it may, the 
Dutch reticence might well be explained by the political situation of the time. 
In Vienna there was still no certainty about the territories the Netherlands 
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would gain.51 Either the Dutch sovereign still hoped to gain the lands along the 
Rhine up to Mainz as he had demanded, and thought of an international 
Rhine regime based on cooperation as a second-best option, or the Dutch 
preferred to wait until territorial composition and political autonomy were 
assured, so as to face the most important Rhine partner, Prussia, as an equal.52 
By February 1815 the last stumbling block for Dutch participation in the 
River Congress Committee that was about to start its deliberations had dis-
appeared. The Congress had reached an agreement on the territorial compo-
sition and administrative structure of the Netherlands. The new country 
incorporated almost the entire Austrian Netherlands and the Prince-Bishopric 
Liege. The Dutch sovereign received the title of King of the Netherlands and 
Duke of Luxemburg.53 Yet Dutch ambitions to incorporate a longer stretch 
of the Rhine into the kingdom failed. Instead the Prussians received large 
territories along the Rhine, becoming instantly a major Rhine state. This 
meant that the Dutch representative needed to enter into negotiations on the 
future Rhine regime with his peers, the representatives of Prussia, France, 
Baden, Bavaria, Nassau, and Hesse-Darmstadt. 
Humboldt and Eichhoff at the River Congress Committee in Vienna 
The sometimes strongly opposing interests were not very promising conditions 
for the negotiations about the future Rhine regime in the spring of 1815. 
Moreover, the accompanying ignorance regarding the matter at hand made it 
even more difficult. The representatives lacked expert, sometimes even basic, 
knowledge and diplomatic back-up. 
In the first session it immediately became clear that the Prussian and 
French representatives were much better prepared for the negotiations than 
the other participants. The French Minister Plenipotentiary, the Duke of 
Dalberg (1773–1833), and the Prussian representative, Wilhelm von Hum-
boldt (1767–1835), presented very similar projects based on the liberal prin-
ciples of the Napoleonic Octroi Administration.54 In the second session the 
smaller riparian states, including the Netherlands, were invited to air their 
views. France and Prussia, it appeared, were proponents of a centralised 
administration guarding the freedom of Rhine navigation, but the smaller 
German riparian states rejected such a permanent central authority.55 
According to the Dutch delegate to the River Congress Committee, Gerrit 
Karel van Spaen de Voorstonden (1756–1841), almost everyone in the ad hoc 
committee felt that Prussia, represented by the supposedly liberal Von Hum-
boldt, was not willing to conform to a centralised or permanent administra-
tion itself once it was established. The smaller riparian states were afraid of 
Prussian dominance within such a central authority, argued Van Spaen. 
‘Nominally Prussia wants to commit itself to mutual obligations, but not in 
practice!’56 Although most riparian states recognised the need of a new 
regime, the smaller states were wary of a central authority that could become 
a hegemonic tool of the most powerful riparian state. 
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Van Spaen, too, feared Prussian dominance and openly attacked Von 
Humboldt’s plan to establish a strong executive body for governing the Rhine. 
Unless the Netherlands received a larger say in such a body, commensurate with 
its importance in controlling the Rhine delta, Van Spaen stated, he would reject 
any such proposals.57 Von Humboldt, however, ignored the Dutch demand and 
stated that a central authority could only operate effectively if it had a strong 
directorate. Interestingly, the Dutch resistance coincided with scepticism from 
the other smaller riparian states. They understood the future administration not 
only as a tool to secure freedom of navigation on the Rhine,58 but also as a 
possible threat to their national sovereignty. The most outspoken in this regard 
was the representative of Baden, Baron von Berckheim (1774–1849). After 
more than 20 years of French dominance he was tired of the ‘fake authorities’ 
that were in their executive power merely tools of powerful states taking 
advantage of the weaker ones. 
It would be … extremely useless, and even dangerous, to give such an 
administration more powers … because a state, chastised by all other 
fellow states, that cannot fulfil one of the assumed duties, would neither 
allow, if it has bayonets, that domestic law is determined by a foreign 
authority.59 
Due to the continuing opposition of the smaller German states and the 
Netherlands, no majority could be found for the constitution of a central and 
permanent authority with far-reaching powers. Instead, the smaller riparian 
states suggested that the Commission would primarily be a consultative body, 
which might also act as a court of appeal in matters of Rhine navigation. 
This would ensure that any new regulations regarding the liberalisation of 
Rhine navigation and the harmonisation of the tax system would only be 
implemented with the consent of all riparian states.60 Humboldt, who was the 
driving force behind the River Congress Committee, took up the pen to 
redact a new version of the plan for the future Rhine regime that was also 
supported by the smaller Rhine states. 
The River Congress Committee consisted of the representatives of the 
involved riparian states, plus Britain. However, external experts were used to 
push the Committee to consensus. Remarkably, the Committee members 
came to depend to a great extent on the assistance of Johann Joseph Eichhoff, 
the ex-General Director of the Octroi Administration, who had made sure he 
had been invited to Vienna as an external expert. That he would be intro-
duced to the Special Committee was almost certain well before the sessions 
started in February 1815. Only a couple of months earlier he had published 
his magnum opus on the Rhine regime that he had been working on ever 
since his short-lived correspondence with Stein in May 1814. Despite his 
uncontested expertise on the matter, the Prussians had shown no interest in 
him. Both Stein and Solms-Laubach knew about the accusations that had 
been made against him since 1809. They had turned instead to Colonel Peter 
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Jacob Gergens (1764–1816), the inspector of the right side of the Rhine, who 
had always monitored Eichhoff closely, protecting ‘German interests’ against 
what he understood as ‘French injustice.’61 In the course of 1814, Eichhoff 
therefore had turned to the Austrians. His talents, expertise, good command 
of the French language, propensity for intrigue, and, not unimportantly, his 
Catholic descent, convinced Metternich himself to formally invite him to 
attend the Congress. The Austrian government believed Eichhoff could be put 
to good use to protect Austria’s interest in opening the Rhine and secure ‘the 
only direct commercial outlet left to [the emperor] towards the northern 
seas.’62 
During the formal sessions of the River Congress Committee Eichhoff 
indeed successfully pushed the delegates to an agreement. The issue of forced 
transshipment, for example, was one of the most important problems, also 
perceived as such within the public realm, of which these officials had no 
significant knowledge. The Imperial Recess of 1804 had already terminated 
the staple rights in Mainz and Cologne. However, the forced transshipment 
right was still in force and allowed both ports to have long-distance mer-
chandise passing the city to be transferred to the boats of the local shipping 
associations. What is more, transshipment entailed the levying of crane, quay, 
weighing, and storage fees. These rights benefited local skippers and port 
activity, but hampered trade and augmented freight rates considerably. In the 
third session, the Congress Committee invited the deputies from Mainz and 
Frankfurt and Eichhoff to shine a light on the problem. 
The deputies from Mainz and Frankfurt held strongly contrasting opinions. 
Eichhoff, by contrast, presented a well-informed and balanced view, in which 
he explained that, on the one hand, the right seemed very much in contra-
diction with the principle of the freedom of navigation. On the other hand, he 
underlined, unlimited freedom for skippers to load or unload would be 
destructive for commerce and navigation on the Rhine. The river, physically, 
could not handle the larger ships from the lower parts on the narrower and 
shallower segments of the Upper Rhine. Therefore, Eichhoff advocated for 
the preservation of forced transshipment in Mainz and Cologne, with the 
argument that new regulations would secure safe, speedy, and regular navi-
gation and protect commerce by preventing excessive fees. The River Con-
gress Committee decided to abolish the forced transshipments nonetheless. In 
the public sphere the issue had become a key example of the old unfair 
system, based on privileges, that was not aimed at the promotion of the 
common good, but merely of the local interest. Thus, even though the Com-
mittee members decided not to accept Eichhoff’s solution to the problem, his 
outline of the issue resulted in a unanimous decision. 
Outside the Congress Committee Eichhoff continued lobbying by writing 
memos to the representatives about his projected Rhine regime. He actively 
gained the personal confidence of the Dutch representative Van Spaen. They 
stayed in close contact with each other, and during the entire Congress Van 
Spaen relied on Eichhoff’s expertise, while he continued endorsing the liberal 
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mind of the former General Octroi Director towards his government in The 
Hague.63 The River Congress Committee much respected Eichhoff’s judicious 
reflections during the sessions in the early spring of 1815, fostered as they 
were by a wealth of experience and unaffected by partisan concerns.64 
Eichhoff was the only external expert who actively appeared multiple times in 
the sessions of the River Congress Committee and who contributed in a 
considerable way to the establishment of common ground. It is remarkable to 
see how many aspects of his memoranda of 28 February on the design of the 
future Rhine Commission, as well as its more permanent administration, can 
be found in the final agreement among the riparian states.65 
On 9 June the general stipulations were integrally incorporated into the 
Final Act and signed by the plenipotentiaries of the eight High Powers. An 
additional 32 river clauses were included in the annexes.66 In this document 
the Powers declared that ‘those whose states are separated or crossed by the 
same navigable river, engage to regulate, by common consent, all that regards 
its navigation.’ Fundamental for these regulations was the principle of free-
dom of navigation. The agreement on Rhine navigation strongly reflected the 
interests of the smaller German states and the Netherlands. The riparian 
states agreed that they would henceforth regulate all matters related to Rhine 
navigation jointly and would grant free navigation to each other’s citizens, 
provided that the skippers respected the safety regulations. Ship owners were 
exempted from all duties or levies besides a uniform and limited toll from 
the point from which the Rhine was navigable until the sea (jusqu’à la mer). 
The rights of staple were abolished; Rhine tolls were jointly fixed to a 
maximum and could not be increased anywhere without the consent of all 
commission members. Additionally, the number of toll stations was to be 
reduced. Rhine trade became ‘free’ for nationals of both the riparian and the 
non-riparian states. 
Crucially, a new central authority, the Central Commission for the Navi-
gation of the Rhine (CCNR), was established. The CCNR would become the 
only official platform of communication between the riparian states concern-
ing all matters relating to Rhine navigation. Furthermore, it was entrusted 
with drafting and enforcing common regulations that would go beyond the 
general guidelines for Rhine shipping and commerce as set by the additional 
river stipulations in the Final Act of Vienna. Until this Commission issued 
the definitive arrangements, the Octroi Convention would remain in force. 
Finally, it operated as a court of appeal for skippers and traders in disputes 
concerning toll collection or policing.67 
The Commission consisted of representatives of the seven riparian states 
and would function as a periodic diplomatic conference that convened 
once or twice a year. It would take decisions by majority, in which each vote 
counted equally.68 Each delegate was considered an agent of a riparian state 
charged with the task of cooperating for the common interest. Furthermore, 
as a permanent authority, one Chief Inspector and three sub-inspectors were 
to be elected for life by the commissioners. These inspectors, constituting the 
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executive administration, were to be installed to monitor the enforcement of 
the regulations. They would also function as contact persons for merchants 
and skippers when the Commission was on leave. Finally, the Chief Inspector 
was to provide the Commission with all the necessary information and 
counsel to maintain or improve the navigability of the Rhine. For that reason, 
the Commission was to publish an annual report with detailed information 
on the state of Rhine navigation. Both the Commission and the Chief 
Inspector would reside in Mainz.69 
Metternich was happy with this result and believed that Eichhoff had been 
an important asset in reaching the agreement that protected the Austrian 
interest considerably. To show his gratitude Metternich recruited Eichhoff’s 
son Joseph to the Imperial Service and later appointed him secretary of the 
Commission for the Navigation of the Elbe in Dresden.70 Despite Prussian 
hesitance towards him, the Committee’s driving force, Humboldt, also recog-
nised Eichhoff for his services by charging him with the preparatory works for 
the future Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine.71 In May 
1815 Eichhoff started the new endeavour within the framework of a special 
preparatory committee that was not coincidentally supplemented with the 
Prussian-minded Colonel Gergens and Carl Albrecht Wilhelm von Auer. 
A ‘Central’ Commission for the Rhine, not a ‘European’ one 
Ever since the Peace of Westphalia, international cooperation with the 
objective of abandoning tolls and other obstacles to free navigation on the 
Rhine had lain dormant, despite massive public support.72 Part of the reason 
that subsequent treaties remained merely an acknowledgement of public opi-
nion can be found in the Treaty of Westphalia itself. In historiography the 
Treaty is regarded a watershed in how states relate to each other. The West-
phalian System regards each state, large or small, as equal in the sense that 
they are all charged with the sovereignty over their respective territory in 
which no other power has a say. After the territorial states rose from the 
imperial ashes in 1648, it would prove to be extremely difficult to coordinate 
matters like the regulation of navigation on international rivers, such as the 
Rhine, regardless of its major commercial potential for north-west Europe. 
Indeed, such coordination would involve a dozen larger and smaller states 
and authorities, each with a very limited ability to exercise influence beyond 
its borders. Besides, it was in the common interest of the involved rulers to 
respect each other’s sovereignty, as an attack on this principle could be inter-
preted ‘as an attack on the very order which guaranteed their existence.’ This 
recognition of each other’s sovereignty kept the Rhine in a state of anarchy 
and Rhine commerce in a deadlock until the end of the eighteenth century.73 
The European declaration of the principle of freedom of navigation in 
Paris, its re-establishment during Vienna, and the establishment of this Cen-
tral Commission illustrate the Powers’ desire not to restore the European 
status quo ante after Napoleon’s downfall. Clearly, the Powers in Vienna had 
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taken the Rhine Octroi Convention and the Central Octroi Administration as 
points of departure. However, to make the new European river policy work, 
the European prosperity narrative, primarily brought in by the British, and 
the Prussian blueprint for a strong executive Rhine Administration, were 
outweighed by a riparian security interest. Indeed, the CCNR was particu-
larly revolutionary in the sense that it constituted an organisational formula 
that enabled ‘safe’ international cooperation, as it guaranteed the members’ 
sovereignty. 
To protect the sovereignty of the individual Rhine states, the institutional 
set-up of the new Central Commission was weakened in comparison to the 
Octroi Administration. When it comes to the jurisdictional function of the 
Central Commission, for example, one sees a slight dismantling of the exist-
ing centralised authority. The international court on Rhine navigation was 
terminated. Instead, the CCNR would function as a court of appeal. None-
theless, local courts were required to take an oath in which they accepted that 
the freedom and uniformity of navigation were the most important principles 
in the jurisdiction of Rhine navigation. Furthermore, the resulting jur-
isprudence was immediately applicable to the entire Rhine. Finally, as a court 
of appeal, the CCNR decided on the basis of majority. This means that ver-
dicts were binding, even for states that theoretically might not agree with the 
decision.74 
In addition, as an administrative body drafting and enforcing common 
regulations for Rhine commerce and navigation, the authority of the CCNR 
was decreased in comparison with the Octroi Administration. The CCNR was 
not responsible for the levying of tolls, nor had it a say in the maintenance of 
the riverbed. It did carry out governmental tasks in the sense that it was 
responsible for governing the Rhine and that it was charged, for example, 
with drafting uniform police regulations for the entire river. On top of that 
the Commission was authorised to decide by majority. Nevertheless, the 
decisions taken in the Commission would not be binding for those states 
whose commissioner had not agreed upon them. Consequently, decisions were 
not implemented in member states without the approval of national institutions, 
once again a principle that was to protect national sovereignty. 
This also meant that the British representative Clancarty was not at all 
satisfied with the result of the River Congress Committee. Clancarty had 
insisted on the Treaty of Paris being the ‘Parent of … Freedom of Naviga-
tion.’ It was, according to him, only just that the signatories of the Treaty of 
Paris ‘should have the power of fostering and protecting its own offspring 
from being destroyed by the mistaken cupidity of others.’75 Rather than a 
matter exclusively reserved for the riparian states, he thus understood the 
protection of the principle of freedom of navigation of the Rhine as a task for 
the four major European powers and, interestingly, also France.76 
Vienna ultimately charged the riparian states with the responsibility of 
designing a new regime for the Rhine that enabled the development of 
commerce and navigation based on the principle of freedom of navigation. 
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Even though it was far from clear what this regime would eventually look 
like, the representatives of the riparian states formulated some principles of 
‘free navigation’ that clearly followed from security and prosperity considera-
tions (the security-prosperity nexus). The French delegate, the Duke of Dal-
berg, noted, for example, that limiting the number of toll stations, simplifying 
toll collection, and abolishing the former local privileges were indispensable 
for ‘the safety of commerce and the promptness of the transports.’77 ‘A Cen-
tral Commission,’ the delegate also stated, ‘is necessary to continually watch 
over the exact execution of the agreed stipulations for the safety and the lib-
erty of Rhine navigation.’78 In an internal report the Dutch minister of trade 
also emphasised the importance of enabling skippers and merchants to 
determine the arrival time of their cargo, for example by well-maintained 
towpaths: ‘This security is of the utmost importance for commerce. It is only 
for this reason that one prefers the other, much more expensive, land route 
over water shipments.’79 The representative of Baden saw it as the mission of 
a new Rhine Administration to provide skippers and merchants with all the 
necessary means to ‘inspire their confidence.’80 The word safety, or  security 
(sûreté), used in relation to commerce and navigation, was at the time thus 
closely connected to the above-mentioned notions of liberty and order within 
a competitive environment.81 Trade security along the river meant that mer-
chants, skippers, and others involved acted within one framework of rules, 
regulations, norms, and standards. Rather than providing some actors along 
the Rhine with privileges, such a framework provided all involved with the 
ability to predict the commercial, fiscal, and navigational circumstances on 
the entire river, enabling them to anticipate being unharmed in the future. 
Besides trade security, the River Congress Committee adopted reciprocity 
as a second principle that determined their common understanding of the 
freedom of navigation principle. This was a highly distinguishing principle 
that had major implications, as it determined who would be part of the new 
regime. The British representative Clancarty had always insisted on the 
opening of the Rhine for trade and navigation for all nations. The riparian 
states, however, clearly embraced the understanding of the Paris Peace Treaty 
as a means of ‘clearing the navigation of all obstacles that could give rise to 
conflict between the riparian states’ and that, in fact, it had been decided ‘not 
to give the subjects of all non-riparian states a right of navigation that was 
equal to that of the subjects of the riparian states, and for which there would 
exist no reciprocity.’82 From the Final Act it can be deduced that freedom of 
navigation was no longer considered a natural right, but an act of goodwill by 
each individual riparian state.83 Goodwill implied that the principle of free-
dom of navigation was understood in a purely reciprocal sense. This meant 
that British or other non-riparian skippers were excluded from benefiting 
from the new regime. Presumably Clancarty was therefore not terribly proud 
of the result and had this specific Vienna episode erased from the record. It 
seems he did not even submit the protocols of the River Congress Committee 
to the Foreign Office. 
Power and commerce before and after Vienna 53 
Still, there were also successes for Britain and for Europe as a whole in 
terms of improved conditions for creating prosperity and maintaining security. 
Even though Rhine navigation was not opened to the British, the new regime 
secured the development of traffic, trade, and prosperity in the heart of 
Europe. In addition, the commercial exclusion of the British from the Con-
tinental rivers had been prevented and so their influence was safeguarded. 
Furthermore, by implementing a regime of shared use for this vital source of 
prosperity, the European powers prevented the advantages of river navigation 
from finding their way into the hands of a single imperialistic power. In fact, 
imperial interests had been removed from the river, while smaller potentates 
were less likely to come into conflict with each other on the fair use of river 
resources as the way to diplomatic talks through the CCNR was always open. 
Expert knowledge had entered the diplomatic forum through Eichhoff, with 
the appealing narrative of promoting the common good rather than the local 
interest through trade security, regularity, and speed. 
Conclusion 
Vienna had finally established freedom of navigation as a European principle 
and it had created an inter-riparian organisation to implement this principle 
on the Rhine. The European powers hoped to have finally found a way to end 
once and for all the cycle of fragmentary and hegemonic scenarios that had 
generated conflict and poverty along their international rivers for too long. 
Yet, as we will see in Chapter 3, the basic understanding of trade security, 
reciprocity, and the freedom of navigation remained contested among the 
riparian states, while the menace of European Great Power intervention con-
tinued to loom over this first experiment of transboundary river governance. 
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3 On behalf of the common good 
Dutch-Prussian rivalry in and outside 
the CCNR (1816–1831)1 
Introduction 
In August 1816 the members of the new Central Commission for the Navi-
gation of the Rhine assembled in Mainz for the first time. The delegates were 
optimistic about the progression of their responsibilities and expected to reach 
an agreement on a provisory legislative regime on the trajectory of the 
Franco-German Rhine before the end of the year. After all, it was based on 
the previous Octroi regime, and was already largely accommodated within the 
framework of the Viennese principles by a preparatory committee led by 
Johann Eichhoff in 1815. 
However, the delegates’ optimism was mistaken, as in no time at all a fur-
ious disagreement emerged between the Prussian and the Dutch delegates on 
the interpretation of the Viennese articles. Within a couple of years, Prussia 
successfully portrayed the Netherlands as a repressive power that oppressed 
free Rhine trade and harmed the ‘common good’ of European trade and 
prosperity. Quickly, the Netherlands found itself in the dock against the Eur-
opean High Powers and needed to develop a counterstrategy. The quarrel not 
only compromised the Commission’s tasks and would almost lead to its col-
lapse in 1825, it also played havoc with Dutch-German relations in the first 
half of the nineteenth century and beyond. Nevertheless, in 1831, on the brink 
of European Great Power interference, Prussia and the Netherlands finally 
found common ground to reconfirm the riparian condominium and agree on 
the conditions of a definitive Rhine administration. 
This chapter focuses on the question of how the CCNR commissioners 
managed to find common ground after all. It explains who these commis-
sioners were, and how the Commission became a forum for discussion and 
dispute settlement. 
From Vienna to Mainz 
On 5 August 1816 the CCNR convened for the very first time in the fortified 
city of Mainz. The choice of Mainz as the Commission’s residence was not 
totally arbitrary as it had been the seat of the general Octroi Administration 
after 1805. Until the French annexation in 1799 Mainz had been the 
Dutch-Prussian rivalry (1816–1831) 59 
residence of the Archbishop-Elector, the substitute of the pope north of the 
Alps and one of the most influential princes of the Holy Roman Empire. 
After 1815, the city became part of the Grand Duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt. Its 
fortress became the most important defence of the German confederation 
against France and was governed by Prussian and Austrian forces.2 Although 
somewhat in decline after 1816, the city had the stature that an international 
organisation could expect for its seat. The offices at number 29 and 30 on the 
Grosse Bleiche were modest, and contained, as well as the archives, the resi-
dence of the director of the Administrative Commission, Johann Friedrich 
Ockhardt. Nonetheless, they were nicely located as the Grosse Bleiche, a long 
and wide lane in Mainz running from the upper part of town to the Rhine, 
was allegedly the most handsome street in town.3 
The inaugural meeting was of a most formal quality. The letters of attorney 
were exchanged and ratified and articles X and XI of the Vienna Final Act 
were read aloud. Article XI contained formal practicalities such as how many 
times the Commission should convene and how the president was to be 
appointed. Article X depicted the raison d’état of the Commission: ‘In order 
to establish a precise control over the monitoring of the common regulations, 
and to form an authority which deals with the official communications 
between the riparian States on everything relating to navigation, a Central 
Commission will be established.’4 Finally, Count Solms-Laubach, the Prus-
sian Oberpräsident of one of the Rhineland provinces and chief of the tem-
porary Octroi Administration, was formally invited to hand over the Octroi 
Administration to the CCNR.5 The constitutional meeting reached the front 
page of national newspapers: ‘This is how one of the most liberal conceptions 
of the Vienna Congress will now be realised,’ the Baierische National-Zeitung 
concluded.6 
Its first main objectives were to take over the central administration of the 
Octroi and to return the toll levying to national authorities. Subsequently, the 
CCNR was entrusted with drafting and enforcing common regulations that 
would go beyond the general guidelines for Rhine shipping and commerce as 
set by the Final Act of Vienna. Until the Commission issued these definitive 
arrangements the Octroi Convention would remain in force on the Franco-
German Rhine, although it needed to be adapted to the stipulations of the 
final treaty. The abolition of the right of transfer in Mainz and Cologne, thus 
eliminating the special privilege of both port towns to demand transshipment 
of long-distance merchandise into local boats, was the most prominent 
example of such adaptations.7 
Among the Commission members a certain optimism prevailed, as their 
instructions were quite clear, and in the design of the new regime they could 
fall back on the existing one, that of the Octroi. In his letter to the minister of 
foreign affairs, the Dutch Commissioner Johan Bourcourd (1757–1842) wrote 
that he observed a ‘pleasant atmosphere’ during the first meeting.8 Bourcourd 
had arrived as one of the first commissioners in Mainz back in the fall of 
1815 and was eager to start the negotiations on a new Rhine administration.9 
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Before he was sent to Mainz, the 59-year-old had worked as a customs officer 
in the port of Amsterdam, then as governor at the Dutch West India Com-
pany, and thereafter as a councillor in matters of trade and the colonies in, 
respectively, the city of Amsterdam and the national government in The 
Hague. For his entire career Bourcourd had intersected the worlds of com-
merce and public administration, and therefore seemed a logical choice to 
represent the Dutch interests in Mainz, even though he had no knowledge of 
the Rhine or its former regime whatsoever.10 
In fact, a lack of expertise on the existing Rhine regime was a quality 
shared by all Commission members. Possibly the youngest among them, the 
Commissioner for Nassau, Ludwig Christian von Rößler (1785–1835), was 
most informed, as he was the director of the department of road and riv-
erbank construction within his government.11 Bourcourd described the repre-
sentative for Baden, Von Müßig, on the other hand, as ‘not an unfair person, 
but full of vanity and a clever-minded lawyer without mercantile knowledge.’ 
The Bavarian Commissioner Bernhard Sebastian von Nau (1766–1845), for 
his part, was a versatile man, being a cameralist, a professor in natural his-
tory, a businessman, and active as a diplomat and statesman for the grand 
Duchy of Frankfurt, the Austrian empire, and the kingdom of Bavaria. He 
had been chairman of the Bavarian-Russian liquidation commission and from 
1815 he was a member of the Imperial-Royal Austrian and Royal Bavarian 
Joint Land Administration Commission that governed Worms.12 Bourcourd 
described him as a ‘nastily smart gentleman.’13 The French Commissioner 
Yves Louis Joseph Hirsinger (1757–1824), legal expert and professional dip-
lomat, was born into a prestigious family from the Alsace. Previously he was 
chargé d’affaires at the French legation in Brussels and ambassador in Swit-
zerland, Constantinople, London, and Frankfurt.14 According to Bourcourd 
he was a decent and sociable man, who was very attached to enjoying the 
good things in life.15 The Hessian delegate was the most senior among the 
Commission members. Johann Balthasar Pietsch (1747–1826) was a legal 
expert and had made quite a career under the French administration as pre-
fectural counsel in Mainz.16 Finally, the Prussian delegate, Johann Friedrich 
Jacobi (1765–1831), was a businessman and administrator. In administrative 
experience, although not in age, he might be considered the most senior 
member in the Commission. He had been employed by the French govern-
ment since 1794. After becoming president of the municipality of Aachen, 
he was appointed as prefectural counsel for the administrative department of 
the Ruhr in 1800. In this role he was also observed by a friend of his father, 
the philosopher and theologian Gottfried Herder, as a ‘worthy, brave and 
sensible’ man. The French rewarded him for his service by decorating him 
with the Knighthood of the Legion of Honour, the highest French order of 
merit. In 1810 he was appointed member of the Corps legislative and moved 
to Paris. After Napoleon’s downfall, he returned to Aachen, where he entered 
the service of the Prussian administration to design a new tariff system for the 
new Prussian territories on the Rhine. Not much later, in May 1816, Jacobi’s 
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old friend Wilhelm von Humboldt, had him appointed as Commissioner in 
the CCNR.17 
All in all, the group of commissioners could be said to represent the ‘fine 
fleur’ of post-war French, Dutch, and German administrators. Most of them 
had a legal or fiscal background. Only two had mercantile experience, while 
only one commissioner had particular knowledge about the Rhine in terms of 
its geophysical character. Their governments had elected them for their skill 
in representing their respective interests. Yet most of them entertained liberal, 
Smithsonian-cameralist views and were dedicated to applying their state-
centric expertise on an international level and to making the new regime and 
liberal stipulations of the Vienna Treaty operational. 
A road map to international cooperation: Eichhoff’s ‘Instruction 
Interimaire’ 
All Commission members had, often as legal experts, ample experience in 
state administration, diplomacy, and trade. Yet, none of them knew a lot 
about the existing Rhine regime. Therefore, in the first three years of its exis-
tence, the Commission relied in part on the expertise of third parties: the 
Figure 3.1 Map of the city of Mainz 1825, made by captain Hock, who also produced 
the first (but lost) integral map of the entire Rhine (see Chapter 4) 
Source: Hessisches Staatsarchiv Darmstadt (HStAD) P 1, 1126. https://arcinsys.hessen. 
de/arcinsys/llist?nodeid=g100351&page=1&reload=true&sorting=41 
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inspectors and administrator of the Octroi. Already by the second meeting of 
the CCNR, in August 1816, the diplomatic forum opened the floor to the 
former General Director of the Octroi, Johann Joseph Eichhoff, who had 
prepared a plan for the interim administration. 
Eichhoff was a vain man. He systematically called himself L’ancien Direc-
teur général de l’Octroi de navigation, chargé par le Comité du Congrès de 
travaux préparatoires pour le Règlement du Rhin.18 It was true. As we saw in 
Chapter 2 the chairman of the Congress Committee, Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
charged Eichhoff with the task of preparing an interim plan for the Com-
mission. Initially he led a three-person committee, appointed by the chief of 
the temporary Octroi Administration, Count Solms-Laubach.19 However, he 
quickly found that his two colleagues, Colonel Peter Jacob Gergens and Carl 
Albrecht Wilhelm von Auer, had very different opinions about the inter-
pretation and execution of the Viennese principles ‘in order to be able to hope 
for satisfactory results of our meetings, such as the Central Commission was 
entitled to expect.’20 Therefore, he took the liberty of continuing the 
preparatory works alone. 
What is more, in his writings Eichhoff consistently referred to the Com-
mission as La Commission Centrale de l’Octroi de navigation du Rhin à 
Mayence.21 Clearly he regarded the Commission as the next and final step in 
accomplishing a liberal Rhine regime, a process that had started with the 
Octroi Convention back in 1804.22 The CCNR was to finalise his legacy by 
including the Netherlands in the convention,23 and preferably by appointing 
him as the General Director of the new Rhine regime. 
By his own account, Eichhoff had made all the necessary amendments to 
the existing Octroi articles in the spirit of Vienna, ‘in order to not leave any 
uncertainty, neither to the skippers, nor to the agents of the Octroi, about the 
obligations that one is to follow during this time lapse until the execution 
of the definitive regulations.’ In his mind, the project settled the matter and 
cleared the road for involving the Netherlands in the negotiations on the 
definitive Rhine regulations.24 If it was up to Eichhoff, the Commission would 
skip the interim regime, and have his elaborated project implemented directly 
by all the riparian states, including the Netherlands – thereby substantially 
expanding the remits of the Vienna stipulation and enlarging the scope of the 
project he was charged with.25 Taking a closer look at Eichhoff’s project, 
which over the months came in several but similar versions, we see an elabo-
rate road map with a particularly liberal character, delineated most notably 
by securing equal treatment in a competitive environment. 
In short, Eichhoff’s project was an attempt to create a regime based on 
uniformity, equality, and continuity. The regime promoted uniformity in the 
sense that it substituted the unfortunate diversity of regimes on the Rhine that 
had been damaging commerce and navigation for such a long time. ‘This act,’ 
so Eichhoff introduced the piece, ‘is to be considered as the charter with 
regard to everything that needs to be regulated for the Rhine, from the point 
where it becomes navigable, until its mouth in the sea.’ Eichhoff warned that 
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it was not going to be easy to reconcile the often conflicting interests among 
the riparian states, who still clung to their specific privileges, norms, and 
regulations. Yet he detected a ‘moral union’ that was strongly inclined to 
pursue the ‘common good’ even if that meant that one was to make some 
sacrifices. The regime therefore also guaranteed equality, in the sense that it 
refrained from promoting the local to the disadvantage of the general interest. 
The regime fostered continuity in the liberal streamlining of regulations and 
the removal of obstacles to uninterrupted trade, such as the Octroi had 
attempted before. 
With its 127 articles, it was not only similar in size to the 132 articles 
comprising Octroi, but Eichhoff’s project would pursue exactly what had 
made the Octroi so unique; not only rearranging the tolling system, or 
ensuring fiscal interests, but also issuing measures to protect commerce and 
navigation on the Rhine – both commercial security and physical safety were 
therefore part of this highly modern river regime.26 In his presentation to the 
Commission, Eichhoff emphasised that the core of the ‘soft and liberal’ (doux 
et libéral) regime boiled down to four things: speed and security for the 
expedition of merchandise up and down the river, and order and affordability 
in transports.27 In fact, the bulk of the proposed measures and dispositions 
were intended to secure speed, security, order, and affordability. They did so 
in three main fields: tolling, riverbed and towpath surveillance, and the 
abolition of the forced transshipment in Mainz and Cologne. 
A consistent reorganisation of the tolling stations and procedures was 
essential to increase the navigability of the Rhine. First, the number of tolling 
stations was to be limited to 12 and they were to be relocated at proportional 
distances: proportional, not in the sense of spatial distance, but in the sense of 
navigable distance. Some parts of the Rhine, especially the upper parts, were 
more difficult and more time-consuming to navigate, therefore the freight 
rates were higher. With the relocation of tolling stations on the basis of 
navigability, the Commission increased the navigability of the Rhine for the 
transportation of some, mainly agricultural, products, thereby preventing 
local inhabitants ‘from losing … an easy and valuable outlet for the produc-
tion of the soil.’ This way of tolling meant that the riparian states on the 
Lower Rhine would lose some of their revenues. However, relocating the tol-
ling stations according to spatial distance would paralyse navigation on large 
parts of the river, and that would not do any good to the Rhine commerce in 
general. Furthermore, tariffs should be fixed and were to be levied in ratio 
with the distance of the voyage. In support of industry and agriculture, some 
goods, such as bone scraps, chalk, or fertilisers, were to be charged special 
low tariffs. Likewise, the height of the recognition right, that is, the sum to be 
paid for a ship, loaded or not, to pass a tolling station was to be rescaled 
according the size of the ship. This would set the smaller ships on a more 
equal footing fiscally with the larger ones. 
For the sake of speed, the number of personnel at the tolling stations would 
be maintained at least on the level of the Octroi. They were to work swiftly 
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according to strict and standardised procedures and measures. Gauging was 
considered a reliable, easy, and quick verification method of the amount of 
cargo shipped that did not delay the transports too much. In addition, the 
tolling and the measuring of timber rafts were standardised according to 
geometric principles. Skippers, in turn, were to use a standardised cargo 
document, a so-called manifest, to declare the quality and quantity of their 
merchandise. For the merchant, these manifests ensured that the wares he had 
entrusted to the skipper were registered. For the Rhine administration, these 
documents were of the greatest importance in levying tolls in the right 
amount, in safeguarding the general accounting of the tolling stations, and in 
serving as a source for compiling reliable statistics on Rhine navigation. 
In addition, fining, in the case of fraud or wrongful declaration, was regu-
lated. Eichhoff suggested a fine of no less than ten times the ordinary toll in 
cases of fraud. This was much higher than the Octroi prescribed; however, 
the former General Director wrote: ‘[such a fine] is necessary to come to the 
aid of the administration as a kind of salutary terror, in order to prevent 
fraud, or at least to render it infrequent.’28 By calling the fine a ‘salutary 
terror,’ Eichhoff clearly expressed the Smithsonian-cameralist view from the 
turn of the nineteenth century that no longer believed that individual self-
aggrandisement necessarily leads to the common good and therefore favoured 
moderate state intervention in the economy.29 Eichhoff regarded it a tax of 
injustice as much as a punishment. After all, the new regime procured order 
and good government that secured the freedom of the skipper. Committing 
fraud and abusing such a regime was simply unjust, and frustrating the rights 
of a riparian sovereign deserved to be punished. 
Besides tolling, the new regime was to improve the conditions of the riv-
erbed and the towpaths. In the past few years, the French had neglected the 
Rhine entirely. Moreover, no inspections had been taking place, which meant 
that not only was it unclear how bad the situation really was but also that one 
was in the dark regarding what works had to be done to improve navigation. 
As decided in Vienna, the actual works were to be executed by the respective 
authorities of the riparian states, but the Commission had a special role in 
inspecting and monitoring the execution of these works. Every spring the 
Commission’s permanent inspectors, accompanied by geometric experts, were 
to examine the existing conditions of the riverbed and the tow paths. Gov-
ernments who would not be willing to immediately execute the necessary 
repairs would be declared in default. 
Finally, Eichhoff’s project dealt with the abolition of forced transshipments 
in Mainz and Cologne. This right allowed both ports to have all long-distance 
merchandise passing the city to be transferred to the boats of the local ship-
ping associations. Such a privilege not only hampered speed, but it also 
favoured local boatmen at the expense of others. The abolition was plainly 
articulated in article XIX of the Vienna convention. However, Eichhoff found 
it necessary to establish additional police regulations. He feared that without 
these regulations, the freedom of loading and unloading would degenerate 
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into a ‘source of a multitude of abuses, equally fatal for the skippers and the 
merchants of good faith.’ Security of goods and safety of the skippers were at 
stake here. The regulation that was to be uniformly applied in all Rhine ports 
prescribed that immediately after arrival the skipper needed to show his 
manifest to the controller. The controller inscribed the name of the skipper in 
the crane and scale register and provided him with an unloading permit. The 
use of the appropriate transshipment installations demanded the payment of a 
tax, yet these revenues were not to be considered a profit for the specific town. 
They were to ensure an exact regularity in the transshipments under the sur-
veillance of the police and a committee consisting of controllers, port inspec-
tors, and local merchants. After unloading, the skipper presented himself to 
this committee and showed his qualifications; he then received the right to 
load his ship for a destination port of his choice. Meanwhile, the cargo was 
weighed, the controller compared the result of the gauging with the manifest, 
and had the skipper pay the necessary surcharge. Ultimately, the skipper had 
his ship loaded and was authorised to leave the port. Eichhoff emphasised 
that foreign and indigenous merchants would more easily entrust their mer-
chandise to the shippers as they found considerable reassuring guarantees in 
the proposed regulations. Furthermore, as loading and unloading was not 
restricted, the skippers could and would receive return freights everywhere, 
which strongly benefited the freight rates. 
Thus, uniformity in regulations, continuity of trade and transport, and 
equal treatment within a competitive environment would assure speed and 
security in trade, and order and affordability in transport. Consequently, 
merchants gained a reasonable opportunity to predict the costs and timing of 
transport,30 while states received a reasonable opportunity to predict the fiscal 
revenues from the Rhine. These measures were thus preconditions for 
increasing prosperity. Again, in line with Smithsonian-cameralist beliefs at the 
turn of the century, Eichhoff considered it the task of the government (in this 
case an intergovernmental regime) not to provide prosperity to the people, but 
to procure order, predictability, and thus a secure environment for the people, 
in which they could prosper: 
this task must seem very difficult, and indeed it would be, if the members 
of the Commission could lose sight of the fact that by wisely caring for 
the common good of the Rhine, they will increase the particular advan-
tages of each of its co-owners, and that by acting in a contrary way, they 
would inevitably destroy this prosperity, of which this river is susceptible, 
and which they are called upon to establish.31 
Eichhoff was right. It proved extremely difficult within the Commission to 
balance local interests against the common interest. Even though his road 
map was a consistent and viable elaboration of Viennese principles, and 
regardless of the fact that all riparian states favoured the promotion of com-
merce and navigation, Eichhoff’s project would end up in the bin. Tragically, 
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he himself would eventually be sacrificed, figuratively speaking, for the 
promotion of inner cohesion in the Commission. 
The bone of contention: Dutch sea rights and Prussian forced 
transshipment rights 
In the very first years after the end of the Napoleonic wars, cross-border 
Rhine trade saw quite a spectacular revival. The continent was restocked. 
However, the very inefficient sailing ships, the high taxation, and especially 
the uncertain conditions for navigation on the Rhine, due to unclear regula-
tions and degenerated tow paths and riverbeds, made long-distance commerce 
fall to insignificant amounts.32 Officially, the Dutch Rhine, and thus the 
Netherlands, did not take part in the interim system that the CCNR was 
preparing to combat these problems. Nevertheless, the Dutch minister of for-
eign affairs, Van Nagell, instructed Bourcourd to take an active part in 
drafting the interim regulations as much as he could, since it was to be 
expected, Van Nagell wrote, that a very similar regime would eventually also 
be applied on the Dutch Rhine.33 Overall, the Dutch had a pronounced lib-
eral approach in Rhine matters and it was because of this that the Dutch 
Commissioner Bourcourd was not at all dissatisfied with Eichhoff’s 
performance. 
Like Van Spaen, the Dutch representative at the Congress of Vienna, Bour-
courd saw Eichhoff as a useful partner with an unparalleled expertise who 
merely acted on behalf of the common interest.34 Moreover, Eichhoff had good 
relations with almost all relevant courts.35 He regarded him the creator of ‘the 
liberal System of the Congress of Vienna’ that would finally result in the 
removal of all obstacles to navigation. Bourcourd hoped he would have the 
same effect on the deliberations in Mainz and would ‘facilitate the elimination 
of all the partial views that the other states may raise.’36 In private, Eichhoff 
had shown his support for the Dutch cause and, not unimportantly, he had a 
son who after his service in the French army had recently been accepted into 
the Dutch navy.37 This gave the Dutch government, Bourcourd argued, an 
opportunity to appease or influence Eichhoff in the personal sphere.38 
However, not all commissioners appreciated Eichhoff’s road map as much 
as the Dutch Commissioner did. In September 1816, it was the representative 
from Nassau, Ludwig von Rößler, who first came with a new version of 
Eichhoff’s project and made the indefinite dissolution of the forced 
transshipment rights in Cologne and Mainz conditional on the opening up of 
the entire Rhine from where it became navigable into the sea.39 Prussia 
instantly and eagerly agreed to proclaim both measures at the same time.40 
For the Netherlands this was an impossible request. This was, first, because 
the interim regime was not to be applied in the Netherlands, only the defini-
tive regime and, second, because the Netherlands would never allow a foreign 
power or organisation to interfere with its sovereign rights, such as its sea 
rights, the right to govern its seas and inlets.41 In fact, Bourcourd stated in the 
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Commission that the Netherlands could not be excluded from the favours of 
the abolition of the forced transshipment, not by law, but neither by the 
principle of reciprocity. After all, the Netherlands had always shared in the 
advantages and the burdens of the Octroi. Moreover, forced transshipment in 
the Netherlands did not exist, because it had only a few toll stations and had 
not increased the shipping rights since the end of the Congress in 1815.42 
In 1816 no major powers doubted that the Dutch interpretation of the 
Viennese articles was correct. Even Prussia, after having its former repre-
sentative in the Vienna River Congress Committee, Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
consult his British colleague, the Earl of Clancarty, believed that the Vienna 
Convention did not touch upon the navigation from and to the sea, as it 
strictly regarded river navigation only.43 The Prussian Commissioner Jacobi 
therefore did not act on his own behalf. He was instructed by his Prussian 
superiors. These superiors, specifically the Prussian Chancellor Karl August 
von Hardenberg, had kept their ear to the ground at the Cologne Chamber of 
Commerce and tried to capitalise on the Prussian Great Power status in order 
to dominate post-war European projects. In this instance, the Netherlands 
became the object of Prussia’s imperious and imperial behaviour. However, it 
was quite capable of finding ways and means to circumvent or even subvert 
the dominance of the Great Powers. Most importantly, it did so by establish-
ing a liberal coalition of the willing among the smaller Rhine states in the 
CCNR against the increasingly dominant and potentially imperious Prussia. 
It is remarkable how, despite its weak legal argument, the Cologne Cham-
ber of Commerce successfully changed the mind of the highest Prussian 
authorities and provided them with an attractive rhetorical argument. The 
Chamber pictured the Netherlands as a dangerous Rhine power that was 
likely to put chains on the Rhine for its own benefit. After all, back in the 
day, when it had been liberated from Spanish domination, it had done the 
same, bringing commerce in all major German Rhine cities on the brink of 
ruin.44 The Chamber wrote: 
Will the future German historians write about our times as they wrote 
about the sixteenth century, saying that the German princes, after they 
had so nobly destroyed the yoke of foreign rule and with it the shackles of 
the disgraceful continental system, had no energy or no patriotism 
enough to remedy the oppressions that Holland allowed itself against the 
Rhine trade, that all the efforts of a politically greater power to save the 
prosperity of the Rhinelands failed because of the diplomatic skills of a 
much smaller state? 
The Chamber was prepared to abolish the privilege of the forced transship-
ment in its Rhine port. Yet, in return for this sacrifice, Cologne needed free 
access to the sea. 
The Prussian Commissioner Jacobi did not believe the Netherlands would 
ever approve free access to the sea: ‘The Dutch Government would rather 
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start a war, than to let the commodities flow freely up and down the Rhine.’ 
The country depended for the larger part of its commerce on transit trade. 
Absolute freedom of the estuary ‘would mean as much as the total ruin of 
Holland, something that can never have been the purpose of the Vienna 
Convention,’ he wrote to the Cologne Chamber. Nevertheless, the Chamber’s 
demand for reciprocity pushed the right button for Jacobi’s boss, Chancellor 
Hardenberg, and it was under his direction that the Prussian delegate shifted 
his position within the Central Commission. 
Jacobi was supported in his tirade against the Netherlands by Peter Jacob 
Gergens. This was the same Gergens that back in 1809 had provided the 
French investigating Commission with incriminating documentation against 
Eichhoff. He had also been the main source of information on Rhine-related 
matters to Stein and Solms-Laubach, even after Eichhoff had excluded him 
from the preparatory works in 1815.45 Gergens therefore might have had 
Prussian interests at heart, but at the same time he was one of the few people 
with state-of-the-art knowledge of the actual navigable conditions on the 
Rhine. Therefore, the Commission invited him to shine light on the issue. 
According to Gergens, the abolition of transshipment rights in Mainz and 
Cologne would not suffice to realise freedom of navigation as long as the 
Netherlands continued obstructing it.46 
In Gergens’ view, the Netherlands obstructed the freedom of navigation in 
three distinctive ways: first, it levied an entrance fee on all the merchandise 
flowing into the country down the river; second, the Netherlands levied a 
transit right in its main seaports, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Dordrecht, on 
all merchandise coming from the sea and destined for the German hinterland; 
and third, the Netherlands did not allow freedom of navigation up and down 
the Waal and the Merwede from and to the Rhine. If one wanted to abolish 
the transshipment rights in the German cities, one had to consider that: 
then the navigation of the Rhine would be free for the Dutch, but not for 
the Germans and the French … [since] the Dutch would be enabled to 
bring all their colonial wares and other products or goods manufactured 
abroad to the Germans and the French, and could even charge German 
or French goods on their return, without paying, in Germany or in 
France, any other right than the Octroi. On the other hand, the Germans 
and the French would enjoy the freedom of navigation only as far as the 
frontier of the Netherlands. Arriving at this border at Schenkenschanz 
they would be obliged to pay the licence fee, the Octroi rights to the 
Dutch toll offices and then they would be forced to unload at a Dutch 
port because they are forbidden to enter the sea. 
Jacobi added: ‘Holland wants to see the Interim Conditions as an acquired 
right, while it was provided to the country during Vienna as a privilege.’47 
Bourcourd reported to The Hague that Prussia tried to win over the smaller 
Rhine states to its cause by providing favourable prospects of pecuniary 
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arrangements regarding the settlement of the toll revenues. Simultaneously, 
Prussia continually instilled mistrust against Holland by pointing to the 
restrictions on the salt trade and the transit tax of 3 per cent that the Neth-
erlands imposed in October 1816. Prussia, Bourcourd wrote, ‘collects stones 
and searches for other means against us, as much as it can,’ and ‘It truly 
seems, as if we are the most devious government that ever existed, while by 
God’s blessing we certainly are as sincere as the most sincere.’48 
Luckily, Bourcourd was right in counting the expert Eichhoff among his 
friends. Eichhoff openly criticised the interim project that Nassau presented. 
It was not in the Central Commission’s power to exclude any tributary that 
had signed the Vienna Convention from any benefit arising from the provi-
sions of this same Convention.49 It was also clear to Eichhoff that the Vienna 
convention concerned the fluvial navigation of the Rhine only. The ports of 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam would be the logical geographical limits of the 
Rhine regime.50 
For the Netherlands two things were now of major importance. First, 
Eichhoff needed to be embedded in the new Rhine regime, possibly as Pre-
sident of the General Administration. Second, Bourcourd wrote to the For-
eign Office, it would be in the Dutch interest to appear as a reasonable 
country that was informed by mild and liberal principles. The interim regime 
should be amended in that sense. Then the smaller countries would follow, as 
such a regime would be beneficial for their commerce. Prussia, Bourcourd 
predicted, would not then dare to maintain its opposition.51 
Regardless of Prussia’s obvious exaggerations of the Dutch threat – ‘a ter-
rifying phantom of supremacy in navigation’52 – the other Rhine states were 
sensitive to the reciprocity argument and became increasingly reserved 
towards the Netherlands at the end of 1817.53 The Commission concluded, 
therefore, that the Netherlands was to comply with four additional conditions 
to come to enjoy the full benefits of the resulting freedoms of the interim 
regime. The first was that the shipping rights on the Dutch Rhine, both the 
Waal and the Lek, should return to their Vienna level. The second condition 
was the abolition of custom visits on the Rhine that, ever since the introduction 
of the new toll law, practically resulted in forced transshipment. The third was 
that all new Dutch ships were to be gauged and would receive a manifest equal 
to the one used by the skippers on the conventional Rhine. The final condition 
was that skippers from the conventional Rhine could freely take return cargo in 
the Netherlands.54 On the recommendation of Prussia, Eichhoff and two 
members of the provisional Rhine administration were asked to once again 
compile a new version of the Interim Instruction in which these demands were 
integrally included.55 Strikingly, the Commission thus did not regard freedom 
of navigation into the sea as a reasonable request. 
In February 1818 the newest version of the Instruction Interimaire that 
Eichhoff presented could count on the support of a large majority. France, 
Bavaria, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau unconditionally accepted it. 
After some hesitation the Netherlands asked in a note for some minor 
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adaptations.56 To all the Commissioners’ surprise, it was Prussia’s Commissioner 
Jacobi who declared at this point that the Dutch request ‘once again annihilated 
the hope of finally reaching a general agreement on an Interim Instruction.’57 
After Jacobi returned from a personal meeting with Chancellor Hardenberg, the 
Prussian Commissioner proposed to have the forced transshipment abolished 
only with the establishment of a definitive regulation that included significant 
additional demands for the Netherlands, i.e. introducing a fixed custom duty in 
its sea ports and abolishing the transit ban on certain products. 
The Commission was unpleasantly surprised by this sudden hiccup and 
reminded Prussia that it had already announced it would accept the new 
Instructions and thus would allow the abolition of the forced transshipments 
immediately. Moreover, the Netherlands, the Commission stated, had given a 
satisfying and sound assurance that it would comply with the four conditions. 
Even Hesse-Darmstadt, Prussia’s lap-dog, stated it was willing to abolish the 
forced transshipment in Mainz.58 In March 1818 the Commission, apart from 
the commissioners of Hesse-Darmstadt and Prussia, acknowledged that the 
Netherlands fully adhered to the conditions. Now it was Prussia’s and Hesse-
Darmstadt’s turn to abolish the forced transshipment. Prussia reacted in a 
panicked manner and stated that the riparian states should either have 
recourse to the High Powers (its friends) or should skip the Interim Instruc-
tion altogether and start designing the definitive regulations with Prussia. 
Prussia’s chicanery was very disappointing to the other members. The proto-
cols read: ‘The Central Commission was and is of the opinion that the abo-
lition of the forced transshipment of ships in the ports of Cologne and Mainz 
as irrevocably pronounced in Vienna must be realised by the interim instruc-
tion already.’59 After one and a half years of discussions on the Interim 
Instruction, the Commission had hoped to finally reach an agreement, start 
monitoring the common regulations, and extend it to the Dutch Rhine as 
well, thereby becoming a true authority which would deal with the official 
communications between all riparian states. 
Interestingly enough, Prussia had overplayed its hand, and by September 
1818 the cards had totally changed. The commissioner of the small state of 
Nassau concluded sharply that Prussia apparently preferred the private inter-
ests of the city of Cologne. The commissioner of Baden added that it was not 
precisely the collapse of the health of the German Confederation that worried 
him, but that public opinion about the value of international treaties such as 
Vienna would be damaged if the forced transshipment continued to exist.60 
All in all, the smaller German Rhine states worried that Prussia’s project to 
bolster its new possessions on the Rhine, by benefiting the city of Cologne, 
would harm the larger interest of the development of Rhine navigation. 
The Dutch strategy to appear as a liberal and mild-minded authority, and 
have Eichhoff vouch for its position, increasingly convinced the smaller Rhine 
states of Dutch benevolence towards the riparian condominium as a whole. 
In December Bourcourd reported extensively on the Prussian chicanery, 
underlining the contradictory positions Jacobi had taken in the past two 
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years. The Dutch Commissioner reported that the Netherlands, in contrast, 
had given more than it legally needed to do. During Vienna it had agreed to 
maintain the shipping rights at their existing level in return for taking 
advantage of the abolition of the forced transshipment. However, for the 
benefit of the negotiations, the Netherlands had granted the four additional 
conditions as well. Consequently, Bourcourd asked his Prussian colleague to 
finally ‘cede to the legal force of the arguments of his colleagues, by not 
opposing any longer to [the act of Vienna].’61 Four months later, in March 
1819, the majority of the Commission adhered to this request and demanded 
that the forced transshipment would be abolished within two months.62 Jacobi 
was instructed by his government not to respond to the request at all.63 This 
was a tactical move that Prussia, being one of the Great Powers, could permit 
itself. It also knew that the other Great Powers, especially Britain, would 
favour the final goal, to increase freedom of movement on the European 
continent by opening the Rhine to seaborne vessels. 
At this point there was only so much the Commission could do. Appealing 
to the Great Powers, as Prussia had provocatively suggested, was not an 
attractive option because it would undermine the legitimacy of the Commis-
sion, being a riparian affair. But not doing anything was risky too. After three 
years of fruitless deliberations on the interim regime, the forced transship-
ments were still in force. This not only endangered the objective of free navi-
gation on the Rhine, it also jeopardised the entire experiment of an 
international commission as such and the credibility of the rule of interna-
tional law. Understandably, the larger public was losing faith in the value of 
international treaties such as Vienna. It was not used to these kinds of inter-
national administrations and could not be expected to understand why the 
decision-making process took so long. Of course, outsiders did not take into 
account that the commissioners often needed to obtain time-consuming 
instructions from their respective governments. Besides, because the negotia-
tions were taking place behind closed doors, the larger public could not be 
aware of the progress the Commission also achieved. Instead of reaching out 
to the Great Powers, individuals in and close to the Commission decided to 
approach the general public instead, with the aim of rescuing the Commission 
from dying a silent death. 
In 1819 the Bavarian Commissioner, Sebastian von Nau, published the first 
of a series of 500-page volumes with a wide selection of session protocols and 
other official documentation that were to inform the public about the progress 
of the CCNR.64 The same year, the inspector of the provisional administra-
tion of the Rhine, Joseph Franz Ockhart (1756–1828), published a 400-page 
volume about the continuing unsatisfactory conditions for navigation on the 
Rhine and the structure and operating procedures of the new regime that 
were to resolve all this.65 It was a third publication, unanticipated by the 
Commission itself, that was possibly the most revealing one. 
Only months after Von Nau’s and Ockhart’s orchestrated publications, it 
was the former General Director of the Octroi Administration, Johann Joseph 
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Eichhoff, who surprised the world and the Commission with another book on 
the current deadlock of the Commission’s negotiations. Remarkably, Eichhoff 
presented the publication ‘in deepest devotion’ to the ‘high governments of 
the Riparian Rhine States’ in the quality of ‘an official report.’66 Eichhoff 
also presented his publication in a letter to the Commission, in which he 
emphasised once more that he had always worked for the common interest on 
the basis of the Vienna Convention. ‘But,’ Eichhoff continued, ‘my views were 
not always shared by all the Commission members, and among themselves they 
could not agree on the projects that they designed.’ So, he argued, there was 
only one way out of this dreadful situation, which was to call for the interven-
tion of the governments of the riparian states, or even the interference of the 
guarantor Powers, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. After all, ‘it was 
about major interests which have been entrusted to the care of the Central 
Commission, the prosperity of the trade of the most important river of Europe 
depends on the realization of a system of free navigation.’ Eichhoff’s appeal to 
the governments of the riparian states, or even to the Great Powers, by means 
of this publication was a public affront to the Commission. In the protocols the 
Commission unanimously concluded bitterly that ‘the author was not compe-
tent to assess the Commission’s negotiations, and therefore the publication 
cannot be recognised as official.’67 
Despite this public pillorying, Eichhoff’s unexpected affront provided the 
Commission with a new narrative that could be employed to regain internal 
cohesion. In August 1819, the new Baden commissioner and chairman, 
Theodor Hartleben, took the third anniversary of the Commission as an 
opportunity to once more underline its importance: ‘Increasing the movement 
of people is one of the most important objects of the European national 
interest, and the freedom of navigation is one of its first fundaments.’ He 
wisely stayed far from blaming his co-commissioners for the Commission’s 
delay. Instead, he explicitly blamed Eichhoff. Being the former General 
Director and the only participant of the Congress in Vienna at the Commis-
sion’s table, Eichhoff had been a man of stature, a man to listen to. However, 
his idea to regulate the transshipments in Mainz and Cologne rather than to 
abolish them gave the commissioners an unforeseen stick with which to hit 
each other.68 By his self-righteous yet ambivalent understanding of the status 
of the forced transshipments during the interim regime he had created discord 
among the committed and benevolent commissioners ever since his first 
appearance in August 1816, Hartleben concluded. 
In other words, the Commission’s malfunctioning was not the result of the 
inexperience, or an intrinsic incompatibility of commissioners in an inter-
governmental organisation, Hartleben stated. The reason that the Commis-
sion members had not agreed on the interim regime yet was simply because 
they had listened too much to an outsider, an outsider who even called into 
question the legitimacy of the Commission by appealing to the higher Powers. 
Tellingly, Hartleben finished his passionate plea for the Commission with a 
quote from the song Ballade der Lästerzunge (Ballad of Vicious Tongues) by 
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the German poet Gottfried August Bürger: ‘Die schlechtesten Früchte sind es 
nicht, woran die Wespen nagen’ (‘It ain’t the worst fruits the wasps gnaw’). In 
other words, the fact that the Commission received so much criticism indicated 
its importance and its relevance, rather than its incompetence. The Commis-
sion’s president made sure this message also found its way to the larger public. 
In several episodes over the course of an entire month, he published his 26-page 
speech on the front page of the Allgemeine Justiz-, Cameral- und Polizei-Fama, 
a  magazine he edited.69 
This was a definitive and public excommunication of the man who dearly 
wanted to become the General Director of the new Rhine administration. It 
was also a loss for the Netherlands, as Eichhoff had been a useful companion 
in Bourcourd’s efforts to promote the Dutch interests. Still, the Netherlands 
was supported by all commissioners, except for Prussia. In addition, Hartle-
ben confirmed once again in his speech that the forced transshipments were to 
be abolished during the interim regime, and that the freedom of navigation 
could not be extended into the sea. Personally, Hartleben was not against the 
extra-fluvial extension of the principle, but the Commission was simply not 
charged with that mission. ‘Those who believe that the boldest wish has been 
satisfied when one may sail the Rhine freely to the sea, have not understood 
the demands of the spirit of the times in the nineteenth century.’ 
After Hartleben’s speech Prussia continued holding off any further nego-
tiation, with the argument that it had not received instructions from its gov-
ernment. In session after session the dimensions of the Commission’s 
protocols dwindled visibly, its contents reduced to the utmost formalities. This 
irritated the Commission to such an extent that it decided to take the ultimate 
step. In a letter to the Prussian Chancellor Hardenberg, it explicitly held the 
Prussian government accountable for not bringing the Vienna Convention into 
practice. The lifting of the forced transshipments had become increasingly 
pressing: 
It is all the more urgent as the complaints about the stagnation of the 
trade are multiplying, and because the navigation of the Rhine, instead of 
being alleviated, has to fight against new obstacles and the fluctuations 
between the former and the new order of things. 
In an attempt to deliver the message in a more charming way, the letter said: 
May it please His Excellency to add to the crown of his brilliant merits 
for the good of the nations the new merit, of having accomplished by his 
high intervention the free navigation of the Rhine, for which since a long 
time all the voices have united.70 
The letter had no demonstrable effect, but it showed that Prussia’s efforts to 
portray the Netherlands as ‘a terrifying phantom of supremacy’ had failed to 
meet their objective, at least within the Commission. 
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The end of the CCNR? Prussian withdrawal and European 
interference 
Addressing a head of state was a move to which the Central Commission 
had never resorted before. This shows the seriousness of the perceived pro-
blems and the extent to which the Dutch view on things was supported by 
the full majority of the Commission. But it also illustrates the institutional 
development of a new kind of organisation that took itself seriously. By 
directly addressing a head of state of one of the Commission members, it 
really transcended one of the formal qualities of the Commission as for-
mulated in Vienna, which was ‘to form an authority which deals with the 
official communications between the riparian States on everything relating 
to navigation.’ No longer did the Commission regard itself merely as a 
conduit of official communications, but as a source of coordinated commu-
nications towards individual governments. Nevertheless, how the Commis-
sion regarded itself is one thing; what the impact was of such coordinated 
communications another. 
When in September 1821 the Prussian commissioner finally presented a 
new project, it still contained the demand to extend the freedom of navigation 
into the sea. This was a deliberate, and successful, attempt to shatter the 
negotiations on the interim regime indefinitely. For Prussia, it was no longer 
desirable to keep the negotiations exclusively to the Commission. In Decem-
ber 1817, Hardenberg mentioned to Jacobi that only the Great Powers would 
be able to decide on the matter of Rhine navigation.71 In addition, earlier in 
1821 the Minister of Commerce, Hans Graf Von Bülow (1774–1825), had 
written to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Günther von Bernstorff 
(1769–1835), that the situation reminded him of the 40 years’ negotiation over 
the closing of the Scheldt, thereby suggesting that the main decisions should 
not be made in Mainz, but elsewhere.72 In 1822 a perfect opportunity to raise 
the issue to the highest level presented itself, when the Great Powers held a 
new European Congress in the Italian city of Verona. 
From the sources it seems that the initiative of ‘European interference’ 
was not taken by Prussia, but by the leader of the Great Powers, Great 
Britain. In 1822 the Netherlands was about to issue a new tariff law that 
allowed the government to prohibit the transit of certain foreign goods up 
the Rhine. Great Britain was highly doubtful that the Netherlands had the 
right to establish a prohibition without consulting other states; in principle 
this frustrated the freedom of navigation on the Rhine, and thus disregarded 
the Vienna Congress Treaty to which the Netherlands had also acceded. 
Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington (1769–1852), the main repre-
sentative of Great Britain at the Congress of Verona, consulted over the 
matter with France and Prussia and decided to address a note to the 
attending partners at the Congress on 27 November saying, ‘notwithstand-
ing this Treaty, to which every Power in Europe is a Party, the Government 
of the Netherlands have thought proper to close the mouth of the river 
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against the commerce of the world.’ As this was a matter of general interest, 
he further demanded that 
an effort might be made by the Ministers of the Five Powers at the Court 
of Brussels, to induce the King of the Netherlands to adopt measures in 
relation to the navigation of the Rhine, in concert with other Powers 
bordering on that river, which may have the effect of bringing into 
execution the Treaty of Vienna on this subject. 
The proceedings of the Congress further noted that the difficulties in settling 
the new Rhine regime were mainly the result of Dutch obstructions.73 This 
was highly offensive to the Dutch, as they perceived Prussian negligence, not 
alleged Dutch obstructions, as the reason for the delay. It was even more 
painful, as Niek van Sas pointed out, since Great Britain and the Netherlands 
had been partners in a ‘special relationship’ ever since the Dutch renaissance 
in 1813.74 Moreover, the Duke of Wellington was Prince of Waterloo, a title 
especially created by the Dutch king to honour the British field marshal as 
victor of the battle that defeated Napoleon.75 These circumstances demanded 
a deliberate approach. In the months following Verona, the Dutch govern-
ment received notes from the Austrian, British, Prussian, and Russian minis-
ters urging the repeal of the transit prohibitions. Russia hoped the 
Netherlands would finally implement ‘several of the essential clauses of the 
fundamental pact of Europe, which are in opposition to the commercial 
measures which it persists to maintain.’ Clancarty, the British representative 
in the River Congress Committee in Vienna, now minister in Brussels wrote: 
If it shall be permitted to the Maritime Power, having the Control over 
the Mouth of a Traversing River to prohibit the entry of it in Transit to 
certain Articles selected at its pleasure, the freedom of Commerce upon 
that River no longer exists – the River may be completely shut in its 
Navigation to all Articles whatever either going to or coming from parts 
beyond Sea, at the sole will of a single Power, and the whole Treaty in 
this respect become completely nullified.76 
In response to these remonstrances the Netherlands first tried to request the 
intervention of the Five Powers in order to bring into effect article XIX of the 
Vienna Convention, i.e. the abolishment of forced transshipment in Mainz 
and Cologne. This was declined. Moreover, in a special note the Netherlands 
tried to seduce London into concluding a bilateral agreement on the basis of 
favourable transit tariffs. This attempt to separate Great Britain from the 
other Great Powers and bring it into the Dutch camp swiftly failed as well. In 
the years following the Congress of Verona, the Netherlands was in dock. The 
British rejected the proposal to transfer the negotiations upon the subject to 
London and continued, in accordance with the other Powers, to urge the 
Dutch government to settle the matter according the Vienna stipulations.77 
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It shows that the Great Powers considered themselves guarantors of the river 
stipulations of the Vienna Treaty, protecting the European interests rather 
than the riparian interests, let alone those of the Dutch.78 
Meanwhile, in Mainz, the balance was shifting. After Jacobi’s project had 
been set aside by the other commissioners, Prussia sent a new representative, 
Daniel Heinrich Delius (1773–1832), a former minister in Brussels and gov-
ernor of Trier. Delius was a man with ‘serene superiority’ and, most impor-
tantly, could be regarded by the other German states as a Prussian with an 
eye for the larger German interest.79 Deliberations continued, but Delius 
started openly questioning the efficiency of the CCNR. In the summer of 
1824, in a confidential note to the representatives of the smaller German 
states, the Prussian commissioner suggested terminating the Commission 
altogether and starting negotiations on the future Rhine administration on a 
bilateral basis.80 In a note to the British government, Prussia announced that 
the minor states had responded positively to this demand, and – although this 
was in reality not the case – he claimed that they were willing to withdraw 
their commissioners from Mainz.81 Prussia would do the same unless ‘the 
Netherlands Government should, without further delay, accede to the princi-
ples of the Congress of Vienna, as interpreted by the Ministers of the Allied 
Powers at Verona.’82 The Prussian attempt to get the most powerful Great 
Power putting pressure on the Netherlands failed. By June 1825 the threat 
had not led to any concerted action by the five Great Powers, nor by the 
minor riparian states. 
Thus, to push the issue to the extreme, in the 364th protocol of the CCNR, 
the Prussian delegate simply adjourned the CCNR’s sessions indefinitely. In a 
written note, Delius stated in absentia that his government believed that the 
costs, by now no less than 700,000 franks (or about 5 million euros today), 
outweighed the benefits of the Commission. After nine years of endless dis-
cussions, its ordinary tasks were totally bogged down. The Commission was 
not in a position to control compliance with the regulations, as the definitive 
regulations were still not fixed. Besides, mutual communications regarding the 
navigation of the Rhine did not require a permanent riparian assembly. As for 
its extraordinary tasks, one could safely say the Commission had failed, 
Delius wrote. The CCNR could not agree on the definitive regulations; 
therefore the replacement of a Rhine administration was unnecessary, as most 
tasks were directed to the individual riparian governments and did not require 
a permanent assembly. 
That was the moment the Netherlands found a new ally on its side within 
the Commission. The French delegate reacted to Delius’s note as if he had 
been kicked by a horse. It was inadmissible that Prussia demanded the dis-
solution of the Commission, while it was this very state that with the sole aim 
of promoting its own interest obstructed the establishment of a new Rhine 
regime by maintaining the forced transshipment. The French Commissioner, 
Baron St. Mars, concluded that this move must have been the personal 
initiative of the Prussian delegate as it did not correspond with the 
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commissioners’ mandate to establish common regulations for the Rhine as 
determined by the Vienna Convention. In this unusual and painful situation, 
the Commission was to appeal to the integrity and righteousness of the 
Prussian king and demand Delius’s replacement. After Verona, France was 
the only Great Power that had never reprimanded the Netherlands on the 
issue of Rhine navigation. It supported the Dutch understanding of the 
Vienna Convention because French trade over the Rhine was not much tou-
ched by it, whereas east–west trade routes through French canals could only 
profit from a closed Rhine mouth. 
For very different reasons, the other riparian powers agreed with France. 
On 22 June 1825 the Commission’s majority concluded that Delius was 
obstructing the realisation of the Vienna Convention. His argument about the 
costs was thwarted, as a non-permanent Commission would result in a mere 
25 per cent cost reduction. More importantly, however, he was to blame for 
the fact that he had never shown real interest in the interpretation of the 
riparian governments of the jusqu’à la mer issue. Altogether, the Commission 
concluded that Delius’s ‘declaration is aimed at nothing less than an indefinite 
adjournment, during which no providence would have been made, and which 
would offer no guarantee (Bürgschaft) to the states of the Rhine, neither for 
the past nor for the future.’83 In other words, in the eyes of the riparian states 
the Commission was the only body that could and should bring them security. 
Secret Dutch-Prussian negotiations 
After 1825 the cards were reshuffled again, to the disadvantage of the Neth-
erlands. The Commission’s attempt to push the Prussian government to 
cooperate failed. Delius withdrew from Mainz, and left the Commission 
paralysed. Besides, in the current situation, most tolling stations were located 
on Prussian territory. Until 1825 the Central Bank of Cologne had always 
fairly redistributed these revenues among the riparian states. After the with-
drawal of Delius, the bank stopped reimbursing these incomes, thereby also 
affecting the Commission itself, which depended on these earnings. Van 
Eysinga noted in 1936 that by controlling this bank, Prussia controlled the 
‘nervus rerum omnium.’ Thereby, the main Rhine state knew how to take 
advantage of its hegemonic position as ‘beatus possidens.’84 
Moreover, Baden and Bavaria, especially, were shifting position and were 
looking for Prussian cooperation. Baden had started the largest canalisation 
project under the famous engineer Johann Gottfried Tulla (1770–1828), but 
experienced strong opposition from the Rhine states downstream which 
were frightened of an uncontrollable acceleration of the water stream once the 
works were finished. In exchange for Prussia’s (silent) approval to continue 
their engineering projects, Baden would acknowledge Prussia’s predominance, 
but it would think them magnanimous ‘who gladly give advantages to little 
ones, because they are small states and need them.’85 In Bavarian newspapers, 
the Dutch position was increasingly criticised. The liberal-minded Bavarian 
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Algemeine Zeitung concluded that the Netherlands interpreted the treaties in 
a way that suited their own interests best, and that was useless for German 
86commerce. 
A pamphlet, probably written by merchants of the larger German Rhine 
towns and addressed ‘to the enlightened part’ of the Dutch merchants, clearly 
made this point.87 Whereas the German riparian states appealed to legitimate 
European or even universal principles, the Netherlands was driven by irra-
tionality. Reciprocity was key to liberty and liberty was key to prosperity, 
while chasing after solitary economic advantages was not only an insult to 
European solidarity, but it could also invoke uncontrollable rivalries.88 The 
writers underscored the Dutch interest in an open river, as competing French 
and German ports were already welcoming the diverted commerce. It warned: 
what are the capabilities of an isolated state, that violently made an 
enemy out of its most powerful neighbour at the Rhine, depends on 
remote quasi-friends that only pursue their self-interest … and above all 
comes out in opposition to the High Allied Powers [?]89 
No one doubted that the Great Powers would intervene when the security of 
the Vienna principles were endangered. In a cold and evocative tone the 
pamphleteers noted that they did not need to fear an escalation and its con-
sequences ‘since the Dutch government has been endowed with too much 
sense to take the highest risk.’ The message was clear: if the Netherlands 
continued to block the free navigation of the Rhine, it would lose what it said 
it was so vigorously protecting – its national sovereignty.90 
The Bavarian comments and the German pamphlet were reactions to a 
surprising public provocation by the Austrian minister in the Netherlands, 
Count Félix Von Mier, in 1826. The provocation once more showed the 
interest the Great Powers had in the issue, including Austria, which until then 
had always been protecting its only direct commercial outlet towards the 
northern seas from the sidelines. In a memorandum that against all diplo-
matic standards he had published in a Frankfurt newspaper, the Austrian 
official insisted on the liberalisation of Rhine navigation into the sea. Von 
Mier not only referred to the principles and arrangements that had been 
agreed on in Vienna, but also mentioned that since the Allies had charged the 
Netherlands, and the House of Orange, with sovereignty over the Dutch 
territories, Holland was also to meet the Allied conditions. 
The Austrian statement about the principle of free navigation infuriated 
the Dutch king. It did not recognise his absolute sovereignty and depicted 
him as some kind of secondary authority that was (publicly) kept on a leash 
by the Great Powers.91 Presumably the minister, speaking for one of the 
major European powers, expected with his public memorandum to force a 
breakthrough in the lingering Rhine debate. In reality, the result was the 
complete opposite. The British ambassador in the Netherlands, Charles 
Bagot (1781–1843), reported to the Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, 
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George Canning (1770–1827), that the Austrian insinuation had ‘piqué au 
vif ’ the Dutch king: 
Perhaps it is a pity that this chord was touched, for the King will never 
get off his high horse about it, and there is so much to be said on both 
sides that the real question may be deferred ad infinitum, or perhaps lost 
in the discussion of one that practically does not signify a pinch of 
92snuff. 
While in 1822, after Verona, the Netherlands had reached out to the five 
Great Powers, Von Mier’s reaction had definitely shut that door. Yet the dif-
ficulties within the Commission and shifts among riparian states made the 
Dutch position vulnerable. It was because of these circumstances that on 
10 September 1826 the Netherlands issued a decree that would install free-
dom of navigation on the river Lek as installed on the German-French parts 
of the Rhine from April 1827 onwards.93 Straight away, the government 
started a charm offensive by informing all the Great Powers about this shift of 
policy. Simultaneously, the Dutch government offered the Prussian govern-
ment the opportunity to start negotiations on their differences, prior to 
starting the discussions in Mainz anew.94 
In the government’s instructions to the special delegate J.E.P.E. Gericke van 
Herwijnen (1785–1845), the Dutch strategy for the negotiations with the 
Prussians was clearly formulated. Bourcourd, the Dutch commissioner in 
the CCNR, had prepared the core of it, i.e. to create the impression that the 
Netherlands represented the rights of the riparian states as a whole and to 
look for consensus on the basis of strict reciprocity. The Netherlands natu-
rally demanded the abolition of the forced transshipment on the German 
Rhine. In return it had already announced the introduction of the liberal 
regime on the Lek. Additionally, the Netherlands had one other trump card 
to play. It could consider expanding the liberal regime to the much more 
important river branch of the Rhine: the Waal. This extension would trans-
cend the Vienna stipulations and was presumably an offer no one could 
refuse. The offer, however, was not without conditions. First, the river regime 
would reach to the sea, meaning that the Netherlands maintained maritime 
sovereignty and could continue to levy transit duties as it saw fit. Second, 
navigation on the Rhine would only be allowed to citizens of the respective 
riparian states. 
Gericke was instructed to underline that these conditions were also in the 
German interest, as they protected the German Rhine from ‘an overdose of 
foreign goods’ and promoted the navigation of the Rhine under German 
flags, while a significant reduction of the transit duties made them completely 
insignificant and hardly perceptible.95 This proved to be a clever strategy. 
Indeed, Prussia was wary of foreign boats and the excessive flow of British 
goods in its territory. This would harm Prussian and German infant industries 
along the Rhine. Until 1827 Prussia had threatened several times to call in the 
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Great Powers to protect the implementation of the Viennese articles. How-
ever, the Dutch-Prussian negotiations clarified that the interests, expectations, 
and principles of the Great Powers were not compatible with those of the 
riparian states. Indeed, Prussia’s attachment to their deviant interpretation of 
the Viennese articles disappeared and direct interference by the Great Powers 
became undesirable when it turned out that Great Britain merely desired an 
open Rhine that was accessible for its own merchandise and transport. 
By 1829 Prussia and the Netherlands finally agreed on the conditions of a 
new Rhine regime. The Rhine would have a uniform toll system and free 
navigation for residents of all riparian states. Boatmen associations and forced 
transshipment were abolished. The Waal would be made subject to the Rhine 
regime as well. Finally, the Netherlands limited its transit taxes to a fixed 
rate and renamed them. This meant that the Great Power understanding of 
the jusqu’à la mer clause was rejected. The agreement was submitted to the 
CCNR and finally ratified as the Mainz Convention in 1831. Great Power 
intervention on the Rhine had been prevented. 
There are indications that Prussia never really intended to withdraw from 
the Commission, but used its absence as a means of leverage against the other 
riparian states. Possibly it was the unanticipated vigour with which the other 
European Great Powers publicly intervened that initially pushed the riparian 
powers apart. But as soon as the ‘European’ understanding of the Vienna 
Convention did not seem to correspond with either the Dutch, or the Prus-
sian, or the larger German interests, the Dutch and Prussian governments 
chose to reconsider a bilateral approach. The Dutch-Prussian negotiations 
strengthened the notion of a common interest, or better, the notion of a 
common disinterest. The individual interests of Prussia and the Netherlands 
corresponded better with the interest of the riparian states than with the 
European interest at large. 
Conclusion 
After 1816 the CCNR faced the difficult task of implementing a regime for 
navigation on the Rhine that balanced local interests against the common 
interest under the flag of freedom of navigation. Initially, Eichhoff helped a 
great deal to determine the three main characteristics of the freedom of 
navigation principle, namely uniformity, equality, and continuity. However, it 
was only after extensive discussions, and a quasi-implosion of the Commis-
sion itself, that the commissioners reached an agreement on two additional 
demarcations to the freedom of navigation. First, who was to enjoy speed, 
security, order, and cheapness on the Rhine? And second, where was the 
regime to be applied? In the course of the 1820s, the CCNR managed to 
answer these questions by redetermining the security-prosperity nexus. 
The CCNR found the answer to the first question in the principle of reci-
procity, more specifically inter-riparian reciprocity. Only those sharing the 
burden of cooperation should benefit from the Rhine regime. Moreover, the 
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regime’s establishment was a sign of goodwill towards each other, rather than 
the formalisation of a European security instruction. The principle of reci-
procity secured sovereignty towards each other and collectively towards the 
Great Powers, while simultaneously promoting prosperity within the riparian 
condominium. Eventually, the CCNR found the answer to the second 
question – where the regime was to be applied – in a fluvial understanding of 
the principle of navigation. Thus, Dutch sovereignty was maintained, and 
German infant industries were simultaneously protected from an excess of 
British merchandise. In an additional bilateral agreement, the Netherlands 
and Prussia mitigated the most detrimental consequences of the maintenance 
of the Dutch sea rights to (German) Rhine trade. In a strict sense the Mainz 
Convention of 1831 did not mirror the Vienna spirit, as the Netherlands 
remained the gatekeeper of the Rhine. Moreover, Great Britain was sidelined, 
and the European project of turning international rivers into the Continent’s 
main transnational corridors of commerce and communication was deliberately 
redesigned into a project for the common good of primarily the riparian states. 
It is true that in the immediate establishment of the Mainz Convention the 
CCNR played a minor role. Nevertheless, in the years of negotiations leading 
up to its adoption, the CCNR had clearly set the bandwidth of the negotia-
tions between Prussia (Delius) and the Netherlands (Gericke, who was 
instructed by Bourcourd). Despite the highly contested topics the members 
discussed, the Commission had never fallen apart. It had shown itself able to 
actively intervene and sometimes discipline rather passionate disagreements. 
It removed off-topic issues from the table and had Prussia and the Nether-
lands clearly formulate their final demands. Moreover, it rationalised what 
could be rightly demanded from the Netherlands to enjoy free passage in 
Cologne and, when the Netherlands met these demands, it required that 
Prussia fulfil its duties in return. In the course of the 1820s the CCNR turned 
into a moral union that had never existed before, pursuing the common (that 
is riparian and inter-riparian) good. 
Moreover, on the practical and public relations side, the CCNR started to 
reach out to a larger public by publishing a portion of its protocols since 
1818, and more importantly, it published the provisional regulations. These 
were much-needed instructions and directions for merchants and skippers 
alike, who until then had no means of reasonably predicting the costs and 
timing of transport. In addition, the CCNR had slowly started to improve 
gauging. In other words, in matters of bureaucratisation and professionalisa-
tion, the CCNR had started a process of securing transport safety, commercial 
security, and toll revenues. 
The continued existence of the CCNR after the Mainz Convention can be 
explained in two complementary ways. On the one hand, the CCNR con-
stituted a legitimate claim of the riparian states to settle their own affairs, 
without Great Power interference. Thus by 1831 the European prosperity 
narrative had definitely succumbed to the riparian interest of trade security on 
the basis of inter-riparian reciprocity. On the other hand, the CCNR was a 
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rather efficient way for the riparian states to coordinate all practical matters 
related to Rhine navigation. However, the coordination and implementation 
of a new uniform Rhine regime was strongly hampered by a highly hetero-
geneous, fragmentary, and inaccurate collection of information on the geo-
physical character and navigable conditions of the Rhine. Before the CCNR 
could establish the new regime, before it could turn to making navigation on 
the Rhine safe, it needed to find a way to collect, harmonise, exchange, and 
interpret the relevant information. For an organisation that was established as a 
semi-diplomatic forum, rather than a centre of riverine knowledge production, 
this proved to be an arduous task in the following decade. 
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4 A river, a legislator 
The origins of a riverine knowledge system 
in the 1830s 
Introduction 
By 1831 the framework of the new Rhine regime had finally been established. 
However, without precise and compatible geophysical and hydraulic knowl-
edge, the commissioners were faced with the impossible task of rendering the 
river more manageable in both maritime and financial terms. This became 
especially clear during the tedious process of mapping the Rhine and during a 
first crisis in assessing the navigability of the Rhine, or more specifically of the 
Waal in the Netherlands in those years. How could the CCNR promote 
speed, security, order, and affordability on the Rhine when it depended on 
politicised reports from the respective national authorities? This chapter 
shows how in the 1830s the CCNR started to build a riverine knowledge 
system of its own by employing its administrative force and external experts 
in standardised data collection. By 1840 the CCNR established this new form 
of knowledge production and distribution, which was, on the one hand, cru-
cial to invigorate the principles of the new regime (uniformity, equality, con-
tinuity, reciprocity, and fluviality) and thus its legitimacy. On the other, the 
discussion of what safety of navigation actually entailed led to the formation 
of a new palette of norms ranging from transparency, predictability, and an 
increasing confidence in the human ability to govern a river in accordance 
with technocratic laws. 
What did they know? 
What could the members of the Central Commission know about the Rhine 
in 1831, in terms of its geophysical character and its navigable conditions? It 
is an overly simple question, but remains difficult to answer. As shown in 
Chapter 3, none of the Commission members were experts on the Rhine, in 
so far as its economical and geographical coordinates were concerned. This 
was still true in the 1830s, the inception phase of the new-style CCNR. Even 
with new members substituting for the old diplomats from the first round of 
commissioners, they remained first and foremost diplomats, some with a fiscal 
background. The three main sources of knowledge and information on the 
physical, socio-economic, and functional character of the Rhine must have 
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been the growing collection of cultural expression such as poems, travelogues, 
and pictures of the ‘Romantic Rhine,’ the more official reporting and map 
collections of local and national water authorities, and, finally, the first 
reports written by officials related to the Commission in the period preceding 
the 1830s. 
The starting phase of the Rhine Commission could draw on the products of 
the effervescent stage of Rhine romanticism, with its manifold outlets that 
spoke to the imagination, ranging from registered folk songs, to legends, fairy 
tales, and epic stories. The British poet Lord Byron (1788–1824) put the 
Rhine on the map, figuratively speaking, by writing in a melancholy manner 
about the part between Koblenz and Bingen, where natural beauty and ruined 
castles made it extraordinarily scenic. ‘The river nobly foams and flows/The 
charm of this enchanted ground,’ Lord Byron wrote in 1818, 
And all its thousand turns disclose 
Some fresher beauty varying round: 
Through life to dwell delighted here; 
Nor could on earth a spot be found 
To nature and to me so dear, 
Could thy dear eyes in following mine 
Still sweeten more these banks of Rhine! 
In the same period the British artist William Turner (1775–1851) also visua-
lised the Rhine with his watercolour paintings. With Die Lore-ley, both the 
name of a steep rock in the same segment between Koblenz and Bingen and 
of the nymph singing there, the German poet Heinrich Heine (1797–1856) 
added some tragedy to Byron’s and Turner’s romanticism in 1824. ‘It seizes 
the boatman in his skiff/With wildly aching pain,’ Heine wrote about the 
effect of the nymph’s hymn: 
He does not see the rocky reefs, 
He only looks up to the heights. 
I think at last the waves swallow 
The boatman and his boat; 
And that, with her singing, 
The Loreley has done.1 
Thanks to these cultural expressions in the first decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Rhine became a prime destination for the emerging tourist industry, an 
industry that indeed started on and around that particular river in the heartland 
of Germany. This resulted in the first, and an increasing number of, commer-
cially distributed travel reports and state-of-the-art popular imagery that depic-
ted the Rhine in all its natural and historical splendour.2 The first book that set 
in motion the famous travel guide empire from Koblenz, Baedeker, was in fact a 
tourist guide about a Rhine trip from Mainz to Cologne.3 
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For romanticist travellers, the Rhine’s beauty and history provided an 
escape from the threatening side effects of the unnatural and rootless moder-
nity of industrialisation. For the commissioners in the CCNR, these infor-
mation sources provided a frame of imagination for what the Rhine 
represented. Depictions of natural and historical beauty might have increased 
the commissioners’ commitment to the river, as a territory they could and 
would identify with, and as a lifeline with an increasing cultural dynamic of 
its own. The Dutch Commissioner Johan Bourcourd, for example, felt so 
much attracted to and part of the region, that he stayed on even after his 
retirement in 1832, and built himself an estate to which he retired in the 
Rhine city of Wiesbaden for the rest of his life, some 60 kilometres from 
Heine’s Loreley.4 
But besides such emotional commitment, the travel reports as sources of 
information also had a very practical result. They provided a first collection 
of maps of segments of the river that allowed the commissioners to picture 
the Rhine in its entirety and to appreciate its geophysical diversity and com-
plexity. Cartographic Rhine illustration as a genre had started with the 
German painter Elisabeth von Adlerflycht (1775–1846). In the early 1810s, 
she drew the very first ‘Rheinpanorama,’ mostly out of aesthetic satisfaction. 
It was a parallel projection of the Rhine from the Nahe to the Mosel, high-
lighting locations of natural and historical interest. It is a composition we still 
recognise in some of today’s greeting cards from the Rhine or other rivers. 
Indeed, with the romantic upswing of the Rhine in the early 1820s, these 
kinds of visual representations became highly popular and provided the 
commissioners with a bird’s-eye view of the subject they administered. 
Next to the somewhat fuzzy and intangible romantic interpretations of the 
Rhine, reports from local and national water authorities were already a much 
more concrete and therefore highly important source of information on the 
Rhine. In the wake of the French Revolution, progressive statesmen around 
Europe centralised the fragmented water management systems into national 
organisations. In the first half of the nineteenth century the increasing cen-
tralisation of water management in the respective riparian states was accom-
panied and driven by the production of a national knowledge system that 
concerned the behaviour of the Rhine and the conditions of the dikes and 
shores.5 These mostly nationally aggregated knowledge reservoirs constituted 
an important source for the respective commissioners in the CCNR to grasp 
the geophysical character of the Rhine and its navigable conditions. 
A typical example of a centralising national river management system was 
the Netherlands. At the end of the eighteenth century the country suffered 
from an increasing number of ever more damaging river flood catastrophes 
that could only be tackled by hydraulic expertise and a powerful institution. 
The birth of central water management in the Netherlands followed under 
French administrative rule in 1798. The hydraulic expert and former head of 
water management in the province of Holland, Christiaan Brunings 
(1736–1805), was appointed chief executive officer of the National Bureau of 
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Figure 4.1 Cartographic illustration of the Rhine valley, or Rheinpanorama by 
Elisabeth Susanna Maria Rebecca von Adlerflycht (1811) 
Source: Historisches Museum Frankfurt (HMF.C04577), Foto: Horst Ziegenfusz 
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Water Management.6 This bureau was charged with developing a centralised 
river policy and with managing floods. By observing the rivers as a coherent 
system and utilising general principles of mostly Italian and German water 
engineers, experts appointed by the Bureau systematically gathered informa-
tion on the rivers and tried to tackle the main problems they caused. Dangers 
occurred especially in wintertime, when huge ice floes pushed against the 
fragile dikes and blocked the water stream. 
Only eight months after its establishment, the Bureau encountered its first 
test case, one that resulted in a first intensive flow of information. Floating ice 
and growing water caused an alarming situation on the Upper Rhine before 
Nijmegen in January 1799. The frozen ground made it impossible to anchor 
provisional water barriers, while the water instantly flushed away the manure 
used to raise the dikes. Inhabitants of the countryside took refuge in the sur-
rounding cities. On 5 February the church bells rung, the dike breached, and 
within minutes the city of Zeevenaar was inundated. The priest had the poor 
take shelter in the school on somewhat higher ground, while the cattle took 
refuge in the church. Others could stay in their attics: ‘Many people had to 
spend the night in the attic in that fierce cold, and walk over it to avoid 
freezing,’ the priest wrote.7 Agents of the National Bureau of Water Man-
agement inspected and reported to their superiors in a consistent manner on 
the rivers and the dikes and advised local authorities what emergency mea-
sures to take. Never before had the central government been so involved in 
local water management. Nevertheless, in Zeevenaar four inhabitants per-
ished, so the priest noted, while all along the rivers the disaster sadly led to 
the death of dozens of people and enormous material damage.8 
After this disaster, which hit a large part of the Netherlands, the Bureau 
sought to standardise ways of observing, reporting, and advising in order to 
increase its efficacy. Special regulations resulted in the first systematic compi-
lation of river measuring data, such as water levels and dike conditions, which 
were instrumental in determining flood prevention policies.9 As a second 
measure, the Bureau introduced the systematic inspection of channels, dikes, 
groynes, and sluices that fell under its jurisdiction by their engineers during 
fall and spring. 
Despite this first systematisation of centralised river management and 
knowledge production, new floods occurred in the Netherlands. The January 
1809 flood caused even more death and destruction than the previous inun-
dation ten years earlier, with 100,000 victims, among which there were 275 
fatalities.10 In an attempt to raise material and moral relief, the Dutch poet 
Johannis Immerzeel (1776–1841) published a booklet in verse: 
Cruel dangers! Floating ice and waves 
Tear and drag a hundred to death 
Livestock doesn’t find any fodder 
The child does not find a mother 
The poor no water: rich no bread11 
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Louis Napoleon, King of Holland, visited the disaster areas and showed 
himself utterly committed to relieving the dire situation of the Dutch. More 
importantly, he put much effort into structurally enhancing the country’s 
resilience with regard to the rivers’ threat. Napoleon turned the Bureau of the 
Waterstaat into a separate ministry with its own research department. He 
improved communication between the existing local water authorities and 
their reservoir of empirical knowledge of river behaviour with the technolo-
gical-scientific and river management experts of the Bureau on the national 
level. Research in the Bureau also entailed the collection and study of 
national and international literature on hydraulics and civil engineering.12 
The body of experts on Waterstaat became responsible for the plans, pro-
jects, and execution of river engineering works for the conservation and 
improvement of the kingdom of Holland. It would be a difficult task, yet 
there was no doubt this enormous project was achievable, the king wrote: 
‘When the total security of an entire nation is so imminent and so totally 
threatened … no effort is too great for such an undertaking.’13 The Bureau 
was increasingly populated by professionally schooled hydraulic experts, who, 
in their studies, were strongly influenced by the impressive results of a battle 
against the water that was being fought on the Upper Rhine under the 
famous leadership of Baden engineer Johann Gottfried Tulla. 
In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, after major floods had 
harmed the country more than once, the Baden government also followed the 
French example of centralising the water authorities within the 
Großherzoglich Badischen Oberdirektion des Wasser- und Straßenbaus and 
professionalised the schooling of hydraulic engineers in Karlsruhe. Within this 
framework, and as director of the Oberdirektion, Tulla projected his Rhine 
correction programme. The programme was preceded by large-scale mea-
surement operations, generating data on water levels, discharge, and velocity. 
It was on the basis of these data that the works were determined and carried 
out.14 Both in the Netherlands and in Baden, improving navigability came 
second to the protection of the land against unpredictable floods. Nonetheless, 
both reforms were important steps in the professionalisation of centralised 
water authorities. At its core, this centralised water management continued 
after the French defeat in 1814. 
Protecting navigation from natural and man-made obstacles required not 
only the understanding of (sometimes conflicting) hydraulic theories on how 
rivers can or should behave, but also the collection and analysis of specific 
empirical data for every stretch of its course and of the adjacent towpaths, as 
well as on the character and quantity of the navigation and commerce taking 
place between Basel and the Dutch sea ports. In part, the CCNR commis-
sioners could extract this kind of information from their respective ministries 
of Economic Affairs. Additional information was to be found in the archives 
of local port authorities, chambers of commerce, shipping insurance compa-
nies, and, of course, the former Octroi Administration and national customs 
authorities that assembled a wealth of substantial, but simultaneously quite 
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disconnected, data. As there had never been an international body governing 
the entire Rhine before, the information on the river was fragmentary, 
incomplete, often mistaken, and sometimes incompatible. 
Besides romantic interpretations of the Rhine and reports from local and 
national water authorities, the Commission could rely on a third body of 
intelligence: that is, accounts by its own officials. Yet even these accounts 
had their limitations. Illustrative of how little even well-informed officials 
knew about the Rhine, despite its great importance for western European 
trade relations, is that in an outstanding publication of 1816, the author 
needed no less than 48 pages to come only to an estimation of the river’s 
length, width, and depth.15 The author of the book, which focused solely on 
the current geophysical and maritime conditions of the Rhine, was the 
inspector of the provisional administration of the Rhine, Joseph Franz 
Ockhart. He knew that in principle one could know the length of a river by 
measuring the length of the towpaths running along the water stream. By 
collecting and adding up all the possible data on the distance of these tow-
paths from town to town, Ockhart came to a final distance of 303.5 miles, 
which was about 15 per cent shorter than most educated guesses of well-
known geographers of his time. However, it was still not certain what this 
possibly more precise distance exactly meant. A mile was a relative measure, 
as it equalled the distance walked in one hour. This made it unclear as to 
how many kilometres it corresponded to. In the German provinces on the 
left side of the Rhine, for example, one calculated 5 kilometres per hour, 
whereas a typical Swiss hour involved 5.555 kilometres, and a standard 
French hour, bon vivants that they were, a mere 4.444 kilometres. To keep it 
simple, Ockhart maintained the 5 kilometres scale, but he knew that his 
collection of the available data was not precise. For definite figures of the 
Rhine’s length and size, one needed to await the measurement that the 
CCNR was to carry out. 
In the introduction to his work, Ockhart underlined the fundamental 
importance of having available specific geophysical information on the Rhine 
in order to secure freedom of navigation. After all, the only guarantee that 
this freedom would be safely exercised was the issuing of police regulations. 
And, so Ockhart reasoned: 
[all] that is to be regulated about the navigation of a river, must, as it 
were, emerge from the particular nature and quality of its bed, as well as 
from the other conditions, by which its navigability is determined: then in 
this respect, also the Rhine, as it were, must be asked first of all, what it 
allows for the safety of the transports to be accomplished on its waters. 
One needed to know the geophysical and hydraulic particularities of the 
Rhine in detail in order to be able to design and apply the right regulations to 
it. In a philosophical vein, Ockhart observed that, in this sense, every river 
was its own legislator.16 
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After all the diplomatic negotiations and political bickering that had 
absorbed so much of the valuable time of the Commission in the 15 years 
following Ockhart’s appeal, it was now time to create an administrative 
regime and police regulations on the basis of information that was aggregated 
from these three main sources and was now ready to be synthesised and pro-
cessed by the Commission itself. The new constitution of the CCNR in 1831 
empowered the Commission to do exactly that. 
The administrative machine 
At 11 o’clock in the morning of Thursday 16 June 1831, in the usual offices 
of the CCNR on the Grosse Bleiche in Mainz, the representatives of the 
riparian states officially exchanged the ratified Convention. One month later 
it would enter into force. This day would therefore mark a formal turning 
point in the history of the Rhine, and of the Commission itself. A Dutch 
paper wrote: 
[T]he shackles, in which the navigation of the Rhine had been caught for 
centuries, are removed … the gates from this glorious river are opened for 
shipping and commerce into the great sea. … Free competition will take 
the place of the old skippers’ guilds, and for the future everything pro-
mises liveliness and prosperity to those associated with the navigation of 
the Rhine.17 
From 1832 the CCNR subjected the Rhine to its new regime bit by bit.18 
Compared to the formative phase that lasted from 1816 to 1831, many 
things would change for the CCNR, such as its meetings. Ever since its first 
session in August 1816, the Commission had convened on a permanent basis, 
initially two to three times a week, later one to three times a month. After 
1831, the CCNR sessions were concentrated in time to a great extent. 
Between 1832 and 1836, the CCNR would convene twice a year. The summer 
session took about 14 days scattered over July and August. The winter session 
took about the same number of days spread over November and December. 
After 1836 the meetings were reduced even further to one annual summer 
session that, until the 1860s, would take about ten days dispersed over August 
and September. This limited gathering time made it redundant for the com-
missioners to actually establish themselves in Mainz; only the French com-
missioner did so, since he was also the French consul in Mainz. The fact that 
it was sufficient to travel once or twice a year to the fortified city for such a 
limited amount of time allowed the position of CCNR commissioner to be a 
side-job. After the Mainz Convention, the average duration of the position 
was roughly a decade, while the turnover of Rhine commissioners was 
between 20 and almost 50 per cent higher when compared to the 1816–1831 
period.19 Did this looser organisation of the CCNR make it less decisive, 
authoritative, or effective? In fact, it didn’t. 
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The Mainz Convention was clear in the powers and duties it attributed to 
the Commission.20 With its constitutive labour finished, its work focused on 
five main responsibilities. First, it was to monitor the compliance of the reg-
ulations as stipulated in the Convention of Mainz. Second, it was to propose 
new regulations to the respective governments of the riparian states in so far 
as necessary or deemed useful for the development of navigation. The Com-
mission decided on new regulations by majority, but it could not enforce these 
regulations without the approval of the concerned state. Third, it was to insist 
on the involved authorities speeding up the engineering works that were 
necessary in and along the river course to protect the banks, the riverbed, and 
the towpaths, or works that could in any other way be beneficial for naviga-
tion. Fourth, as was already postulated by the Vienna Convention, the Com-
mission was to report annually on the conditions of navigation, in terms of 
progress or decline, and any changes that may have occurred in the preceding 
year. Ultimately, the Commission functioned as a court of appeal in disputes 
regarding Rhine navigation.21 
In the Mainz Convention of 1831, one of the prime functions of the Com-
mission stipulated by article X of the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 did not return. 
It was no longer made explicit that the Commission was ‘to form an author-
ity which deals with the official communications between the riparian States 
on everything relating to navigation.’ Instead, in practice the Commission 
would become a node, collecting, distributing, and producing information on 
a much more inclusive scale, and thereby not only aiming to solve justified 
complaints of riparian authorities about the conditions of Rhine navigation, 
but also those of merchants, ship owners, and leading figures in Rhine naviga-
tion. In order to carry out its advising, coordinating, and monitoring functions 
well, the Commission would depend more and more on a growing auxiliary 
network of knowledge-based experts. The main coordinating figure of these 
information flows coming into and leaving the CCNR was head of the larger 
administrative machine: Chief Inspector of the Navigation of the Rhine. On 17 
December 1831 the Prussian local government official Ferdinand Wilhelm 
August von Auer (1786–1877) was installed Chief Inspector for life.22 
Von Auer was not totally unknown with regard to Rhine administrative 
matters. His father, Carl Albrecht Wilhelm von Auer (1748–1830), was direc-
tor of the tolling station in Emmerich in the first decade of the nineteenth 
century, and in 1814 Stein appointed both men, and Colonel Gergens, in the 
temporary directorate of the Octroi under Solms-Laubach.23 In 1816, after 
this brief Rhine experience, Ferdinand von Auer became governing counsel in 
Cologne until his appointment in Mainz, where he resided at Schlossplatze 1. 
As the landlord of the CCNR offices at the Grosse Bleiche did not want to 
continue the rental contract after 1831, the Chief Inspector rented out his 
private home for the annual sessions, while the CCNR archives were also 
relocated to his residence.24 
The Chief Inspector of the Navigation of the Rhine headed the adminis-
trative machine of the CCNR. His main task was to assess whether 
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complaints about the conditions of navigation on the Rhine were justified or 
not. In the case of reported disorder or fraud in the ports, natural or man-
made obstacles in the riverbed, neglect of the towpaths, or in the case of toll 
collectors or customs officials acting contrary to the present order, the Chief 
Inspector was charged to solve these problems as quickly as possible by 
applying for assistance to the local authorities. Should these not respond to 
his demand, the Chief Inspector was to bring the issue to the CCNR. More-
over, he collected all information that was considered useful for the annual 
meetings in order to facilitate the work of the CCNR. This intelligence was to 
inform the CCNR about the state of navigation on the Rhine and its short-
comings, and the Chief Inspector’s recommendations were included as well.25 
Therefore the Chief Inspector functioned as a channel of information between 
the merchants and ship-owners on the one hand and the CCNR on the other. 
The Chief Inspector was elected, appointed, and paid by the CCNR. He took 
an oath in front of the CCNR commissioners, and had no other loyalties than 
towards this institution. 
The Chief Inspector was assisted by four sub-inspectors, each of whom was 
exclusively active in one of the four districts. The first district ranged from 
Basel to the discharge of the Lauter, that is, the Bavarian-French border, and 
was shared by Baden and France. The second district, from the French 
border to the discharge of the Nahe, or the city of Bingen, was a stretch 
shared by Bavaria, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau. The third district, from 
Bingen to the Dutch border, was exclusively Prussian, while the fourth district 
included the two branches of the Rhine from the Dutch border to the sea. 
The respective national government or governments appointed the sub-
inspector. These officials were to carry out two surveys a year assessing the 
navigability of the river and the conditions of the towpaths. They were to 
inform their governments of any detected deficiencies and possible solutions 
to them and were to report their efforts to the Chief Inspector.26 
Finally, the toll collectors and customs officials completed the administrative 
machine of the Rhine regime. Although, like the sub-inspectors, they too fell 
under the jurisdiction of the respective national governments, they had to abide 
by the Mainz Convention. By working closely together they could establish 
something of an esprit de corps, thereby developing a dynamic flow of knowl-
edge and inside information on their own, which, theoretically, gave them some 
leverage over their national governments in turn. 
In all this Von Auer was an especially key figure, as it was he who entered 
into circulation and predigested the flow of information on which the Com-
mission’s machine revolved. He collected information from the inspectors, 
who were themselves low-threshold points of reference for local stakeholders 
of Rhine navigation. Furthermore, with his right to request information from 
local authorities, he could not only control whether the Mainz Convention 
was implemented, but also assess whether the complaints were legitimate.27 
What is more, the Chief Inspector’s systematic documentation of the Rhine in 
terms of navigability gave the CCNR reliable information with which to 
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inform the general public about the conditions of the Rhine and the adjacent 
towpaths. As the focal point of these information flows, the Chief Inspector 
also functioned as an agenda setter for the annual sessions of the CCNR. The 
very first session of the new-style CCNR organised its deliberations into sub-
commissions. Each of these sub-commissions tackled an issue that had been 
put forward by the Chief Inspector, such as ‘reducing shipping taxes’ or 
‘Rhine measuring, boat gauging, inspection, toll tribunals and administrative 
execution of the regulations.’28 Finally, besides agenda setting, the Chief 
Inspector was the only agent consistently asked to advise the Commission in 
all important matters. This gave the Chief Inspector an important role in 
shaping the measures that the CCNR was to propose to the governments of 
the riparian states to secure freedom of navigation. 
Starting in the 1830s, the administrative machine of the CCNR was, com-
pared to its earlier form, designed to be both more robust and more flexible at 
the same time. It was flexible in the sense that the riparian representatives 
were physically not bound to the city of Mainz and could focus on other 
matters during a large part of the year. The administrative machine of the 
CCNR, however, was more robust in the sense that the tasks and responsi-
bilities were more clearly determined and its functions of advising, coordi-
nating, and monitoring all came together in one person, who was 
permanently active in this aim. However, as we will see in Chapter 5, the 
concentration of these responsibilities in one person also made the CCNR 
vulnerable at times to increasing riparian tensions such as in the 1840s. 
Mapping the Rhine 
One of the first tasks of the CCNR was to get a precise idea of the topo-
graphy of the river it was governing. This was of paramount importance in 
rendering it more manageable, both in hydraulic and in financial terms. With 
regard to hydraulics, Ockhart had already proclaimed in 1816 that specific 
geophysical information on the Rhine was necessary to secure freedom of 
navigation, as it was from this information the Commission could derive 
police regulations. It was with this aim in mind that Johann Joseph Eichhoff, 
who had been in charge of the preparatory works for the Commission, came 
up with a gigantic map of the entire Rhine and an accompanying bill of 1,500 
florins (almost 6,500€ today) the following year. Eichhoff had his ‘Hock-map’ 
assembled especially for his first version of the ‘definitive Regulations’ he had 
composed for the CCNR. The map was named after its creator, who was a 
captain in the corps of engineers of the allied army. It was certainly the first 
detailed map of the entire Rhine, and at 3 metres by 6 metres, it was possibly 
also the largest Rhine map ever made. Hock had assembled it on the basis of 
the available materials. The Prussian Commissioner Jacobi called the map 
‘awesome,’ but showed no interest in reimbursing Eichhoff and Hock for this 
service, as the measurements of the river banks seemed incoherent to him, 
making the map an aesthetic curiosity, but useless for the Commission’s 
98 The origins of riverine knowledge in the 1830s 
purposes.29 Jacobi thought about this venture not so much in terms of the 
hydraulic manageability of the river and its navigation, but in terms of 
financial interests. 
The Commission needed to construct a map of the entire Rhine as that was 
the only way to render the river financially manageable. At the Mainz Con-
vention the location of the toll stations had been determined, as well as the 
level of the toll tariff. Yet this had been estimated in relation to the navigable 
distances as appeared from the old, inconsistent maps. With a precise and 
complete map, the CCNR could, first and foremost, substitute the temporary 
tariff with a definite one and distribute the Rhine toll revenues among the 
riparian states fairly, relative to the exact distance of their respective riparian 
possessions.30 It goes without saying that compiling a map of the entire 
navigable Rhine was a highly symbolic endeavour too: a visual integration of 
a shared river. It would substitute the haziness about the Rhine’s length and 
size with definite clarity that everyone agreed on. This would be helpful in 
determining police regulations. But what made mapping the exact topography 
of the river such a sensitive issue was that the measurement determined the 
distribution of the toll income among the riparian states. This sensitivity 
caused a major stumbling block for the commissioners in reaching an agree-
ment on the terms on which a map of the entire navigable Rhine was to be 
compiled in the 1830s. This episode shows that even with regard to apparently 
neutral and rational acts such as measuring a river, the Commission needed 
external expertise to help determine what method was appropriate. 
The main question here was, should the map be entirely drawn up anew, 
or could the Commission partly rely on existing material? As mentioned 
before, maps of the Rhine existed. The oldest detailed Dutch maps of the 
Rhine date from the late sixteenth century. More recently, after Napoleon 
annexed the territories west of the Rhine, the French immediately started a 
Figure 4.2 Map of the Rhine between Switzerland and Holland 1640 by the Dutch 
cartographer Willem Jansz. Blaeu 
Source: Hessisches Staatsarchiv Darmstadt, P 1, 11892217 https://arcinsys.hessen.de/a 
rcinsys/detailAction.action?detailid=v4958741 
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topographical survey under the leadership of the famous cartographer Jean 
Joseph Tranchot in order to include the new territories on the existing map of 
France, the so-called Cassini map that had been completed in 1793. This 
operation was carried out between 1804 and 1813, but was only finalised 
under the Prussian general Karl von Müffling in 1828, who, together with the 
Dutch engineer Cornelis Rudolphus Theodorus Krayenhoff (1758–1840), 
perfected the instrument of trigonometry, and who, after having worked on 
the fortresses of the Wellington barrier and Mainz, spent time together dis-
cussing hydrology and land surveying.31 When south-west Germany was still 
a theatre of war, the various belligerent parties also initiated topographical 
surveys that included the Rhine. Knowing how the Rhine flowed, what its 
character was at certain points, where it could be crossed and where its shores 
were hard to defend could benefit the army’s strategic powers.32 However, 
taking these surveys together, they hardly added up to a consistent map of the 
Rhine. After all, they were not meant for navigational guidance, but for land 
registry, tax payment purposes, or for military strategic considerations in an 
upcoming campaign.33 Despite the local and regional importance of all these 
maps, they did not constitute a coherent visual representation of the Rhine. 
First of all, they did not cover the entire river from where it became navigable 
into the sea. Second, the maps were different in kind and composed with 
distinctive techniques for diverse ends. 
At the turn of 1832, the Prussian delegate, anticipating the difficulties that 
the compilation of an entirely new hydraulic map would evoke, convinced the 
CCNR not to commission a large hydraulic Rhine map, but a more modest 
survey to measure primarily the river’s length. The CCNR assigned the 
Prussian hydraulic and bridge engineering inspector Roesler34 to carry out the 
survey.35 Clearly, the Commission felt a bit uncomfortable charging an exter-
nal (Prussian) expert with this sensitive task. Therefore, Roesler was to take 
an oath in front of the Commission, promising to act in the common interest 
alone. Moreover, in the first July session in 1832, the Prussian commissioner, 
Jacobi, stated once more that Roesler was to get as free a hand as possible, 
but ‘He will not allow himself to be misled into any kind of arbitrariness and 
be prepared to give satisfactory information to his management at any 
time.’36 To constrain the risk of arbitrariness even further, the Commission 
issued strict instructions that determined what was to be measured – the 
towpaths, or in case these were absent, the banks at mean water level – and in 
which unit of measurement the result was to be presented – the French metre. 
The instructions also said that existing maps were only to be used when their 
exactness was verified and would not exceed a 1 per cent margin of error.37 
However, very quickly a debate emerged concerning the method of mea-
suring the length of the river. In August 1832 the Dutch delegate, P.A. Ruhr, 
informed the Commission that measuring the towpaths would not work on 
the Dutch part of the Rhine. Being a delta, there were too many tributary 
flows interrupting the towpath. Therefore it would be better, the Dutch 
Commissioner noted, to measure the navigable channel of the Rhine 
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instead.38 In May 1833, after the measuring commissioner returned from his 
first survey of the Rhine from Basel to Bingen, he too raised objections to the 
initial measuring instructions. A more exact way of measuring the river’s 
length was, he wrote, by calculating the main current line (Stromstrich) that 
was usually followed by boats and was longer than the towpaths. On stretches 
where the river was curvy or enriched with isles, the difference in length was 
especially significant, Roesler stated.39 
This led the Prussian commissioner, von Schutz, to call in the help of 
another authority, the Royal Prussian State Construction Commission (Ober-
Bau-Deputation) in Berlin that came up with yet another conclusion. Taking 
costs and speed of the measuring survey as the highest consideration, the 
length of the Rhine, the Construction Commission advised, should be mea-
sured merely by means of determining the medial axis of the river flow. 
Contrary to this medial axis, measuring towpaths was problematic, because, 
as the Dutch delegate had noted correctly, these paths were not present 
everywhere or were interrupted in too many places. Measuring the main cur-
rent line as opposed to the medial axis would become a very expensive and 
time-consuming operation as well. In order to determine the location of this 
current line one needed to measure both the depth of the stream and its 
velocity. In addition, currents are very versatile and yet another problem 
would arise when more than one main current line appeared in the river. The 
Prussian Construction Commission, therefore, guaranteed that instead of 
measuring the towpaths or the main current line, measuring the medial axis, 
on the basis of existing maps, would be precise enough for the purpose of the 
measurement and would be by far the cheapest option to determine the river’s 
length.40 This also meant that in this age of measuring the world, measuring 
the Rhine’s length became a desk job.41 
In 1834 the Commission adopted the Royal Prussian State Construction 
Commission’s opinion and amended its instructions for Roesler. Much against 
his own desire, the Vermessungs-Commissar was to determine the medial axis 
on the basis of the available maps. He was allowed to carry out excursions to 
the river bank only in case of grave doubt about their accuracy.42 The CCNR 
asked the national authorities to provide Roesler with all the necessary maps, 
or to create new ones if material was lacking. Over the next couple of years 
Roesler was condemned to work from the office after all, and the map he 
made was only a cheap by-product of his real task: measuring the length of 
the river. In 1839 the measurement of the Rhine was finished and Roesler 
presented a general map of the Rhine that consisted of 14 sheets and 4 tables. 
It turned out that the total length of the Rhine did not deviate much from 
what was already known, but the length of the individual parts did deviate 
quite a bit. Particularly on the Franco-Baden part of the Rhine, the river was 
shorter than initially believed, possibly affecting the future toll revenues of 
Baden considerably. Nevertheless, the Commission, including the Baden 
representative, approved the new measurements in 1841. At this point, the 
Chief Inspector could finally start determining the definitive toll tariff.43 
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In 1842 the Commission adopted an additional article to the Mainz Con-
vention that substituted the new tariff for the old one. On 1 July 1843 these 
new tariffs were  finally introduced.44 
Mapping the Rhine – as a function of rendering the river more manageable 
in both hydraulic and financial terms – turned out to be an enormous 
operation that took ten years to complete. It was the first exercise in stan-
dardising knowledge and knowledge collection about the river, in order to 
turn it into a controllable unit. It was also the way to overcome bickering 
between the riparian states. Bringing in experts and producing knowledge 
helped to secure the Rhine once more and deflect polarising energies in 
another direction. 
Safety of navigation 
Measuring the Rhine and determining the toll tariff was first and foremost on 
the Commission’s agenda, but securing the freedom of navigation by remov-
ing physical obstacles came directly second. Again, a kind of Gordian knot 
had to be unwound since, in fact, it was not in the powers of the CCNR to 
remove these obstacles itself. It was merely to monitor and to report the 
conditions for navigation, and to advise about, and to urge for, its 
improvement. 
Figure 4.3 View of the Loreley 
Source: J.L. Bleuler, Voyage pittoresque des bords du Rhin (Laufen, ca. 1840): Badische 
Landesbibliothek Karlsruhe (CC BY-SA 4.0) 
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Improvement of the navigability of the Rhine was no superfluity. Heine’s 
‘Loreley,’ the poem about the river nymph drawing the skippers to the rocks, 
spoke greatly to the imagination of contemporaries, precisely because the 
stretch at Sankt Goar, where the Loreley was located, was indeed dangerous 
to navigate. Due to its underwater rocks and heavy currents, boats were 
shipwrecked. These poor conditions were common all along the ‘romantic’ 
Rhine. The riverbed between Sankt Goar and Bingen was covered with rocks, 
each of them able to cut through the keel of a boat, even those that had not 
that deep a draft. Further upstream, between Bingen and Mainz the situation 
was not much better. Here the river was crowded with isles, sharp bends, 
sandbanks, and irregular shipping channels. On the junction between these 
two sections of the Rhine lay the Binger Loch, perhaps the most notorious 
example of a risky fairway. 
In 1827 the invisible threat of submerged rocks at the Binger Loch caused 
an accident that made it into the local, national, and international news-
papers. On 11 September, one of the first steamboats on the Rhine that had 
started a regular service between Cologne and Mainz only in May that year, 
the Concordia, crashed. It carried 200 passengers and a large amount of 
commercial cargo from the Frankfurter Trade Fair. The cargo was for the 
most part lost. In addition, the crash caused numerous personal injuries: 
‘Madame Hoffman, among others, lost several teeth; an English lady sus-
tained a crushed mandible, etc.,’ a Dutch newspaper reported. Nevertheless, 
the strong construction of the steamboat had prevented a worse outcome. 
‘Any other Upper Rhine vessel would have been irrevocably completely lost in 
such circumstances,’ the same article noted.45 Contemporaries had high 
expectations of the employment of steam-powered boats on the Rhine. Yet 
the accident demonstrated that even the latest transport technology was not 
equipped to safely navigate the Rhine. 
The safety of navigation depended on the conditions of the navigable 
channel and the towpaths on the one hand, and uniform regulations on the 
other. Through the Chief Inspector and the sub-inspectors the Commission 
had an active role in assessing the conditions of the water and the towpaths. 
These were also the points of contact for local stakeholders and interest 
groups, who referred their complaints to them. At the first July session after 
the rebirth of the Commission in 1832, it was indeed the Chief Inspector who 
informed the CCNR of shortcomings of the Rhine in the Duchy of Nassau. 
This time, not the channel, but the towpath along one of the best German 
wineries, Rüdesheim in the Rheingau, was blocked. ‘[Terrace] rises above 
terrace to secure the soil from falling. The entire hill is covered with walls and 
arches, the careful preservation of which conveys an idea of the value of the 
vines,’ the Baedeker travel guide tells us.46 Apparently, in 1832 some of these 
walls crumbled, and the rocks had fallen from the steep slopes on the river 
banks, burying the towpaths that were essential to guide the boats safely 
through the Binger Loch. The Commissioner from Nassau was asked to 
eliminate this danger through his government straight away.47 
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But the CCNR did not exclusively receive information on the navigability 
of the Rhine through the Chief Inspector. The CCNR commissioners them-
selves could also submit issues to the table. This could turn into a rather 
politicised debate on the Rhine’s navigability. In 1832, while Nassau did not 
seem to have its own house in order, the Prussian delegate was not too modest 
to inform the Commission that his government by contrast had carried out 
multiple and very expensive detonation operations in the Binger Loch in the 
past three years. Here, as far as Sankt Goar, the riverbed was scattered with 
visible and underwater rocks and reefs. The Binger Loch was one of the most 
dangerous parts of the river; it was the place where ‘the idyllic [part of the 
Rhine] stops, and everything unites in a wildly romantic picture,’ the Chief 
Engineer responsible for the blasting operation wrote in his memoirs.48 The 
navigable channel was the demarcation line between Prussian and Nassau 
territory. The removal of the rocks that were mostly situated on Prussian soil, 
the Chief Engineer remembered, was initiated and executed by the Prussian 
authorities alone, ‘whose charitable work is so well-known for raising trade 
and traffic.’49 The detonation had been successful. It removed one of the most 
dangerous obstacles in the Rhine, thereby doing the navigation an essential 
favour, the Prussian Commissioner underlined.50 The CCNR thus was not 
involved in the actual detonation of rocks, but served as a platform from 
which individual commissioners could brag about their government’s efforts 
in order to build leverage against future demands from their peers or force – 
gently or less so – reluctant governments to increase their efforts too. It also 
served as an assembly that functioned in a diplomatic or not so diplomatic 
name-and-shame style, with the aim of igniting a course of action that would 
eventually pursue the improvement of the Rhine’s fairway. 
In 1836 Prussia made a show of virtue again, but this time in contrast to 
the Netherlands. Prussian authorities had been alarmed by the claims of the 
Cologne Chamber of Commerce that accused the Dutch government of 
neglecting its towpaths along the Waal. Thereby, the Chamber warned, it 
acted against article 67 of the Convention of Mainz that stated that the tow-
paths should be maintained in good condition at the expense of the national 
government. In his well-prepared response, the Dutch commissioner, P.A. 
Ruhr, adopted a position of righteous indignation. The Waal, he noted, was 
simply not suitable for towpaths. The river was capricious and the regular 
floods had washed away part of the towpath already well before 1831. It was 
this discussion on the navigability of the Waal that would ignite the first 
major diplomatic crisis of the CCNR in the 1830s. 
In the Netherlands and beyond, it was common knowledge that not only 
the domestic but, above all, the upstream trade suffered from the lack of 
towpaths on the stretch from Gorinchem downwards. When there was no 
wind or an easterly wind, ships in Dordrecht could simply not depart for 
Cologne. Those skippers who were lucky enough to reach Gorinchem, or the 
upper arm of the Rhine, the Lek, could utilise the towpaths all the way to 
Cologne and return to Dordrecht while those at anchor were still waiting for 
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a favourable wind. In an environment of uncontrollable weather conditions, 
well-maintained towpaths were the only guarantee of speedy, but more 
importantly, calculable arrival of the delivery.51 There was no reason for the 
Dutch government to neglect the navigation, and thereby the interest of its 
very own people in such a way, if it had been possible to maintain the 
towpaths, the Dutch commissioner stated.52 
The Netherlands could not be held legally accountable, Ruhr reasoned. 
Besides the practical impossibility of maintaining towpaths on some parts of 
the Dutch rivers, the Mainz Convention only obliged the Netherlands to 
maintain existing towpaths along the Waal, not to reconstruct ones that had 
already disappeared well before 1831. Nevertheless, the Dutch commissioner 
made a conciliatory proposal of a solution to the problem. The Dutch gov-
ernment would install a steam-powered tug service that would, unaffected by 
high waters or lack of wind, and operating on fixed departure and arrival 
times, contribute to speed, regularity, and moderate freight rates, ‘wishing 
only the advancement of the general interests of commerce and navigation,’ 
the Dutch commissioner ended his response.53 
The commissioners were not altogether pleased with this Dutch initiative. 
The former French laws also demanded the maintenance of the towpaths 
before 1831, they claimed. And the oldest skippers still remembered that there 
once were towpaths that were accessible with an eastern wind, but unusable 
with northern and southern winds. In the course of the past years the Neth-
erlands, they said, had neglected to maintain these paths. The other commis-
sioners emphasised that the installation of a tug service could only be 
approved in concert with the other riparian powers, on a voluntary basis and 
on the basis of the equality of flags and on condition that there would never 
be delays, that the costs were comparable with those of horses, and that in 
case of malfunctioning the right to use the towpaths would be continued.54 
The Dutch commissioner hoped to win the other commissioners to his case 
when he pictured the conditions of the river as unalterable and the dis-
appearance of the towpaths as irreversible. The navigation would find no 
remedy in the enormous costs involved in restoring towpaths as it would not 
change the capricious character of the river itself: ‘shipping on the Rhine … 
would continue to be in the same deficient, unsafe, and for the present general 
commercial interest unsatisfactory state,’ whereas now ‘fortunately a well-
organised tug-institution by means of steamboats has ascended from it.’ The 
Dutch authorities installed this state-of-the-art tug service, it was true, with-
out consulting the other riparian states, but at least it bore all additional costs 
and risks. Furthermore, the Dutch commissioner confirmed that by rule all 
flags would be treated equally, that all skippers were free to sail instead of 
being tugged, and that there would always be an adequate number of tug-
boats available to secure the continuity of the service. Concerning the costs of 
the tug service, the Dutch commissioner remarked that these would not 
exceed the costs of horses, resulting in a considerable annual investment from 
the Dutch government, and proving once again that it only favoured the 
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general interests of navigation and commerce. In fact, the Dutch commis-
sioner stated, ‘by means of this tug-service, the Dutch government better 
complies to the true spirit of the agreement [the Convention of Mainz], than 
when it would have continued to maintain the interrupted towpaths.’ Finally, 
Ruhr stated that if the tug service did not function properly, the right to use 
the towpaths was guaranteed, as long as it concerned the towpaths that still 
existed in 1831.55 
The Dutch commissioner presented the tug service as a modern solution to 
an age-old problem. It goes without saying that the riparian states could not 
have thought of this solution during Mainz, as steam shipping was something 
utterly new, and its various possible applications unknown. The tug service 
was truly an innovation, but at the same time the solution fitted right into the 
Dutch water management policy of the first half of the nineteenth century. 
During this era river development policy was very limited, almost non-
existent. The Dutch King Willem I considered improving the rivers for 
navigability a very risky, costly, and presumably ill-fated venture. Until 1830 
the king preferred to build new canals connecting the seaports with their 
direct hinterland rather than invest in the rivers that would also benefit 
foreign boatmen. After 1830, when Belgium had separated itself from the 
Netherlands, there was neither the political urgency nor the money to 
improve the Rhine.56 
The Germans regarded the wilful neglect of the towpaths and the riverbed 
as a protectionist policy of the Netherlands. This view was also under-
standable because the tug service did not function properly. Three years later, 
in 1839, Rhenish merchants still complained about the Dutch tug service. 
They had experienced difficulties as not always enough tugboats had been 
available, resulting in considerable delays. Moreover, the service was not 
found to be cheaper than horses at all. Only when one bought a subscription 
was it equally, or a little less, expensive. However, there were several problems 
with this subscription system. Smaller skippers could not afford it. But, more 
fundamentally, the subscription had a levelled discount system, giving the 
Beurtvaart, the line shipping system for inland navigation, a 50 per cent dis-
count, whereas non-Beurtvaart ships were offered a mere 35 per cent discount 
on the rates. With this subsidy the Dutch government unequally benefitted the 
Beurtvaart system in which the Dutch were over-represented. All in all, the 
system was not entirely a failure, certainly not in terms of innovation and 
application of new steam-engined technologies, but among the Rhenish mer-
chants it provoked strong feelings of dependency, an emotion they recognised 
from the time that the Netherlands had ‘cast the Rhine in chains’ back in the 
1820s. For Prussia, Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, and Bavaria, the non-functioning 
tug service was reason enough to demand once again that the Netherlands 
maintain and improve the towpaths along the Waal.57 
Besides the discursive trick of dressing up the Dutch tug service as a sign of 
modernity and progress, and thus as an innovation that was in the interest of 
all riparian states, the discussion also resulted in the first cautious steps 
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towards increasing inter-riparian policy transparency. In 1842 the Dutch 
commissioner once more tried to convince the German member states of 
Dutch benevolence by presenting some numbers. In the previous year, the 
commissioner stated, 613 ships were being tugged, with a total of almost 
70,000 tons of cargo. The service expanded to 14 tugboats, totalling 1,500 
horsepower. It received 96,000 guilders in wages and 257,500 guilders in 
subsidies from the Dutch state. Rhine toll officers guaranteed that the service 
was carried out according to the existing rules and regulations.58 Besides, the 
growing number of private steam tugboat companies on the German Rhine, 
where towpaths were fine, essentially proved the fact that this new service was 
preferred to towpaths as it provided regularity, speed, and affordability.59 Be 
that as it may, the Netherlands started providing the other riparian states with 
information that previously would have been considered confidential. 
The German states, save Nassau, remained very sceptical. They were not 
convinced that a private company, the Nederlandse Stoomvaart Maatschap-
pij, to whom the Dutch had given the licence to carry out the tug service, 
would pursue the interests of navigation in general. Besides, despite the Dutch 
claims, reliable and knowledgeable travellers continued to complain about the 
condition of both the service and the towpaths.60 A Duisburg skipper reported, 
for example, that it had taken him 14 days to reach Lobith from Gorinchem 
due to multiple waiting days and stopovers. Moreover, tugging had been more 
expensive for him than the use of horses. In one example, the German states 
calculated that tugging was up to three times more expensive.61 
The Dutch commissioner ignored these concerns, which he waved away as 
private issues. His government did more than was required to facilitate the 
navigation on the Dutch rivers, as it even had a service on the part from 
Rotterdam to Gorinchem, where nobody denied that towpaths on this stretch 
could not exist and that the Netherlands had no legal obligations to maintain 
them whatsoever. In a more aggressive strategy, the Dutch commissioner 
directed the other commissioners’ attention to the bad conditions of the tow-
paths on the Upper Rhine instead. Baden and France reacted in surprise to 
these accusations, and redirected the Dutch trick of striking with transparency 
by answering that the French authorities had invested no less than 999,690.63 
francs to their improvement in 1843 alone.62 In the following years the Dutch 
tug service continued, but the issues concerning the navigability of the Waal 
remained far from solved. 
Conclusion 
During the 1830s the CCNR strongly developed its organisation as a node of 
information sharing with the aim of securing the freedom of navigation on 
the Rhine. This new riverine knowledge system included information sources 
from the commissioners, from local stakeholders through the Chief Inspector, 
and from external experts and expert organisations. This format established 
the CCNR as a forum, on the one hand, of increasing self-gratification and 
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naming-and-shaming dynamics among the commissioners, while on the other, 
the Commission’s discussions were increasingly informed by technocratic laws 
and transparency. Sometimes this mix resulted in continuing suspicion among 
the Commission members. As the case of the safety of navigation on the 
Dutch Waal showed, German merchants and skippers favoured linear, old-
fashioned horse- or man-power, which they could hold in their own hands, 
rather than use an unpredictable, novel tug service wholly managed by a 
Dutch company as that would never allow them to predict the maintenance 
of their livelihood in the future. Within the CCNR, these feelings of depen-
dence and unpredictability continued to inform the German commissioners’ 
understanding of the security-prosperity nexus. For the Dutch, by contrast, 
the tug service became a lifebuoy of its own, as it secured the freedom of 
navigation to an acceptable level, while rendering unnecessary the physical 
improvement of tens of kilometres of hard-to-repair river banks, protecting 
the country from bankruptcy. Sometimes, however, the mixed riverine 
knowledge system also resulted in the depoliticisation of tricky issues, such as 
in the case of the measurement of the Rhine. Once the Commission had 
adopted the measurement method, all Commission members assented to the 
final results, even Baden whose interests were harmed. Having technical, uni-
form standards helped the Commission to avoid any hint of national interest 
or power play, while it allowed the Baden commissioner to justify at home 
these measures to create a uniform toll system. 
Whereas the difficulties in mapping the Rhine had been overcome with the 
help of external expertise from the Royal Prussian State Construction Com-
mission, the first Waal crisis shows that in the early 1840s the CCNR largely 
remained a platform that was as much informed by the observational data of 
the Chief Inspector as by politicised reports coming from national authorities. 
It was in the course of this new decade that the CCNR’s riverine knowledge 
system became predominantly informed by technocrats. However, that was 
only after the technological revolution of steam shipping threatened to eradi-
cate the sailing business on the Rhine in its entirety and the CCNR barely 
managed to defend its raison d’être, namely the principle of the freedom 
of navigation, against a radical and violent attack by the sailing industry 
in 1848. 
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5 Between radicals and experts 
Consolidating a Rhine expert regime 
in the 1840s to 1860s 
Introduction 
In the previous decades the CCNR had managed to turn a European princi-
ple into practice, while expanding a riverine knowledge system. However, 
Chapter 5 shows that in the 1840s, with an international political crisis about 
the Rhine and a democratic and technological revolution unfolding in its 
basin, it became uncertain whether the new Rhine regime would actually 
bring prosperity and security to all the inhabitants of its banks, as the CCNR 
had imagined. The question arose whether the sailors’ industry needed pro-
tection against the unlimited freedom of navigation of the growing number of 
steamships on the Rhine. Remarkably, it was only after the experiment of the 
CCNR to resolve the violent dispute between radical sailors and steam ship-
ping companies failed that the Commission redetermined the protection of 
the freedom of navigation, rather than the security of livelihood, as the main 
mandate of the CCNR. The failed experiment also reconstituted the CCNR 
as an elite organisation that tried to depoliticise inter-riparian conflicts on the 
navigability of the Rhine by employing external hydraulic engineers within 
the framework of an ad hoc Technical Commission. By the end of the 1860s, 
the CCNR gained increasing prominence and it was able to expand its activ-
ities as it professionalised its organisation and developed high-end expertise in 
international river management. This chapter thus shows how, in the highly 
politicised context of the 1840s, a failed experiment in dispute settlement 
contributed to the consolidation of a Rhine regime based on technocratic 
principles in the subsequent decades. 
Sailors vs steamers 
Ever since the French July Revolution in 1830, the German riparian states 
were wary of French aggression.1 But it was the Oriental Crisis in 1840 that 
brought the respective governments to full alert. France had suffered a 
diplomatic defeat against Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. As a 
result, it could not expand its hegemony over the southern Mediterranean coast 
at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. At that point, the French government 
shifted its interest to its domestic territory and claimed the reinstatement of 
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the Rhine as France’s natural eastern border a justified compensation, 
implying the annexation of Rhenish Prussia and the Bavarian region of the 
Rhenish Palatinate. In the summer of 1840 Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister Adolphe Thiers mobilised almost half a million conscripts. Enthu-
siasm to restore the Rhine as France’s natural border was widespread. The 
crisis, which came to be called the Rhine crisis and has been qualified as ‘the 
most serious affair on the international scene from 1830 to 1848,’ unleashed a 
general anti-French reaction in the German states.2 
Such anti-French reactions were concentrated around cultural expressions 
in which the Rhine starred and became a symbol of national unity. Historians 
called Nikolaus Becker’s nationalist Rhine song (‘They shall not have it, the 
free German Rhine’) a  ‘cultural sensation.’3 Historians assume that such 
songs, among other similar cultural expressions, helped overcome the wide-
spread particularism in the German territories. Yet, as Brophy shows, it is not 
likely that the Rhine crisis caused ‘Germany’s uncritical embrace of a martial 
nationalism.’ Instead, Brophy identifies several contesting reactions against 
the new chauvinism that may have led as much to a strengthening of a 
national consciousness within Germany as a whole, as to a sharpened 
left-liberal sensibility towards citizenship.4 
This argument is in line with Sperber’s hypothesis that among the general 
public in the border regions the anti-French reaction was only short lived. 
Becker’s depiction of the Rhine as the age-old bulwark against radical France 
was hijacked by the Prussian authorities and met with very little response in 
the Rhineland. As an inheritance of the Napoleonic era, left-wing radicalism 
was particularly strong in the Rhineland and the Palatinate. The local poli-
tical elite clung to the existing French institutions, whereas Prussian autho-
rities tried to impose their rule. In the second half of the 1840s crop failures 
and a commercial crisis unleashed increasing hardship among the lower clas-
ses and the farmers. When a revolution broke out in France demanding more 
liberal policies, civil liberties, and legal reforms, Prussian authorities sent 
extra troops to the Rhineland to prevent a French invasion and keep internal 
order. This military move resulted in clashes in Mainz and Aachen with the 
local lower and middle classes in March 1848.5 After the Prussian govern-
ment had tried to make of the Rhine a symbol of national unity against 
France, the river became the centre of a very different struggle: that is, a 
struggle of sailors against steamers. This had major implications for the 
Central Commission in Mainz. 
Initially, the arrival of steamboats on the Rhine was very much welcomed, 
both by merchants and the general public. The first steam-powered boats 
appeared on French, Scottish, and American rivers around the 1780s. It 
would take until the 1820s, after the necessary tranquillity had returned to the 
war-ravaged Continent, before the invention was successfully launched on the 
Rhine. Merchants, states, and emerging heavy industry in the Ruhr regarded 
steamboats as a commercial blessing, as they greatly enhanced the speed of 
travel and regularity of navigation. Steamers were deemed a symbol of 
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progress. They appeared in ever-greater numbers on the Rhine from 1826 
onwards, following a Dutch governmental decision to create a rather liberal 
concession system for steamship companies. Increasing transport activity was 
in the interest of trade, and thus in the interest of all.6 
Until the 1840s, the CCNR commissioners spoke in similarly positive terms 
about steam shipping.7 The only brief exception was the French representa-
tive, Baron St. Mars, who raised the question in 1826 as to whether the con-
cessions should not contain additional conditions to protect the small 
skippers against too much competition from the steam-powered boats. 
Additionally, the large amount of capital needed to start a steam shipping 
company made the growing business inaccessible for the smaller entrepre-
neurs, St. Mars agued. The Dutch delegate, Johan Bourcourd, disagreed. An 
increase of transport speed was necessary to keep up with other trade arteries. 
Besides, Bourcourd argued, sail-powered barges still had their advantages. 
They were cheaper and could, if organised well, also compete on agility, 
making them highly useful in the carrying of non-perishable goods. In the 
end, the delegates agreed that competition between the two industries would 
have a benign effect on Rhine trade as a whole and concluded that steam 
should continue without restrictions.8 
The CCNR’s conclusion turned out to be premature. In 1842, after the first 
steam-powered tug associations in Cologne and Mainz were established and 
the iron barge was introduced, the Commission started receiving dozens of 
petitions from alarmed sailing skippers. ‘[T]oday, the battle is becoming 
increasingly threatening between the two kinds of transportation,’ a sailor 
wrote to the French commissioner, ‘and it is nothing less than the annihila-
tion of an industry which will deprive many families of pilots, journeymen, 
apprentices and haulers of their means of existence.’9 The labourers active in 
the sailing business argued that they were not against steamboats as such. 
They were smart enough to know that they could not turn this tide. However, 
it was the way shipping companies applied the new technology that threa-
tened sailors with redundancy. In the Netherlands, but on other parts of the 
Rhine as well, steam-powered tugboats successfully replaced pullers and 
horses. This could be regarded advantageous also for sailors. However, the 
shipping companies also introduced large iron barges that they towed 
upstream swiftly and at an increasingly competitive price. Steamboat compa-
nies had thus penetrated in one blow the market of cargo transport that until 
then had been reserved for the sailing industry. While losing employment to 
the steamers was harsh, the prospect of a future Rhine industry dominated by 
steam tug companies that did not demand any of the sailor’s skills was even 
harsher. Therefore, the sailors asked the Commission to limit steamboats to 
the transport of passengers and their personal belongings. 
The French commissioner regretted the sailors’ predicament, but commerce 
could not simply be sacrificed for the benefit of navigation as the sailors sug-
gested, because ‘one would mistake the spirit of this age and the two princi-
ples of freedom and equality, consisting in a free development of individual 
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inequalities.’10 Still, at this point the CCNR advised the respective govern-
ments to take an interest in the sailors’ fate, not only because the future of 
thousands of families was at stake, but also because the continuation of 
competition between sailors, on one hand, and, on the other, the steam tug 
companies, would improve the transport market on the Rhine. However, the 
call to protect the sailors in light of the growing dominance of steam naviga-
tion on the Rhine remained unanswered. After 1842, entrepreneurs estab-
lished an additional seven steam tug companies in the major cities along the 
German Rhine. The coal entrepreneurs Matthias Stinnes and Franz Haniel 
founded tug companies primarily to carry their own coal upstream, thereby 
circumventing the transport market altogether.11 The sailors were increasingly 
backed into a corner until they found the momentum to break loose. 
The Democratic Revolution of 1848 ignited the spirits of shipmen, pullers, 
and shore dwellers whose property suffered damage because of the large wave of 
steamboats. In March the Mainzer banker, politician, former president of the 
Chamber of Commerce, and enthusiastic democrat Heinrich Städel (1771–1857) 
appealed to his fellow citizens to demand, first, the prohibition of transit via the 
Hessian railways; second, a ban on the employment of steam tugs from Mainz 
upstream; and, third, the substitution of the Convention of Mainz with the old 
Octroi Treaty, thereby enabling the skippers to unite forces again in guilds or 
skippers’ associations.12 Among local boatmen and haulers, Städel found great 
support as they believed these measures would protect their employment. 
In early April boatmen and pullers between Mainz and Bingen started to 
revolt. They stormed several steamboats on the Main, halted their departure, 
and forced the boat owners to employ them.13 On 3 and 4 April, sailors 
sabotaged the Taunus railway between Mainz and Höchst and attacked the 
house of the contractor that built it. The same day, at Biebrich, sailors 
blocked the loading of steamboats and demanded that all heavy cargo be 
shipped by sailing vessels. Further downstream, at Weissenthurm, close to 
Koblenz, the situation got out of hand in an even more violent way, when 
people started firing on the steam tug boat Niederrhein.14 Franz Haniel, one 
of the large shipping company owners, wrote about the incident: ‘One of my 
iron tugboats took twenty-four shots, yet was not fully penetrated. The cap-
tain steering the ship, who was usually the main target, had to be covered and 
secured by iron sheets.’15 
German and foreign newspapers reported on the revolts, and unanimously 
disapproved of the sailors’ methods for jeopardising Rhine trade and traffic. 
A Dutch newspaper commented that such a murderous assault could never be 
justified.16 ‘We had a day of horror here yesterday,’ a reporter in Mainz wrote: 
The working people on the Rhine started the disturbances by obstructing 
the tug service and steam shipping … As the police and armed forces did 
not show up and the civilian guards were weak, the troublemakers got 
encouraged … With the help of the federal soldiers, peace was restored 
by midnight.17 
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In the following days 40 people were arrested in Mainz. Städel was on the 
run. Extra Prussian and Austrian forces were sent to the city and to avoid 
escalation steam tugboats were held in the dock.18 The French commissioner 
within the CCNR, Pierre-Hubert Engelhardt, appreciated that the authorities 
had successfully stopped the dreaded anarchy. Yet he also had the poor con-
ditions of the sailors in mind and thought that the reaction against the rebels 
was too harsh, as he wrote to a friend: 
[T]he current calm is only a state of enforced truce, just as one is generally 
only at the beginning of the social question, which is very different and 
more difficult in Germany than the political question [of unification] … In 
all this one seems more inspired by the fear which is the courage of the 
fearful, presently victorious people than by the moderation which befits the 
strong and truly courageous people.19 
While workers continued their activism and steam tugs remained largely out of 
business, the significant societal problem of a dying sailing business remained 
unsolved. At the end of April 1848 an assembly of Rhenish sailors gathered in 
Cologne. They rejected physical violence. Verbally, however, they became rather 
aggressive in an attempt to catch the attention of the newly elected Frankfurt 
parliament for their case. ‘[Within] the struggle of the work-loving middle class 
against the money aristocracy of the nineteenth century,’ the parliament was 
asked, ‘to take sides for work against capital,’ and against ‘those merchants 
involved in shipping activities in the service of Mammon.’ Their demands were 
very similar to those of Städel: they demanded the abolition of the Convention 
of Mainz and a reintroduction of a guild protecting all Rhine skippers. 
Moreover, the petitioners asked for the complete abandonment of joint-stock 
companies active in the steam-powered cargo transport on the Rhine.20 
In May 1848 the large coal merchants reacted to the ongoing disturbances 
on the Rhine with another pamphlet. Despite sympathy for the fate of hun-
dreds of pullers, horse riders, and innkeepers along the Rhine, the world’s 
progress should not and could not be stopped, they wrote. The merchants 
called an abandonment of steam power a ‘betrayal of the fatherland.’ ‘Yes,’ 
they continued, ‘it would essentially reduce Germany to a plaything of all 
other nations.’21 The employment of steam provided hundreds of thousands 
of new jobs in the coal and iron industry all over the country. Besides, with 
the expanding railways in mind, steam-powered transport on the Rhine was 
the only way to maintain the competitiveness of Rhine traffic. For now, the 
coal merchants argued, it was a ‘holy duty’ to end the difficulties in steam-
tugged coal shipping, as the coal industry was about to fall into a crisis and 
the number of breadless miners and boatmen became increasingly dangerous: 
‘the longer the current great calamities continue, the longer the existing 
lawlessness is being tolerated and life and property remain at risk.’22 
Later that summer the Rhenish steam tug companies said that the forma-
tion of tug companies on the German Rhine had been merely an answer to 
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the establishment of a tug company in the Netherlands, and the introduction 
of the iron barges was simply the reply to a current demand in the transport 
market. Moreover, they waved away the picture of the situation being a fight 
between workers and capital. With an annual salary of 600 guilders, plus free 
accommodation, bed, light, and heating, their captains were paid decently, as 
the deck hands were. What is more, dividends paid to their shareholders were 
very moderate. Instead of the fight of labour against capital, the shipping 
companies pictured the struggle of the sailors as a fight against progress; a 
call for stagnation against an improved future. ‘It is the fight of the old castles 
with their men and swords against gun powder, the writer against the book 
printers, the artisans against the machines,’ they stated. ‘The defenders of the 
old always forecast the downfall of families, if the new will not be prohibited 
or restricted.’ However, the shipping companies concluded, ‘The new stayed 
upright, spread, and the families did not perish. Intelligence and freedom 
have promoted the well-being of humanity everywhere and at all times, 
whenever one allowed intelligence and freedom.’23 
One month later, the Committee of Rhenish sailors answered with – in 
form – an almost identical publication of their own. It showed how much the 
fight against the introduction of the tugged barge had become a moral fight. 
The iron barge was in no significant sense superior to the wooden sailing 
vessel, they held. Nevertheless, the sailors asserted that by virtue of the Con-
vention of Mainz and with the help of steam power, there was nothing to stop 
merchants and capitalists monopolising navigation on the Rhine. Despite 
their appeals to the common interest, commercial necessities, and a pro-
gressive zeitgeist, ‘the whole world knows,’ the pamphlet stated ‘that not one 
of these shareholders is interested in the general welfare, … do not know 
anything about commercial necessities, and instead all pay homage to the 
spirit of egoism.’24 
The destruction of the sailing industry would not be in the common interest, 
nor was it a sign of progress, the sailors wrote. When the sailing industry was 
finally brought to its knees, the competition between the tug companies would 
cease immediately, they speculated. The sailors were thus not fighting new 
technologies, they were combatting old despots in a new disguise: the moneyed 
aristocrats of the nineteenth century, ‘the modern representatives of the lords of 
the Middle Ages, to get back their share in the innovation of steam power that 
was forcibly taken away from them with the weapon of capital.’ The sailors 
were not against the new, they were against the misuse of the new: ‘It is the 
fight of the book printer against the reprinter. It is the fight of free labour 
against serfdom. … It is the fight of labour against capital in the fullest sense of 
the word.’25 They agreed that intelligence and freedom had always and every-
where promoted the general welfare of humanity, as long it did not fall into the 
hands of tyrants. The progress of the zeitgeist should not accrue to the highest 
bidder, but benefit the general welfare, the pamphlet concluded. 
The tumultuous events of 1848 also touched the CCNR, although not 
directly. Certainly, the clash between capital and labour manifested itself 
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clearly on the Rhine and in Mainz – where the Commission held office. Also, 
the attacks on the steam tugs and steamboats could be considered an assault 
on the principle of freedom of navigation, as the newspapers generally did. 
However, an extensive report by the Chief Inspector on 14 July shows that the 
CCNR’s interest in the matter went significantly further than that. The report 
asserted that attempts by the Frankfurter parliament and the national gov-
ernments had not resulted in a solution to the problem and that it was now 
time to start the negotiations about a definitive regulation within the forum of 
the CCNR. It is significant that the Chief Inspector underlined first and 
foremost that due to the employment of steam tugs and iron barges the sai-
lors were indeed threatened in their existence, that pullers and horse riders 
lost a great part of their income, and that the inhabitants of the banks justi-
fiably complained about the damage to their property. By 1848, 9 steam tug 
companies were active on the Rhine, owning 18 steam tugboats and 80 iron 
barges with a maximum loading capacity of 400 tons. Of these nine compa-
nies only three were active in tugging boats they did not also own. This 
meant, so Chief Inspector Von Auer concluded, that these steam tug compa-
nies had sufficient capacity – if employed continuously – to carry out the 
main part of the shipping on the Rhine already.26 Steam was causing a 
transport revolution the Rhine had never seen before, and which was about to 
sacrifice an entire industry. 
Von Auer found himself in a difficult position. On the one hand, he 
remembered that the Commission had shown itself concerned about the fate 
of the sailors and their families before. Moreover, he reasoned that the main-
tenance of the sailors was important in light of securing competition in Rhine 
navigation. On the other hand, however, the Chief Inspector noted that no 
measure to help the sailing industry was to compromise the principle of free-
dom of navigation. Therefore, he wrote to the Commission, the only real 
solution was to abolish the institution of the shipping company on the Rhine, 
make the issuing of a shipping patent subject to the actual ownership of a 
ship, and install a representative body for the sailor class. 
Until these definite solutions were realised, the riparian states were to put 
the acquisition of new steamboats and steam tugs on the Rhine on hold 
immediately and the issuing of patents should be put on hold until further 
notice. On 23 July 1848, the Chief Inspector sent an addendum to the CCNR, 
in which he proposed to halve the Rhine toll and the recognition rights 
exclusively for sailors.27 For the pullers, Von Auer proposed compensation for 
the loss of employment, whereas the horse riders should merely be referred to 
other employment. Finally, the riparian states should compensate the shore 
dwellers for their damaged property, but more importantly, new police reg-
ulations for steamboats and the improvement of the shipping channels should 
prevent the manifestation of future damage.28 
Von Auer’s advice consisted of far-reaching, contested measures that would 
affect the entire maritime industry on the Rhine. Reducing the tolls was a very 
delicate issue for the riparian states, which depended on this income. It was a 
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measure the CCNR had never seriously considered until then. Nevertheless, 
little more than a week after the Chief Inspector’s report, the CCNR officially 
requested the riparian governments to suspend the introduction of new 
steamboats and steam tugs on the Rhine from 1 August onwards, and to stop 
issuing patents and concessions for Rhine navigation.29 Furthermore, in a 
somewhat more hesitant fashion, the respective governments were asked 
whether a to-be-determined reduction of the taxes for sailors might be an 
appropriate temporary measure.30 Even with regard to the pullers’ issue, 
which the Commission understood mainly as a matter for local governments, 
it was willing ‘to be helpful to the states’ governments in an unofficial way.’31 
The CCNR thus almost completely adopted Von Auer’s far-reaching propo-
sals, which went directly against the principle of freedom of navigation, albeit 
only temporarily. 
Whereas the CCNR as a body might have been in favour of Von Auer’s 
three measures, ultimately it was the respective governments which had to 
decide on them. Not surprisingly, contesting national interests played havoc 
with the suggested unified approach to protect the sailing industry. In early 
August, the commissioners of France, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau were 
able to give their full support to the first two measures. The Dutch commis-
sioner, on the other hand, reported that his government fully rejected them. It 
was not convinced the measures would benefit the sailors. The representative 
of Baden reacted in a similar fashion, but was formally willing to accept the 
proposals if all other states would do so too, and on condition that they were 
temporary measures from which the government could withdraw after a 
determined period. In the absence of instructions from their governments, the 
Prussian and Bavarian commissioners abstained.32 Apparently, the emerging 
steam shipping industry in Prussia, Baden, and the Netherlands made it dif-
ficult for these countries to support measures that confined their activities to 
such a great extent, even if they were temporary. 
On the reduction of Rhine tolls the reactions were not altogether dis-
missive. The representatives of Baden, the Netherlands, France, and Prussia 
were allowed to give their governments’ approval. The Nassau commissioner 
would do the same if it was established that the measure would help the sailing 
business to survive. The Hessian commissioner, on the other hand, could not 
yet give his government’s approval and showed concern about the measure’s 
consequences for the port of Mainz. Finally, the Bavarian commissioner was 
still without instructions.33 
The CCNR was far from reaching an agreement, while the circumstances 
called for immediate action. In a rare outburst, the Commission’s president 
and French delegate, Engelhardt, who had shown concern for the sailors’ 
cause in his private correspondence, showed his frustration. Once again, he 
said on the final day of the summer session, the Commission had shown itself 
unable to resolve an urgent matter. He suggested that it might have been 
better not to have become involved in the issue at all, instead of limiting the 
reputational damage by covering up the Commission’s default internal 
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organisation to the larger public.34 He stated that there was no question 
anymore that steam shipping was the Rhine’s destiny. Yet the actual disorder 
on the Rhine needed to be removed. Since all the commissioners were in 
solidarity committed to the removal of this disorder, a similar liability must 
be recognised in terms of the means to be used. However, the president 
continued bitterly: 
[I]f the commissaries were not authorised to subordinate the views and 
interests of the individual to the views and interests of the great whole on 
the river … if their powers are not as extraordinary as the circumstances 
that need to be resolved at all costs … the Commission … has nothing 
left but to gracefully close its protocols and its delegation with the sincere 
confession of its inability to decide, because it merely has the authority to 
make proposals, not to decide anything.35 
No one should forget, Engelhardt stated, that it was far from the Commission’s 
aim to issue measures that would restore the past at the expense of the future 
or to hamper the beneficial development of the Rhine. Instead the measures 
intended ‘to make appear the transition from the past into the future less vio-
lent and ominous to the sailors who are still active.’36 The Commission was to 
provide the necessary freedom for a more thorough examination, dissolution, 
and mediation of the existing conflicts during a future meeting with the stake-
holders. With the negotiations within the CCNR deadlocked, the French com-
missioner opened up a truly novel way to resolve the issue in the foreseeable 
future. 
From 25 to 28 September 1848 the Chief Inspector organised a meeting in 
Mainz with representatives of the sailing industry, the merchants, and the 
steamboat companies to discuss the measures that should be taken to pro-
mote trade and the sailing business. The meeting turned out to be truly com-
plicated. The sailors’ representatives distrusted the objectives of the merchants 
and the steam tug companies, and an open and calm discussion turned out to 
be difficult. Quickly, a fierce discussion emerged about the possible reduction 
of Rhine tolls. The representatives of the merchant class and the steam ship-
ping companies immediately stressed that a fiscal benefit should advantage 
the entire maritime industry on the Rhine. After all, they argued, Rhine taxes 
had brought Rhine navigation as a whole to the abyss, and would eventually 
also destroy the tugging industry. Only after a general tax reduction, the 
representatives concluded, could one start thinking of an additional conces-
sion to the sailors. 
Another point of discussion was the sailors’ proposal to limit cargo trans-
ports to the sailors, and to install a regular tug service in each port to which 
skippers could be contracted. They rejected the acquisition and employment 
of iron barges by the steam tug companies. These, as sailor August Noll from 
Vallendar argued, pushed sailing business away from the Rhine, leaving a 
large number of families without a livelihood, and destroyed their only 
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capital: the boat. Some steam shipping companies were in favour of this pro-
posal, but the representative of the large Cologne steam tug company argued 
that it was an unachievable plan that would merely raise hopes that could 
never be fulfilled: ‘The whole thing is useless!’37 The few small bright spots on 
the horizon were that the steam tug companies seemed willing to lower their 
rates for sailboats, and that the Prussian state was willing to support sailors 
who wanted to establish associations that could acquire their own steam tugs. 
In December 1848 the CCNR could only conclude that the meeting had 
been largely unproductive. No significant agreements between the industries 
were made, and it also cancelled out Von Auer’s third proposed measure, 
which was to exempt sailors from Rhine tolls. Whereas the Dutch and the 
French commissioners had been and still were very much in favour of a toll 
reduction exclusively for sailors, other commissioners concluded after this 
meeting that it would favour the sailors too much at the expense of steam 
shipping. The measure might lead to a bitter and damaging freight rate war, 
they feared. That left the question unanswered of how to help the endangered 
sailors by means of riparian state measures. The Commission was very much 
in favour of enabling sailors to take more advantage of steam power them-
selves by establishing their own steam tug companies. However, the ways in 
which this could be realised depended a great deal on local situations and 
therefore general trans-riparian stipulations were hardly appropriate. This was 
also true for the increased association of sailors in unions. The CCNR 
favoured such a development, but concluded it had no role in realising it. 
Ultimately, the CCNR could agree on – and received the approval of the 
respective governments for – only one measure: to exempt sailors from bridge 
passage fees and halve the recognition rights.38 This was a measure the indi-
vidual states, but also the steam shipping industry, could live with. For the 
CCNR this measure was a poor outcome, but it limited the loss of face. In 
turn, the sailors continued their fight. In Karl Marx’s Neue Rheinische Zei-
tung they wrote that it was no surprise that no agreement was reached during 
the meeting as ‘in one party Mammon takes the place of the heart and the 
capital of arrogant selfishness leads the word.’39 By January 1849 the sailors 
were forming local associations; they tried to establish a tug company them-
selves and contracted existing companies ‘so as to be able to fight their 
common enemy, the capital and the association, by the same weapons.’40 
Besides the tax reductions, this was an important development for the sailing 
business in terms of survival. Because of an ample supply of steam tugs and 
by means of association or shareholding, sailors forced steam tug companies 
to lower their tow rates, which were undercutting those of pullers. In the 
following years, their margins and transport activities increased.41 
The first Rhine survey 
The transition to steam-powered traffic on the Rhine also brought new chal-
lenges for the CCNR in the field of keeping the river navigable. As shown in 
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Figure 5.1 Metternich, symbol of the conservative power in Europe, flees to his castle 
Johannisberg on the Rhine after the democratic revolution in Austria in 
March 1848. (Caption in the original: ‘The devil has finally got the spirit-
killer of Europe afloat, and is carrying him to his castle on the Rhine to 
pay his 33-year overdue taxes.’) 
Source: Stadtarchiv Mainz, ZGS/D10, 36 https://faust.mainz.de/objekt_start.fau?prj= 
internet&dm=archiv&zeig=85006 
Chapter 4, the conditions of the Waal and the Rheingau were focal points in 
the discussion about the navigability of the Rhine. Over the course of the 
years the German commissioners urged the increased assessment of the 
navigability of the Rhine by means of collecting information from local sta-
keholders, while the Dutch commissioner rejected the value of such 
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information and called the complaints exaggerated and unreasonable.42 In a 
genius move the Prussian Commissioner Johann Friedrich Von Pommer-
Esche (1803–1870) succeeded in breaking this stalemate in August 1847. He 
proposed that the Commission carry out a survey of the navigability of the 
Rhine by an inter-riparian collective of experts. 
Von Pommer-Esche suggested that all the riparian states call upon their 
experts to jointly sail the Rhine from Strasbourg to the sea in order to 
determine the state of the navigable waterway, the difficulties of navigation 
and obstacles that still existed, and, finally, the means that could be used to 
eliminate them.43 Von Pommer-Esche’s proposal also testified to the fact 
that the organisation of the Chief Inspector and the sub-inspectors was 
unable to cope with both the registration of the actual difficulties of navi-
gation on the Rhine and their effective communication to the CCNR. 
Nobody could really disagree with the proposed inter-riparian expert survey. 
The Prussian initiative was adopted by the Commission and in early 1849 a 
nine-headed Technical Commission departed from Strasbourg, arriving in 
Rotterdam weeks later. 
In theory the Technical Commission had a straightforward task to fulfil. 
It consisted of the (chief) engineers of the respective seven national Water 
Authorities, the Chief Inspector of the CCNR, and the sub-inspectors of 
the Rhine districts. In a joint report, the Technical Commission was to 
present an overview of the state of the river, in particular with regard to the 
shipping channel and the towpaths. Furthermore, it was to give suggestions 
for improvement works. And, finally, if possible, the report should give an 
overview of the costs to be incurred. This final report and the protocols of 
the survey would then be assessed by the Chief Inspector of the CCNR, 
after which the next steps to improve the waterway were to be 
determined.44 
In practice the compilation of the report turned out to be an uphill battle 
and the final result was both highly ambiguous and contradictory. The 
individual engineers could not always agree on how to determine the con-
ditions of the river. In order to assess the navigability of the various trajec-
tories of the river, one needed to determine procedures and measurements 
that were solid and comparable. However, in a similar way to the difficulties 
that  arose  when measuring  the  length of  the  Rhine  back in the  1830s,  the  
technical commissioners could not agree on how to compare one of the 
most important criteria that determined the navigability of the waterway: 
that is, the river’s depth. This ambiguity about depth measurement made 
unusable the most significant part of the local surveys, namely locating the 
navigable channel.45 
Moreover, the engineers substantially disagreed about the chosen or the 
still-to-be-determined methods of improving the river stream. This dispute 
made it impossible to decide on the hydraulic works that were to be executed 
and to give an indication of their costs. The technical commissioners of 
Bavaria, Baden, and France were united in their opinion that the Rhine 
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should be submitted to a general flow improvement plan. A General-
correctionsplan consisted, among other things, of the shortening of the riv-
erbed by cutting the river’s curves, and maintaining a ‘normal width,’ 
harnessing the river within one bed. This enormous operation was already 
nearly finished on the Franco-Baden and Baden-Bavarian stretches and 
proved successful, and it would not be too difficult to adapt this approach to 
the other parts of the Rhine, the commissioners held.46 
The commissioners of Prussia, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau on the other 
hand, wanted to report on the navigability of the Rhine on the basis of the 
empirical evidence they collected during the survey. In addition, they wanted 
to point out what works had been carried out or were approved to be carried 
out to improve the situation. But what they did not want, in contrast to the 
other technical commissioners, was to regard the existing stream improve-
ment plan as a model for the entire Rhine and apply it accordingly on all 
segments. In particular, the Prussian Commissioner Gotthilf Hagen 
(1797–1884), the famous professor of hydraulic engineering and chief of the 
Prussian Construction Commission in Berlin, was very averse to any form of 
self-congratulating dogmatism. To his mind, it was a mistake to assume that 
the Rhine was to be dictated by a general plan. Even on parts of the Rhine 
that flowed through one state, such as the Prussian or Nassau part, a uniform 
treatment was out of the question: 
Just as little as there is a universal medicine against all human illnesses, 
one may think of a remedy, which can be successfully applied for example 
on the Prussian Rhine, both in rock formations above St. Goar, as in the 
vicinity of the Dutch border.47 
The common technical survey of the navigability of the Rhine in 1849 was a 
complicated and long-winded process, but a couple of important successes 
were achieved. First of all, convening a Technical Commission, bringing 
seven hydraulic engineers of an equal number of states together, was an 
achievement in itself, as this had never happened before. It allowed an 
immediate exchange of ideas about the treatment of the Rhine and created 
direct personal links between the highest relevant officials who ultimately 
needed to cooperate with each other to improve the navigability of the shared 
stretches of the Rhine. Furthermore, it did succeed in giving a fairly detailed 
picture of the conditions of navigability of the Rhine from Strasbourg to the 
sea. And it is in this assessment of the river’s navigability that we can find one 
very remarkable consensus as well: the Dutch part of the Rhine received a 
devastating assessment. Taking into consideration how little consensus there 
was overall, the Prussian commissioner in Mainz delightedly underlined the 
significance of this criticism. 
The Begutachtungsprotocoll wrote explicitly about the erratic state of the 
Waal and the Merwede. The rivers lacked sufficient depth, sandbanks were a 
common obstacle, and the navigable channels were changeable, while on most 
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stretches the towpaths were virtually non-existent. This meant, the six 
non-Dutch commissioners agreed, that 
the Dutch stream is in a run-down condition which is unsuitable for 
safe navigation, and that this condition is essentially due to the fact that 
the Royal Netherlands Government has so far only exceptionally done 
something [to improve the stream].48 
In response, the Dutch commissioner in the CCNR argued that the proposed 
technical solutions would result in new hydraulic problems that would jeo-
pardise the lands along the river. Bringing up the water level in the Waal, for 
example, could turn the adjacent valuable agricultural lands into marshes. 
Moreover, bringing the water level up in the Waal meant bringing it down in 
the other Rhine branches, increasing the risk of dike bursts during winters 
because of dangerous ice-formation.49 
Not surprisingly, the Prussian commissioner of the CCNR dwelled exten-
sively on the harsh condemnation of the Dutch waters. The report proved that 
the Netherlands had not taken enough care of the Rhine and the Dutch 
commissioner’s reaction to it seemed indeed to indicate that the Dutch gov-
ernment subordinated the interests of Rhine navigation to public and agri-
cultural interests.50 Whenever he got the chance to speak during the sessions 
in Mainz, the Prussian commissioner did not hesitate to underline that his 
government, on the other hand, had invested 2.5 million thalers to regulate 
the Rhine in the past 17 years. The Prussian commissioner could count on the 
support of the full majority of the Commission, resulting in an official deci-
sion to demand that the Netherlands take the criticism to heart, comply with 
article 67 of the Mainz Convention immediately, and thus take all necessary 
measures to improve the navigability of the Rhine.51 
The technical survey had not only identified the general shortcomings of 
the Rhine, it had also resulted in a ranked list of deficiencies in terms of 
urgency. The Netherlands was at the top of that list. That was a concern even 
the new Dutch prime minister, Johan Rudolph Thorbecke, fully endorsed. 
In an address to parliament, he recognised that 
people from our side have tried to somewhat distract those objections; 
they have tried to make the black colour a bit brighter, but one needs to 
recognise that they, even from the point of view of the Treaty of Mainz, 
had to do more than has happened for years.52 
If nothing were done about the poor conditions of the Rhine and other 
waterways, the country would run the risk of ‘actually no longer possessing 
any rivers,’ Thorbecke stated, isolating itself from the significant markets of 
the German hinterland.53 
A third success of the technical survey relates to this sense of urgency and 
to the specific compliance mechanism that resulted from it. As the CCNR 
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correctly noted during its summer session in 1850, it had no powers itself to 
engage the riparian states in accepting and implementing the proposals as put 
forward by the Technical Commission. It lacked both a full understanding of 
the proposed technical solutions and the means to be of any use within this 
discussion. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the technical dispute as 
it had emerged between the French, Baden, and Bavarian commissioners, on 
the one hand, and the Prussian, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau commis-
sioners, on the other, but also between the Netherlands and the rest of the 
Commission, were not to be perpetuated in the protocols of the CCNR. 
Instead, the Commission concluded: 
it is of decisive importance that the Commission obtains certain knowl-
edge of certain results of the technical survey, namely those arrangements 
which are based on the relevant technical suggestions, and have been 
carried out, after prior agreement between the riparian States, in their 
affluent river basins.54 
This peremptory order resulted in the standard practice of the CCNR 
informing its members about the ongoing hydraulic works on an annual basis. 
Each state revealed how many kilometres of river had been regulated, what 
depth was reached, and to what extent this had resulted in increased naviga-
tion in terms of tons of cargo shipped, or speed. One of the most determining 
(and not technical) indicators of progress in this regard became the amount of 
pecuniary investment. The new obligation to inform the CCNR was an 
improvement on the existing information system with the Chief Inspector. It 
turned out to be a rather efficient way to create transparency and competition 
within a forum in which each other’s efforts were assessed and weighed 
against one another. 
Extending the tasks of the Technical Commission: the Rheingau and 
the Cologne Railway Bridge 
Bringing together the most relevant hydraulic engineers within an international 
Technical Commission, having them provide for the first time a detailed 
assessment of the river’s navigability, and constructing a new information 
system that obliged the riparian states to provide recurring intelligence, were 
major steps in collectively improving the Rhine’s navigability that can only be 
attributed to the CCNR. It corroborated its status as an institution that took 
its own initiatives and was listened to. It is unlikely that Prussian officials would 
have been able to launch an inter-riparian Technical Commission by them-
selves, as animosity between the Dutch and Prussian government at that time 
would have killed it, or because the initiative would have been slowed down by 
an impenetrable forest of bureaucratic and diplomatic obstacles. 
The compliance mechanism of external expert input, internal intermedia-
tion, and majority denouncement worked. This was also proven by the 
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signing of an agreement between all members of the CCNR in 1856 on 
the river flow improvement plan of the Rheingau. After years of disputes 
between Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau about the malfunctioning river flow 
between Mainz and Bingen, the other commissioners demanded the inter-
vention again of the same Technical Commission that had surveyed the entire 
Rhine. In November of the same year, the Technical Commission carried out 
a survey on the parts between Mainz and Nieder-Walluf and prepared a 
report with an extensive river flow improvement plan. 
During an extraordinary session on 29 November 1856 the members of the 
CCNR reached an agreement. In the agreement Hesse-Darmstadt and 
Nassau committed themselves to simultaneously regulate the Rhine between 
Mainz and Nieder-Walluf within four years on the basis of the plan provided 
by the Technical Commission. They were to create regular shipping channels 
with a substantial depth and consistent width, and proper adjacent towpaths. 
Therefore, they had to close several estuaries, unite islands, construct, 
straighten, or reinforce the banks, and remove the sandbanks by means of 
mechanical dredging. The hydraulic engineers of both states were to commu-
nicate directly and continuously with each other. The choice of the exact 
building materials was still up to the respective governments, but for most 
other matters, such as the sequence of the works, the plans had been fixed by 
the Technical Commission. 
The agreement determined that if Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau faced new 
disagreements regarding these works, these were to be arbitrated by a court of 
arbitration on the basis of a majority of votes. The court would consist of 
Prussian (as requested by Hesse-Darmstadt), Baden (as requested by Nassau), 
and French (as requested by the other CCNR members) hydraulic engineers. 
They would consult with the Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau engineers, and 
would carry out additional local surveys, if necessary. With this 1856 agree-
ment, the Rheingau issue was not solved, as will become clear in Chapter 6. 
However, with the signing of it, the CCNR, with the consent of the respective 
riparian governments, institutionalised a body of hydraulic engineers, not only 
as a corpus of expertise that could consult on river improvement, but one that 
was even charged with arbitrational and binding decision powers. This meant 
that part of the riparian nations’ sovereignty now was redirected to a body of 
expertise that was installed by the CCNR.55 
Whereas the Rheingau survey reaffirmed and extended the weight of 
hydraulic experts in CCNR matters regarding the improvement of the river 
flow, the 1858 inspection of the first standing bridge crossing the Rhine scaled 
it up to unprecedented levels that also went beyond the scope of the common 
interest of free navigation. Up until the mid-nineteenth century, one could 
cross the Rhine in three ways. First, one could cross by means of a stone 
bridge. For this option one had to go all the way to Basel, where the only and 
oldest existing stone bridge site across the Rhine is located. Second, one could 
cross via a cable ferry that brought individuals and their belongings from one 
bank to the other. And third, one could cross via the movable pontoon 
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bridges, such as the ones at Arnhem, Cologne, Mainz, or Strasbourg. When 
one considers that in the 1850s in Cologne each day some 10,000 pedestrians 
and 300–400 carts crossed the Rhine, while for a large part of the day it also 
allowed the navigation to continue, one could argue that the pontoon system 
worked well. However, neither this, nor the other two methods met the 
demands of the expanding railways that needed fixed and secure bridges. 
In the late 1840s, it was the Prussian authorities that first entertained the 
idea of linking Cologne with Deutz by means of a standing bridge.56 Fol-
lowing the latest technological – mostly British – innovations, the Prussian 
government abandoned the initial idea of building a suspension iron chain 
bridge and decided to construct a stronger wrought iron lattice truss bridge. It 
measured more than 100 metres in length and almost 17 metres in width and 
was able to hold two railway decks and a road deck, thereby facilitating the 
integration of both road and rail traffic of both sides of the Rhine. The bridge 
was partly financed by the Koln-Mindener Railways. The plans were 
impressive in terms of technological innovation, scale, and scope. The Cathe-
dral Bridge – named for Cologne Cathedral, which was directly in line with 
it – was to be the first immovable bridge between Basel and the North Sea 
since Roman times.57 But the monumental construction also led to massive 
resistance because the Prussian government opted for a closed rather than an 
opening bridge. This made the design a matter for the CCNR, as the planned 
bridge might inhibit navigation on the Rhine. When the Prussian commissioner 
laid out the plans of his government for the first time in December 1850, the 
commissioners from Baden and Bavaria instantly spoke out against it. 
Five years later, in 1855, when Prussia was about to start the construction of 
the main carrying pillars, the debate about the bridge in the Central Commis-
sion still centred around the problem of obstructing navigation.58 Having a 
closed bridge was not necessarily cheaper or easier to construct, but came from 
the desire of the Prussian government to solve a fundamental problem. Each 
day the Cologne pontoon bridge opened 16 to 18 times to give way to naviga-
tion. Prioritising ships resulted in blocked road traffic for about seven and half 
hours a day, and, since during the night there was no traffic, this resulted in a 
non-functioning road connection of almost half a working day.59 Continuity in 
rail and road traffic, not disrupted by open bridges, was essentially in the 
interest of Europe as a whole, the Prussian commissioner, Martin Friedrich 
Rudolph Delbrück (1817–1903), explained. After all, the direct rail connection 
was necessary to promote traffic between northern Germany, Belgium, France, 
and Great Britain, a significant part of western Europe. The Act of Mainz 
would be a flebile beneficium for the Rhenish merchant class, the Prussian 
commissioner stated, if it made this international connection impossible.60 
The Prussian statement did not convince the other delegates at all. The 
Baden, Bavarian, and Hessian commissioners found it a flagrant infringement 
of the Act of Mainz, specifically of article 67 that stated that the signees 
‘agree to take all necessary measures for their territory to ensure that no 
obstruction of navigation is ever caused by mills or other thrusters and wheels 
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on the river, or by weirs or other artificial devices of any kind.’ Even more 
importantly, the commissioners added, the construction of closed railway 
bridges would inevitably lead to an unfortunate decline in Rhine navigation, 
and even bore the seeds of its complete collapse. Railways were threatening to 
outcompete Rhine trade and traffic. Any additional disadvantages for boats, 
such as lowering the masts or chimneys in order to pass the bridge, let alone a 
bridge on the busiest segment of the Rhine, would certainly have negative 
effects on shipping, favouring the railways. Finally, the three German plus the 
French commissioners stated that all other – even the smallest – rivers and 
canals had open bridges, and Cologne should not be different.61 The sceptical 
commissioners were supported in their tirade against a closed bridge by 
Rhenish merchants and shipping companies, which in 1855 published alarm-
ing pamphlets on its damaging consequences for navigation and trade. They 
regarded the bridge as a contemporary version of a Caudine yoke.62 Tellingly, 
the narrative of pursuing progress, securing the common interest, and fol-
lowing commercial necessities that they applied so vigorously to the promo-
tion of steam shipping at the end of the 1840s was for obvious reasons not 
employed a decade later. 
Of course, the experienced negotiator Delbrück had anticipated these 
objections and he eloquently turned the argument against the other commis-
sioners.63 First of all, the Act of Mainz had not, and could not have, antici-
pated the scale and scope of bridge construction feasible in 1855. In fact, the 
Act did not even consider bridge building on the Rhine an issue, as it was not 
mentioned, not even in article 67. More importantly, a bridge had a very dif-
ferent legal status, Delbrück argued. Whereas mills or wheels always repre-
sented the private interests of the owners, bridges represented the public 
interest, not necessarily limited to the Prussian, or the national interest, but 
ostensibly extending to a large part of northern Europe. In other words, the 
Cologne bridge was not a private matter that should be subjected to the public 
interest of the principle of freedom of navigation. The Cologne bridge was just 
another public interest, that needed to be reconciled with Rhine navigation in a 
satisfying way. 
Second, technology could help reconcile both interests, Delbrück added. 
The Prussians had conducted successful experiments with new methods of 
lowering masts. The conventional method was to detach the mast from the 
keel or the bottom of the vessel, lift it with the aid of a crane, and put it back 
on the bottom of the vessel on the other side of the bridge. For the new mast-
lowering system, a crane was not even necessary. It consisted of a mast 
tabernacle reaching 3 to 4 metres above deck, with a pivot point near the top 
that allowed the mast to fold. In an upright condition the foot of the mast 
was firmly attached to the deck, but in the folded position the mast was fixed 
horizontally, elevated up to 4 metres from the deck, thereby leaving more 
than enough space for deck cargo. An experiment in Cologne had shown that 
with this mast-lowering system three men could lower and raise a 30-metre 
mast within 12 minutes, while the cargo capacities did not need to be 
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compromised. The new mast-lowering system, in combination with the suffi-
cient height of the bridge deck in Cologne, made it possible to reconcile the 
interests of the two modes of international transportation, while allowing a 
closed bridge. Delbrück was fully convinced that the technical adaption of all 
Rhine ships was more efficient and, in his words, safer both for navigation 
and railway transport, than adapting such a large and heavy bridge with an 
opening system.64 
How much the Prussians cared for a closed bridge and therefore for con-
tinuous rail transport became clear once again when Delbrück declared him-
self willing to offer all owners of existing vessels that were eligible for 
modification the necessary compensation. It was true, Delbrück said, that all 
this resulted in some inconveniences. However, it could not be categorised as 
‘obstruction of navigation,’ as intended in the Act of Mainz. Furthermore, the 
new mast-lowering system had the great advantage of allowing skippers to 
pass the bridge at any desired time of the day, instead of waiting for those 
times when the bridge would be open. As a final measure, Prussia released 
steamboats and timber rafters from paying bridge passage fees, from which 
the sailing vessels had already been exempted after the year of rebellion in 
1848.65 Delbrück, who suffered with a strong fever during the September 
weeks he was in Mainz, could not convince the German commissioners of his 
cause. The only positive side of the session had been that the Dutch and the 
French commissioners had not expressed themselves entirely opposed to his 
ideas. On 3 October, having recovered after a two-week resting period in 
Wiesbaden, Delbrück attended, in the company of the King of Prussia, the 
ceremony of the laying of the foundation stone of the Cologne railway 
bridge.66 
In the following years the Prussian commissioner continued to emphasise 
the urgent and common – European – interest of a closed bridge crossing the 
Rhine ‘which grants the same blessing of uninterrupted continuity to two 
coequal transport roads.’ Yet he rejected the Baden, Bavarian, French, and 
Hessian proposal to elevate the projected bridge height 1.5 metres to a little 
more than 16 metres in total, on the grounds that this would negatively affect 
road traffic, would be a very costly operation, and was essentially not in the 
interest of navigation, as the projected height would suffice, even during high 
water. Another important point of discussion remained the promised com-
pensation for the skippers. The Prussian commissioner had ambiguously 
confirmed that ‘Prussia is prepared, out of considerations of equity and in 
pursuit of its vivid interest in the development of Rhine navigation, to pay 
such compensation by considering it as a collective sacrifice, which it must, 
however, first take over.’ In other words, in Prussia’s view the compensation 
was a social burden (Societätslast) that the Prussian government was willing 
to advance. This meant that if other riparian states started building bridges on 
their respective territories, they should return part of this compensation to 
Prussia. This proposal received major resistance. The commissioners pictured 
the plan as a threat to future bridge building, as the financial repercussions of 
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the ‘social burden’ might impede states from initiating bridge construction 
plans at all. During the extraordinary session in the spring of 1858, all the 
commissioners – except the Prussian one – successfully imposed the deploy-
ment of their respective technical commissioners for a visit to the building site 
in Cologne. Once again, hydraulic experts were crucial in the decisive phase of 
the process of reconciliation. The CCNR asked this Technical Commission to 
provide counsel on the questions as to whether an open bridge was still fea-
sible and desirable, and what would be the necessary height of a closed bridge 
for unhampered navigation. Finally, the Technical Commission was also 
asked to express its opinion about the conditions for compensation of the 
individual skippers.67 
The Technical Commission consisted of the major hydraulic engineers of 
all the riparian states – some of them had also participated in the Technical 
Commission for the Rhine survey of 1849, others would do so during the 
survey of 1862. Most importantly, however, the Prussian hydraulic engineer 
and designer of the Cologne Cathedral Bridge engineering plan, Hermann 
Lohse (1815–1893), would guide the Commission, but was officially not part 
of it, and would not contribute to the final report. After 1849 the opinion of 
the Technical Commission for the Rhine survey had determined the course of 
action of the CCNR. Thus, the Prussian absence in the Commission of 1858 
indicates that the Prussian authorities were either convinced they were right 
from an engineering point of view, or they were willing to give in to the 
calculable demands of the Technical Commission, or both. 
Only one week after the extraordinary spring session, the Technical Com-
mission issued its report. In essence, it concluded that the construction of an 
open bridge was still possible, but hardly efficacious. The new and simple 
mast-lowering system allowed the bridge deck to be closed permanently. 
The Commission agreed with the Prussian CCNR commissioner that a bridge 
with an opening mechanism might even be dangerous and would inevitably 
lead to malfunctions, disadvantaging both Rhine and rail traffic. With regard 
to the required bridge height, the Technical Commission concluded that a 
height of little more than 16 metres was justified and technically feasible. 
Finally, the Commission adopted the Prussian proposal to grant compensa-
tion to the skippers on the basis of the loading capacity of their vessels rather 
than the height. This resulted, for example, for a vessel with a 50- to 150-ton 
loading capacity, in a restitution of 200 thalers. A vessel of 500+ tons, the 
largest of its kind at the time, received a restitution of 950 thalers, a sum 
comparable to the annual cost of living of a minor official.68 
In April 1858, the Prussian CCNR commissioner reacted tentatively but 
positively to the report ‘whose personal impartiality and technical authority 
were useless to deny.’ He repeated his arguments for a somewhat lower bridge 
and for regarding the compensation money as a collective rather than a Prussian 
sacrifice, but he found no readiness whatsoever among his co-commissioners to 
comply with these wishes. In a final assertion, Prussia declared itself ready to 
respect the 16-metre minimum and to bear the full compensation costs, without 
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Figure 5.2 Lithograph of the standing bridge near Cologne 
Source: Franz Wilhelm Klenner, Notizen über die neue Rhein-Brücke bei Köln (Köln: 
F.E. Eisen’s Königl. Hof-Buch- und Kunsthandlung, 1859). Digitalisat des Seminars 
für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte der Univ. Köln, www.digitalis.uni-koeln.de/Noti 
zen/notizen_index.html (Public Domain) 
reservation, on the sole condition that the other riparian states complied with the 
exact same terms in similar circumstances. The other commissioners assented to 
Prussia’s proposal to jointly sign an agreement laying down the relevant provi-
sions for the construction of the Cologne standing bridge, and on 7 May 1858 
the representatives of the seven Rhine states signed the treaty.69 This treaty 
would become the default for all future riparian bridge agreements, either in the 
form of a treaty or as adopted as decisions in the session protocols after 1875.70 
Conclusion 
The CCNR’s involvement in the struggle between sailors and steamers in the 
1840s turned out to be a decisive episode for the (mal)functioning of the 
CCNR. We can see that the Chief Inspector, the individual commissioners, 
and the CCNR as a body adopted the threat perception of the sailors to a 
great extent. Ultimately, neither the sailors nor the CCNR were involved in a 
fight against the introduction of a new technology. The problem was that the 
traditional class had no access to the application of this technology, due to a 
lack of capital and organisation. The extinction of an entire industry and the 
consequent loss of livelihood for a large number of people along the Rhine 
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was a concern for the CCNR as it fuelled ‘disorder on the Rhine’ that 
impaired commerce and navigation. The challenging task for the CCNR was 
to reconcile a less ‘violent and ominous’ transition from wind- and man- or 
horse-powered transport into steam-powered transport with their guiding 
principle of freedom of navigation. 
This challenge proved particularly difficult because the CCNR had no 
executive powers and needed also to harmonise the interests of the respective 
riparian states. When the harmonisation of the measures to be taken on a 
transnational level failed, the CCNR made a final attempt to reconcile the 
sailors’ interests with those of the steam-shipping companies. Even though the 
masterstroke turned out to be an almost complete failure, the CCNR mana-
ged to abolish some taxes for the sailors. Moreover, this episode was a crucial 
turning point in the CCNR’s deliberations as it started the discussion about 
the reduction or abolition of the Rhine tolls, an issue that would only be 
resolved in the 1860s. Finally, the meeting also proved to be a crucial experi-
ment in the administrative learning process of the CCNR, as it would never 
again act as an external intermediator between stakeholders and interest 
groups after 1848. In the much-politicised environment of the late 1840s, it 
looked for other ways to effectively reconcile trans- and subnational interests 
with the principle of freedom of navigation. The employment of external 
technological experts proved essential in the Commission’s reconciliatory 
task. 
With the 1859 codification of standing Rhine bridge building the CCNR 
had created yet another instrument to reconcile competing interests along the 
river. While the first Rhine survey in 1849 had helped to standardise and 
harmonise the behaviour of the riparian states regarding the promotion of 
navigability, the 1859 treaty concerned the riparian control of resources that 
went beyond those of the river itself, while protecting the navigability and 
prosperity of the Rhine. Moreover, by once again employing the ‘impartiality 
and technical authority’ of a group of hydraulic experts, the CCNR affirmed 
and reconstituted the weight of the institution of the Technical Commission 
in the process of reconciliation. 
And finally, this episode also shows the implications of the decision-making 
procedure for the larger powers within the Commission. The additional costs 
for Prussia of continuing the bridge construction should not be under-
estimated. Adapting its bridge design to the required height of 16 metres in a 
relatively late phase of the construction must have led to higher building costs. 
In addition, 330,000 thalers was paid as Prussian compensation to the indi-
vidual skippers of 913 ships, which was substantial, considering the total 
building costs of about 2.93 million thalers.71 Perhaps Prussia anticipated 
sharing these compensation costs with other states soon, as they were about 
to construct Rhine bridges themselves, and had to comply to the same con-
ditions as Prussia. Nevertheless, a considerable part of the Rhine fleet had 
already undergone its transformation before the construction of the second 
standing railway bridge, the Südbrücke in Mainz, started in 1860. Be that as 
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it may, exactly four years after the laying of the foundation stone in 1855, the 
Cathedral Bridge was inaugurated. By 1886 no less than 168 trains passed 
this bridge each day, while navigation continued. The CCNR thus managed 
to have the most powerful state along the Rhine, Prussia, conform itself at 
least to some extent to the interests and desires of the other riparian states, 
without a single shot fired. 
In terms of the security-prosperity nexus, towards the 1860s the CCNR had 
thus become less of a diplomatic forum and more consolidated as a centre of 
expertise that acted as a guarantor of the freedom of navigation on the Rhine. 
The level of implementation of the freedom of navigation principle was 
increasingly assessed and determined by technocratic criteria. This was also a 
strategy to remain relevant as an international organisation. Despite its 
executive limitations, the CCNR turned into an advisory and controlling 
body that increased inter-riparian transparency and competition in enhancing 
navigability and successfully used the combination of external expert input, 
internal intermediation, and majority pressure to build consensus and restrain 
Prussia. Gradually, the CCNR became a more technocratic platform, with an 
emphasis on prosperity-enhancing technical interventions for the Rhine, 
counterbalancing national political interests. The question remains whether 
the CCNR was able to continue on this footing in the context of further 
increasing national power politics in the following decades. 
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6 Running an international organisation 
in the context of increasing national 
power politics (1860–1900) 
Introduction 
This chapter lays out how between 1860 and 1900 the CCNR’s work was 
heavily affected by Prussia’s power play in the national and the international 
arena, and by the completion of an interregional railway network that threa-
tened to outcompete Rhine navigation. Moreover, the CCNR found itself in 
an existential crisis as the general public saw too little progress in the main 
points of the Commission’s agenda: the abolition of the Rhine tolls and the 
physical improvement of the navigable channel. Continuing the endless nego-
tiations would result in the definite loss of the Commission’s legitimacy, but 
transforming the CCNR into a fully-fledged supranational organisation on its 
own, a course pursued by its new Chief Inspector, was a no-go in the 
increasingly nationalist context of these years. Upgrading the contribution of 
a transnational expert network – established by the CCNR in 1849 as an ad 
hoc Technical Commission and fully institutionalised after 1860 – therefore 
proved essential both for successfully mitigating the political tensions regard-
ing the Rhine correction programmes and for the very survival of the Com-
mission’s legitimacy. This regained legitimacy also allowed the CCNR to 
secure the highly liberal policy of toll abolition it had been preparing for 
decades. The revival of the CCNR would, however, come at the expense of 
the figure of the Chief Inspector. In the 1860–1900 period the Rhine became 
the subject of high politics once again, but even the Franco-Prussian war did 
not interfere with the depoliticisation of the freedom of its navigation or with 
the continuing existence and activities of the CCNR itself. 
‘Ruhig und unpolitisch’ 
In 1859 the Prussian commissioner, Delbrück, was not exactly grieving about 
leaving the CCNR after ten years of service, even though he had always 
enjoyed himself marvellously during the early-autumn sessions in Mainz. In 
his memoirs written after 1870, Delbrück remembers Mainz as a fascinating 
city, not only because of its picturesque ramparts and fortress towers, but 
mostly because of its highly international character. The city still accommodated 
the Austrian, Prussian, and Hessian garrisons and their accompanying 
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authorities pervaded the city with a vibrant atmosphere. Furthermore, from the 
city one could reach the attractive Rheingau in a heartbeat by means of a 
steamship. Moreover, not unimportantly, Mainz was only a stone’s throw  away  
from other cities, such as Frankfurt and Wiesbaden. ‘How many times,’ Del-
brück recalled, 
did I go to Wiesbaden after dinner, passing the Russian chapel, climbing 
the higher plane on forest paths, to enjoy in the small tavern with good 
wine the view of the Rhine Valley and Mainz over the dark ridge of the 
Donnersberg, until the evening fog rising from the river made the picture 
invisible.1 
His position as Rhine commissioner in Mainz was mostly a side affair. In the 
Ministry of Commerce in Berlin, on the other hand, Delbrück was one of the 
key men. Together with the former Prussian Rhine commissioner – and one 
of his main confidants – Johann Friedrich von Pommer-Esche, he was in 
charge of the illustrious Prussian policy to pursue a customs union among 
the German states in the 1850s and 1860s. When in 1859 Delbrück received 
the highly distinguished position of Director of Commerce and Business 
at the Prussian Ministry of Commerce, he was not able to combine this task 
with the position of Rhine commissioner anymore – even if it was true, as we 
will see below, that in his new position he would still have an important hand 
in Rhine affairs. 
Leaving aside this attractive new position, it was mostly because the 
CCNR was about to leave his beloved Mainz that his departure was made 
particularly easy. No longer would the Commission be running its affairs 
from ‘golden Mainz,’ as Delbrück called it, but from ‘stone Mannheim.’ In 
contrast to Mainz, Mannheim was a young city that had been rebuilt after its 
destruction at the end of the eighteenth century in a strict quadrate form, 
making its streets straight with only regular corners, like a checkerboard. 
Quite possibly, in calling it a city of ‘stone,’ Delbrück was referring to the 
Danish poet Jens Baggesen (1764–1826), who wrote about Mannheim as a 
‘poem of stone.’ The rectangular composition of Mannheim provided it with 
an almost tyrannical rationality that left no space for the imagination. In fact, 
Baggesen spoke about Mannheim in terms of a ‘stiff, rectangular, cold, 
immobile, unkind and deadly city.’2 With the transfer to the much more pro-
vincial and less scenic Mannheim, most of the charm that the autumn months 
on the Rhine possessed for Delbrück was lost.3 
But why had the CCNR to move at all? In its protocols one can read that it 
was found ‘in the interest of the navigation of the Rhine’ that the Commission 
had its seat in an ‘open Rhine city’ such as Mannheim that had torn down the 
remaining ramparts with its rebuilding, instead of in a closed fortified city like 
Mainz.4 In addition, it was a rather convenient misfortune that the popular 
Grand Duchess of Baden and foster daughter of Napoleon himself, Stéphanie 
Louise Adrienne de Beauharnais (1789–1860), died in January 1860, and left 
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three rooms of her castle in the city of Mannheim to the Commission, free of 
charge, the protocols noted.5 Yet an availability of free office space can barely 
be regarded a motivation to move. Neither Mannheim’s ‘openness’ nor Mainz’s 
‘closeness’ had changed in the past decades, which made that consideration an 
obscure pretext to move. 
In his memoirs Delbrück shone some light on this affair as well. According 
to him, it was the increasing political tension in Europe that led to the move 
to Mannheim. In 1859 France and the kingdom of Sardinia provoked a war 
with Austria over the Lombard territories. This also brought Mainz, the lar-
gest fortified city of the German Confederation with Prussian, Hessian, and 
Austrian troops, to a state of the highest military preparedness. At that point, 
the German authorities started to regard the permanent presence of the 
French Rhine commissioner in Mainz as a problem. The French government, 
and especially Napoleon III, were notorious for their flirtation with the his-
torical aspiration to ‘restore’ France’s ‘natural border’ to the Rhine, extending 
its territory to the Rhineland, including Mainz. To have resident in the city an 
accredited French agent was untenable. Instead of starting difficult and pain-
ful procedures to expel the French commissioner from Mainz, the German 
commissioners suggested simply moving the CCNR to a less strategically 
sensitive Rhine city. In other words, the move to Mannheim was not in the 
interest of Rhine navigation at all, but was the solution to a political problem 
that had been raised in these years of high political tensions. The Dutch 
commissioner between 1909 and 1930, Van Eysinga, acknowledged the poli-
tical cause of the move to Mannheim in the first substantial account of the 
Commission he authored in the 1930s. ‘However, except for this event, the life 
of the Central Commission between 1832–1919 proceeded calm and apolitical 
(ruhig und unpolitisch),’ he insisted.6 Delbrück left the Commission at a time 
of increasing tensions between national and particularistic interests on the one 
hand, and the more common interest of a navigable Rhine on the other. In 
these final decades of the nineteenth century the CCNR faced major chal-
lenges in keeping the Rhine competitive with the railways. In this context it 
had to reinvent itself and find a way to mitigate conflicting interests, or it 
would lose its legitimacy and thus its raison d’être altogether. 
Reducing Rhine tolls 
The year 1860 was a crucial one in terms of liberating the Rhine from the 
burden of taxation. Ever since the mid-1850s, when railways increasingly 
started to form a dense and far-reaching transport network connecting 
Cologne via Antwerp or Bremen with the sea, Rhine navigation lost its 
monopoly on maritime trade and was starting to be in real danger of being 
outcompeted.7 One of the ways to maintain the Rhine’s competitiveness was 
to reduce the fiscal burdens on navigation. In 1848 sailors had already been 
exempted from bridge passage fees, while the recognition rights were halved. 
By 1850, the French and the Dutch governments had reduced or even lifted 
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the tolls on their parts of the Rhine entirely and wanted to take advantage of 
toll reduction on the German parts. Besides the Netherlands and France, 
German states Bavaria and, after 1855 especially, Baden turned into fierce 
proponents of toll reduction. However, Baden was facing strong opposition 
from the smaller German riparian states. In the 1850s, the Nassauan and 
Hessian toll stations in Caub and Mainz combined levied almost 900,000 
francs annually, which corresponds to more than 5 million euros in 2015,8 
and constituted at the time more than a third of the total amount of Rhine 
tolls collected. In contrast, the Baden and Bavarian toll stations of 
Mannheim, Altbreisach, and Neuburg collected barely 200,000 francs, 
making their abolition far less of a bloodletting.9 
The Rhine toll question was intricately connected to the extension of the 
German customs union in those years.10 As the driving force and organiser of 
a German customs union, Prussia could not disregard Hessian and Nassauan 
resistance to the reduction of what were for these smaller states major 
revenues. Besides, Prussian officials collected 1.5 million francs annually (or 
8.5 million euros in 2015), almost 60 per cent of the entire Rhine toll collec-
tion. In 1857, Baden achieved a small victory when its proposal to reduce the 
toll categories of some specific goods found approval in the CCNR. ‘Declas-
sification’ of overseas transit goods such as raw cotton would beef up Rhine 
traffic, Baden stated, and the reduction of tolls on raw materials such as pig 
iron would benefit domestic industry. Even Prussia could not deny that with 
such a measure ‘a doubly benevolent purpose is done.’11 
In 1859, in an ultimate and desperate attempt to force Hesse-Darmstadt to 
cooperate, the Dutch commissioner wanted to make the Commission’s 
approval for the construction of the Rhine bridge near Mainz subject to 
Hesse-Darmstadt’s consent to the policy of toll reduction. This proposal 
would significantly delay the accomplishment of Hesse-Darmstadt’s most 
important infrastructural project at the time. However, this exceeded the jur-
isdiction of the CCNR; the plan could not count on Prussia’s support and 
therefore was abandoned.12 Besides the competing interests, Prussia’s stance 
in regarding this toll issue as an internal German affair made the CCNR 
deliberations all the more ineffective. And when in 1860, ‘So close in view of 
the losses and dangers for the navigation on the Rhine by the concurring 
railroads,’13 none of the items on the agenda of the extraordinary spring ses-
sion seemed to correspond with the most urgent matter in Rhine navigation, 
the abolition of Rhine tolls, public agitation rose.14 
The continued lack of riparian cooperation on the matter of toll reduction 
indeed resulted in a strong public counteroffensive. Individual stakeholders 
acted on their own behalf or in newly established interest groups, of which the 
most prominent was the international ‘committee of the united interested 
parties in Rhine navigation.’ They informed the public by means of 
pamphlets, lobbied their governments, and gathered in meetings that resulted 
in unanimously adopted resolutions that were in turn published in news-
papers. A rising Dutch committee member, Amsterdam lawyer (and future 
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Nobel prize winner and CCNR commissioner) Tobias Michel Karel Asser 
(1838–1913), kept the pressure on and boldly asked in one of his pamphlets 
whether the time had come to call for the intervention of the Great Powers to 
solve the Rhine toll question quickly. After all, Asser argued, ‘The freedom of 
navigation on large European rivers has been considered a subject of general 
European governmental care for a long time,’ thereby elegantly referring to 
Wellington’s appeal to the European powers to demand a more liberal stand 
from the Dutch government after the European Congresses of Verona in 
1822.15 
These public calls for toll reduction did not fall on deaf ears. In 1860 even 
the Prussian government started to regard it as a necessary measure in itself. 
The opening of the William–Luxemburg railway at the end of the previous 
year was a cause for great concern. It connected the eastern French railways 
with the Belgian ones and thereby provided a direct route between the Bel-
gian port all the way to Switzerland. It was the first time that the low charges 
of the railways threatened to diminish transport on the Rhine. After even the 
Hessian and Nassauan national assemblies urged their governments to pre-
vent the degeneration of ‘the most beautiful German stream,’ the Baden 
government finally managed to assemble representatives of the German 
riparian states in its capital. The ensuing Karlsruhe Agreement resulted in a 
significant drop in Rhine tolls on the German Rhine, amounting to about 30 
per cent of freight rates. As a consequence, Prussia lost more than 50 per cent 
of its revenue. Yet the Prussian commissioner in the CCNR thought the 
sacrifice was more than compensated for by keeping the Rhine from being 
entirely outcompeted by the railways. What is more, similar toll reductions 
were applied to the Rhine’s German tributaries and within a couple of years 
to all other German rivers as well.16 This major toll reduction, a step that was 
prepared within, but eventually taken outside the CCNR under Baden lea-
dership, could, as we will see below, not satisfy all within the Commission. 
A new Chief Inspector in troubled times 
The year 1860 also marked the appearance of a new Chief Inspector. Like 
Delbrück, the current Chief Inspector of the CCNR was less than enthusiastic 
about his employer’s move to Mannheim. Von Auer had lived through the 
entire second phase of the Commission and had been appointed for life. But 
in 1860 at the age of 74, after 29 years of service, he decided it was enough. 
Von Auer was honourably dismissed and received a pension of no less than 
8,000 francs a year.17 This opened up the position to fresh blood, and at the 
end of the year the Prussian Karl Hermann Bitter (1813–1885) was installed. 
Bitter was a man with quite a track record. He was trained in law and 
public administration – cameralism – and had been employed in Prussian 
public service for 20 years. He had been involved in the workings of the Weser 
Commission, but more importantly, he had been a member of the European 
Commission for the Danube, in which he had represented Prussia since its 
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inception in 1856.18 Bitter had a leading role in the day-to-day affairs of this 
Commission, but had a hard time enjoying himself in the Ottoman port of 
Galaţi, where the ECD resided, as it isolated him from the European cultural 
life he loved so much.19 On his request, Bitter had himself transferred to the 
CCNR in Mannheim in 1860.20 
In Galați Bitter had been used to and had been credited with the imple-
mentation of an executive administrative body that was – as we will see in the 
Conclusion – far more powerful than the CCNR. The ECD was financially 
independent: it levied its own tolls, carried out all the construction works on 
the Danube, implemented and policed regulations, and constituted, as Con-
stantin Ardeleanu calls it, a ‘quasi state.’21 Only just beginning his tenure in 
Mannheim, Bitter proposed unprompted to charge the CCNR with executive 
and legislative powers along the lines of the ECD and to have the Mainz 
Convention adapted accordingly.22 Bitter envisioned a strong executive Com-
mission that was able to implement the principle of freedom of navigation by 
force. The Dutch believed his authoritarian and executive style was what was 
needed to finally push the most liberal Rhine regime through. Bitter’s propo-
sal met with much resistance among the other members of the CCNR 
though, and with the upcoming Rhine survey in 1861, Bitter shifted for the 
time being his attention to the improvement of the navigable channel instead. 
To put his stamp on the Rhine survey, Bitter had arranged the steam boat 
for the Technical Commission and had compiled no less than five extensive 
and less extensive memoranda in which he outlined the main hydraulic 
obstacles for navigation on the three Rhine districts from Basel to the Dutch 
border. He made sure that all the members of the Technical Commission 
received the memoranda before the start of the survey at the end of April 
1861. On the first Rhein-Bezirk, that is from Basel to the Bavarian-French 
border, he was very concise and rather optimistic about the navigability. Here 
and there the inspector had reported floating tree trunks, gravel deposits, and 
some wild currents. However, within five or six years the famous Tulla engi-
neering works on this part of the Rhine would be ready. Bitter expected that 
when the river was finally brought into its ‘completely normal condition’ the 
existing problems would disappear accordingly.23 
In the second district, from the French border to Bingen, Bitter observed 
many more urgent problems for navigation. From Nieder-Walluf to Bingen the 
river was still in an unregulated condition, even after 1854 when the CCNR 
had already demanded the attention of the governments concerned with this 
part of the Rhine. Irregular sandbanks hampered traffic  as there  was not  
always sufficient depth for navigating. In addition, the large width of the river 
in these parts did not result in a current fast enough to remove them.24 It was, 
according to Bitter, one of the worst and most difficult parts for navigation on 
the entire Rhine:  ‘In this case, thoroughgoing corrections are indispensable in 
order to achieve sufficient safety and regularity for the larger shipping traffic.’ 
The Binger Loch continued to be a dangerous passage for ships. The restricted 
width of 23 metres did not allow multiple ships to pass each other. In order not 
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to be dependent on yet another round of detonation, and risking a lower water 
level, the Prussian government had recently approved a project to construct a 
second navigable channel crossing the Mäusethurm-Isle. 
Bitter continued with the third Rhine district, the Middle Rhine, from 
Bingen to Bonn. In the 30-kilometre Rhine stretch downstream from Bingen 
he identified no less than five dangerous passages. The 1849 survey had 
already observed 44 rocks on this particular segment.25 This resulted in an 
irregular navigable channel, and a clear, affordable plan of how to remove 
these rocks, or how to create a regular and deeper channel, had still not been 
determined for all these parts. The Prussian authorities had recently started to 
carry out an extensive regulating plan only for the passage of ‘Wild Danger’ 
(Wilden Gefähr) near Caub, while other parts needed urgent improvement as 
well, such as the Loreley at Sankt Goar, where strong currents had caused the 
wreck of several ships. From Sankt Goar to the Dutch border the problem 
was not so much the depth, as from Koblenz downwards the water was 
almost 1 metre deeper than at the Binger Loch. However, Bitter identified no 
fewer than 16 spots where the river did not have enough width to secure safe 
deviation for ships passing each other. ‘In order to prevent the shipping indus-
try from becoming inhibited in the future, it is urgently necessary to continue 
the regulation of the river that has begun downwards in corresponding 
proportions,’ Bitter concluded.26 
The Technical Commission gently but largely disregarded Bitter’s memor-
anda. The experts, who consisted of the leading hydraulic engineers of the 
riparian states and who had arrived in Basel on schedule, unanimously 
appointed the authoritative Prussian engineer and director of the Strombau-
Verwaltung, Eduard Aldolph Nobiling (1801–1882), chair of the Technical 
Commission. Moreover, the Technical Commission also turned down the use 
of Bitter’s steamboat. Due to shallow and fast water between Basel and 
Strasbourg, the French technical commissioner residing in Strasbourg deemed 
it too dangerous and irresponsible to navigate the Prussian steamboat on this 
part of the Rhine. He refused to allow the boat to even leave the port 
upstream and offered the Commission the use of his sailing boat instead, an 
offer the Commission gratefully accepted. At eight o’clock in the morning of 
30 April 1861, the Technical Commission left Basel for Breisach.27 
Before the Commission even set sail on the very boat that had been used 
for the first technical survey in 1849, two things had become clear. First, even 
after more than ten years of regulating the river stream, large parts of the 
Rhine were in very bad condition, especially with regard to steam navigation. 
Second, besides the Chief Inspector and his sub-inspectors, an alternative 
source of knowledge about the Rhine had settled in permanently: the Tech-
nical Commission. The Technical Commission based its authority on techni-
cal expertise and scientific river engineering theories. In contrast, the Chief 
Inspector appealed to personal observations and local intelligence on the one 
hand, and his authoritarian and executive style on the other. Clearly, these 
two approaches increasingly clashed. 
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However, in the context of the early 1860s, in which the CCNR faced great 
difficulties in reducing the Rhine tolls, this clash did not prevent the Dutch 
Commissioner Emil Testa from considering Bitter’s drive to push through an 
increasingly liberal Rhine regime – albeit in an autocratic way – appealing. In 
the spring session of 1862, the Dutch commissioner used a non-issue as a 
pretext for raising fundamental questions about the competences of the 
CCNR commissioners. It was the start of a campaign within the CCNR to 
consolidate the position of the Chief Inspector with the aim of bolstering the 
Commission’s executive clout, at the expense of the individual commissioners 
themselves. 
In February, prior to the spring session, the commissioners had corre-
sponded and decided under the authority of the Father of the House – the 
oldest member of the Commission – to grant one of its office clerks special 
leave to visit the Great London Exposition in 1862. The Dutch government, 
so Testa argued in April, found this procedure unlawful, since the Commis-
sion could not decide on any matter regarding the CCNR or the principle of 
freedom of navigation on the Rhine, when it was officially on leave. In the 
time between the sessions, the Dutch commissioner continued, only the Chief 
Inspector had authority with regard to all matters concerning the Rhine. He, 
and thus not the commissioners, must take care of matters that could not be 
delayed in any way.28 
The other Rhine commissioners were unanimously astonished by this 
statement, as it would mean that the CCNR would be ineffectual for 11 
months a year. Consequently, it would mean that the sovereign rights that 
were being represented by the individual commissioners would be trans-
ferred to the Chief Inspector, ‘and the Commission would become an 
instrument without will, in the hands of one of its employees.’ It was exactly 
this quality of the CCNR – the continuing competences of the individual 
commissioners with regard to matters of Rhine navigation after the conclu-
sion of the formal sessions – that distinguished it from other commissions, 
such as the Commission for Navigation of the Elbe. The Mainz Convention 
did not prevent the governments of the riparian states from employing their 
commissioners to deliberate on urgent matters during recess. In fact, the 
common practice of the past decades showed that these governments, 
including the Dutch government, had been very willing to communicate by 
means of written correspondence, for example in the case of the construc-
tion of the standing Rhine bridge in Koblenz in that very year. ‘Indeed,’ the 
commissioners stated: 
it is difficult to find a real reason for determining precisely why the Dutch 
Government would forbid itself and other riparian governments a chan-
nel of communication which often leads more easily and quickly to a 
result than the deliberations during the session of the Commission, espe-
cially since this government is primarily interested in Rhine navigation, 
and, consequently, in a speedy expedition of affairs which concern it. 
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It is not likely that the Netherlands indeed wanted to impeach the figure of 
Father of the House. True, it was not formally prescribed by the Mainz 
Convention that the oldest member was to take the lead in correspondence 
during the intervals, yet it had become standard practice ever since 1831. 
Quite possibly, the Netherlands was instead trying to improve Bitter’s execu-
tive position. The Netherlands hoped thereby to put the smaller German 
states under pressure and have the straining Rhine tolls finally abolished. 
However, Testa’s action was as hopeless as his effort had been to pressurise 
Hesse-Darmstadt in 1859 by blocking the approval for the construction of the 
standing bridge near Mainz. And as 40 years earlier, when the Netherlands 
supported Eichhoff in his run for Chief Inspector, it backed the wrong horse. 
In August 1862 the CCNR put great pressure on the Dutch commissioner to 
vote ‘in the interest of promoting Rhine navigation’ in favour of the existing 
deliberative decision-making structure based on consensus at the expense of a 
more executive and hierarchical structure. Eventually, the Dutch commis-
sioner abandoned his position with regard to the Father of the House and the 
Chief Inspector.29 
During these years the German Rhine states, and not solely the smaller 
ones, did indeed lose confidence in Bitter. The commissioners of Hesse-
Darmstadt, Nassau, Baden, and Bavaria jointly declared in a session in 1862 
that: ‘Shortly after Mr. Bitter took office, it became clear that the range of 
powers attributed to the Chief Inspector … could not suffice to a man of the 
character of Mr. Bitter.’ Although unwilling to go into detail in the official 
protocols, the four commissioners noted that between 1860 and 1862 Bitter 
increasingly exercised powers to which he was not entitled, bringing him sev-
eral times into conflict with local authorities. Bitter’s behaviour was about to 
cause serious harm to the operations of the Chief Inspector as a public ser-
vant belonging to seven states, they argued. Therefore, the four German 
commissioners asked the CCNR for something that had never been requested 
before: to remove the Chief Inspector from office.30 The call was not sufficiently 
supported. However, this episode certainly did not improve his position, as we 
will see. 
Within the CCNR, there had been issues before with the figure of the Chief 
Inspector, but Bitter’s ambitions on the Rhine, combined with the Dutch 
support, really touched a sensitive nerve. It touched upon the very quality of 
the CCNR: its function as a clearing house, a place (or non-place when it was 
formally on leave) where the representatives of the riparian states could 
deliberate and work in a secure space towards a sensible solution to the 
existing problems on the Rhine. The balancing out of national interests with 
the common interest of a navigable Rhine indeed consumed a lot of time, and 
sometimes the work needed to be continued through correspondence. How-
ever, the agreement that sovereign rights remained with the individual com-
missioners was the very key to the sense of security that the CCNR required 
to slowly converge divergent interests. Bitter’s insensitive approach had 
compromised this balance. 
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Abolition of the Rhine tolls after all 
In the following years, the CCNR members tried to regain the initiative to cut 
down the fiscal burden on the Rhine. In 1861, for example, Prussia and 
Bavaria demanded the abolition of compulsory pilotage. In 1862, Baden 
insisted on the elimination of beaconage in the Dutch ports, upon which the 
Dutch commissioner instantly requested the complete removal of the lowest 
toll category. In 1863, outside the Commission, the Prussian cabinet proposed 
halving the recognition dues for steamboats, something the Dutch commis-
sioner had been suggesting since 1848, when the reduction was granted for 
sailors as we saw in Chapter 4. Now, the Prussian government stated, the 
entire industry of navigation on the Rhine was in trouble, not just the sailors, 
and in order to save navigation on the Rhine from oblivion, and to support 
producers and consumers along it simultaneously, this measure was more 
than appropriate. The Dutch commissioner could only agree, as did the other 
major riparian states. 
In May 1864, the CCNR specifically gathered to decide on this matter in 
Rotterdam. Unexpectedly, however, the Hessian and Nassauan commis-
sioners raised objections. By rejecting the proposal, and by boldly stating that 
navigation on the Rhine was not at all in danger of being destroyed, the two 
small Rhine states ended up in isolation. The same year, Prussia put Hesse-
Darmstadt and Nassau on the spot by making their renewed membership of 
the German Customs Union subject to their approval of the reduction of the 
recognition dues on the Rhine. Consequently, they approved the reduction in 
October. In 1866, all the proposed reductions and abolitions were imple-
mented, and after Prussia won the Austro-Prussian war in the summer of the 
same year, it even made the total removal of Rhine tolls a subject of the peace 
treaty. What is more, the Prussian annexation of Nassau resulted in the 
removal of the Nassauan commissioner from the CCNR, who had always 
been very hesitant regarding the reduction of the fiscal burden on the Rhine.31 
With such a mighty neighbour, the Dutch government had little leeway to 
discuss the Prussian demands to formally adapt the Mainz Convention to the 
new situation. With the signing of the Revised Rhine Navigation Act of 17 
October 1868 in Mannheim, the CCNR commissioners – as representatives of 
the riparian powers – finally eliminated the levying of Rhine tolls.32 The 
conclusion of the Mannheim Convention was the final step in a long ongoing 
process of increasing convergence in terms of free trade policies along the 
Rhine. After more than 150 years, the Mannheim Convention is still the basis 
of the navigational regime on the Rhine today. 
The Mannheim Convention offered the Commission the opportunity to 
solve an additional pressing problem. Bitter was forced into early retirement 
and the post of Chief Inspector lapsed.33 Officially the position had become 
superfluous, because without tolls, no resolver of disputes about tolls was 
needed. Even though this was indeed an important part of the Chief Inspec-
tor’s responsibilities, it can be safely assumed that Bitter’s disturbance of the 
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delicate balance within the Commission was the real reason for eliminating 
this post altogether. It was a small sacrifice that facilitated the return of a 
sense of security and a rapprochement between the commissioners. 
In his memoirs, Delbrück described the reduction of Rhine tolls as the 
most important question in the CCNR at that time, yet concluded that the 
Commission was not able to play a significant role in the matter.34 The Dutch 
legal expert and Rhine commissioner after the turn of the century, Van 
Eysinga, on the other hand, held that the CCNR paved the way for the final 
abolition of the Rhine tolls by drafting and adopting supplementary articles 
in the 1830s and 1840s that categorised certain goods in special low tariffs. 
Moreover, it collected and published the number of tolls collected along the 
Rhine in its protocols. Thereby it might have provided transparency and 
clarity to the respective governments about the costs and benefits of reducing 
or eliminating these tolls, or additionally might have given armour to critical 
interest groups in their struggle. Finally, Van Eysinga suggests that in the 
1850s, even though the proposals within the Commission did not lead to the 
direct adoption of new supplementary articles, they accelerated the speed of 
the discussions and constituted a reservoir from which external authorities 
would draw their policies in the 1860s, ultimately resulting in a gradual 
reduction of the fiscal burden on the Rhine.35 As this chapter and book 
shows, the CCNR was not the executive body of policy making, but it was the 
clearing house, the deliberative platform that prepared and disseminated the 
steps that needed taking, while simultaneously preventing one hegemon from 
taking control over the rest. 
After 1868 the CCNR continued its work in an environment in which 
Rhine tolls did not exist anymore. This meant that the riparian states did not 
regard the disappearance of the very reason for its establishment as a good 
enough reason to terminate the CCNR. Indeed, the riparian states considered 
its assessment activities, such as the technical survey of the Rhine or the 
evaluation of projected constructions in the riverbed, as too important to get 
rid of.36 Besides, the international organisation was also considered a pro-
mising forum in which conflicting interests on the national, the sub-, and 
transnational level along the Rhine could be reconciled, even in matters such 
as the salmon fisheries, a topic that did not touch upon navigation at all but 
might be solved by adopting the expert input model that by now was well 
established in the clearing-house operations of the CCNR. 
The protection of Rhenish salmon 
Since its inception, the CCNR had always been presented as merely an 
organisation to protect the principle of freedom of navigation on the Rhine. 
However, as we saw in the case of the dispute between the sailors and the 
steam shipping industry in the 1840s, it sometimes took upon itself the task of 
reconciling interests that went beyond this arena. In 1869, we see once again 
the CCNR operating in a totally different field: fishing. Perhaps it goes a little 
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too far to suggest, as Nil Disco does, that the Central Commission served ‘as 
a platform for forcing the “side effects” of economic prosperity onto the 
international political agenda’; however, its operating structure certainly 
facilitated the coming about of international conventions even on topics with 
which it had no direct relation.37 
Van Eysinga wrote no more than a short paragraph on the common reg-
ulation of salmon fisheries on the Rhine. He defends his disregard with the 
argument that the question had nothing to do with the CCNR, the topic of 
his study. The conference in 1869 took place in Mannheim, ‘but not under the 
authority of the Central Commission.’38 Formally, that was true. However, 
the conference took place in the assembly room of the CCNR, it was atten-
ded by the same men who constituted the CCNR, and the original protocols 
were stored in the Commission’s archive. The only procedural difference was 
that an additional eight stakeholders – partly high officials of local autho-
rities, partly experts on fish or fisheries, but not fishermen – attended the 
conference, and the Dutch representation was substituted by Hendrik van 
Beeck Vollenhoven (1811–1871), member of the senate and chairman of the 
Board of the Sea Fisheries.39 So why did Van Eysinga disregard this episode? 
Possibly because the conference in 1869 would not result in the ratification of 
an agreement, and therefore can be considered a failure, something Van 
Eysinga would not have liked to attribute to the Commission. 
In the wake of the formal signing of the Treaty of Mannheim in 1869, the 
Grand Duchy of Baden took the opportunity to resolve the alarming collapse 
of salmon stock that had been observed everywhere in the Rhine and its tri-
butaries in recent years. Salmon was a much-loved fish. Not only was it a 
tasty and nutritious food, it was also considered the king of fish that lived 
both in sweet and salty water. After the 1850s, new industrial techniques in 
catching, processing, preserving, and transporting salmon helped to sub-
stantially expand the market. Between 1840 and 1868 the wholesale price of a 
kilogram of salmon had more than tripled, amounting to almost one 
guilder.40 Several circumstances had caused the recent reduction of salmon 
stock in the Rhine. Factories and farms dumped cooling water or wastewater 
back into the river, thereby affecting the water quality considerably. Moreover, 
the almost completed canalisation of the Rhine had destroyed the aquatic 
ecosystem in Germany. Steam shipping also negatively affected the preserva-
tion and reproduction of salmon. However, according to a Prussian memor-
andum, it was mostly the ‘reckless way of fishing’ that ‘affects already in itself 
the future of Rhine fishery in such a detrimental way that the preservation of 
even the noblest fish is almost impossible.’ It was true, the memorandum said, 
that the interests of fisheries were secondary to the present agricultural and 
general economic needs. But it was also true that improved state supervision 
and care might protect salmon from extinction.41 ‘It may be said to be the 
very best salmon river in Europe,’ the Irish Quaker and salmon breeder 
Thomas Ashworth wrote about the Rhine, ‘and is the least cared for or cul-
tivated.’42 In order to design common regulations to protect the salmon stock 
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in the Rhine, representatives of the seven riparian states assembled in 
Mannheim in the summer of 1869. 
It was a widely shared opinion that those responsible for the reckless way of 
fishing were to be found in the estuaries of the Rhine. Salmon follow, as 
ichthyologists now call it, an anadromous migration pattern. They live in the 
sea for most of their life, but return at set times to the upper parts of the 
freshwater streams where they were born in order to spawn. There, the young 
fish go through their first stages of life, until they migrate to the sea and the 
cycle starts all over again. At the time, natural historians had only recently 
discovered this behavioural pattern. No one denied that most fish were to be 
found in the estuary when starting their journey to their native water, and it 
was there where Dutch fishermen introduced new fishing techniques and 
fished the river dry. Especially on the narrower branch of the Rhine, the Lek, 
nets could span almost the entire width of the river. Hence, hardly any 
salmon passed through.43 
Public opinion in Germany roasted the Dutch fisheries on the spit. Salmon 
protection measures in the German riparian states could only be effective if 
‘the [legally jusqu’à la mer] free Rhine could be liberated from the thievish 
[rauberische] Dutch salmon traps,’ a high official wrote in 1868.44 Nil Disco 
convincingly argues that the wording here is particularly provocative, as it 
clearly referred to the perdurable dispute between Prussia and the Nether-
lands about the freedom of navigation in the 1820s. Simultaneously, it insi-
nuated that the Dutch fisheries were comparable to the well-known robber 
barons of the Middle Ages: ‘just as the “robber barons” had threatened 
profitable shipping’ by illegally levying excessive tolls, the Dutch ‘were crim-
inally undermining the viability of salmon populations (and fisheries) on the 
Rhine,’ Disco notes.45 To end this ‘illegal blockade,’ the Prussian official sug-
gested forcing an agreement with the Netherlands with a new trade agree-
ment, or better, within the framework of the CCNR. After all, it made sense 
to address this salmon blockade within the structure of the only inter-riparian 
legal arrangement that existed, and indeed was about to be reconfirmed with 
the Treaty of Mannheim that year.46 
In anticipation of the conference on a common regulation for fisheries on 
the Rhine in Mannheim, the Dutch government asked Francois P.L. Pollen 
(1842–1886), the young explorer and natural historian for the Royal Museum 
of Natural History in Leiden, to investigate the salmon fisheries in the Neth-
erlands. In his work, published in 1870, Pollen concluded that common reg-
ulations on the Rhine for fisheries were essential to forestall ‘human 
destructiveness and short-sightedness’ and protect the salmon stock.47 Two of 
the most important, but also contested, measures that were to be discussed in 
Mannheim were the introduction of seasonal fishing closures and the ban on 
catching very young or pregnant salmon. 
He argued that the protection of salmon was a common interest, but con-
sequently also the fruit of a common sacrifice. Salmon breeds in the very 
upper parts of the Rhine and its tributaries. ‘It pains the heart of any 
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dignified Dutch,’ Pollen noted, ‘that he must acknowledge that salmon … is 
being born in Germany and Switzerland,’ because he therefore cannot protect 
the breeding places and the young salmon in order to secure a rich future 
catch. In fact, there was a demand for young salmon as apparently French-
men loved to fry them and have them for breakfast. Simultaneously, the 
Germans were frustrated that they could not prevent the Dutch from catching 
the pregnant fish that were on the way to their country. Fishermen themselves 
would never be inclined to limit their catch, as they firmly believed that if not 
caught by them, the fish would be taken by a fisherman further up- or 
downstream. The only way to solve this problem was to introduce common 
regulations that favoured the upstream migration of salmon to the breeding 
places, protected fish, spawn, and brood during the breeding season, and 
secured the free retreat of young fish to the sea.48 
Those interested in the Dutch fishing industry openly despised Pollen’s sci-
entific claims and regarded the proposed measures as detrimental for the 
Dutch and very favourable to the German fishermen. The Dutch fisherman 
Quakernaat van Spijk wrote: 
The independence of the Netherlands and the interests of the nation are 
too dear to us than that we would not oppose with all our powers against 
measures that we think are very suspicious and become therefore an 
outrageous injustice to our industrious fishermen. 
He feared a powerful influence from abroad, supported by ‘theoretical reflec-
tions’ on an assumed depletion of the salmon stock in the Rhine, that would 
ultimately lead to the obstruction of national prosperity. In a conspiratorial 
tone he continued by saying that it was the feeling ‘that we have to give in to 
the influence of strangers and that our nationality is gently affected by heavy 
strokes’ that made him grab the pencil.49 In other words, salmon entrepre-
neurs like Quakernaat van Spijk tapped into their practical knowledge 
of fisheries and pointed to the possibility that ‘scientific’ arguments were 
mere tools for fishermen at other locations on the Rhine to pursue their par-
ticular interests, rather than a claimed common interest. Or, as Disco puts it: 
a ‘self-interested ideology cloaked in the mantle of science.’50 
Because of the strong resistance in the Netherlands, particularly among the 
larger salmon entrepreneurs, the Dutch representative Van Beeck Vollenhoven 
was not very accommodating during the conference in Mannheim. In fact, it 
can be fully laid at his door and that of his government that the convention 
could not be concluded in August when the representatives first met. The 
Dutch demanded proof that seasonal, daily, and weekly fishing closures would 
eventually result in beneficial circumstances for the fisheries. Although in 
Britain such fishing restrictions had resulted in a larger fish stock, whereas in 
the Netherlands the unlimited catch had caused a decrease in these noble 
animals, yet, Van Beeck Vollenhoven stated, ‘these experiences and claims are 
not yet so convincing and undisputed that the Royal Dutch Government 
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could already engage in such extensive restrictions.’ He therefore suggested 
much shorter fishing closures.51 None of the representatives believed that the 
Dutch proposals would be sufficient to protect the fish, and consequently the 
fisheries, against extinction. It was on this point that the Baden representative 
adjourned the conference. 
On his return to the Netherlands, Pollen went straight to the most impor-
tant fish auctions along the Rhine. For several months he consistently coun-
ted the number of pregnant fish and non-pregnant fish. With this data Pollen 
was able to identify the high season of pregnant salmon heading for the 
Upper Rhine from 1 September until 15 November. Hence, he suggested to 
Van Beeck Vollenhoven to limit the proposed fishing closure in the Nether-
lands, Prussia, and Hesse-Darmstadt to this period of time. On the Upper 
Rhine the closure should last from mid-October to 1 January. The method of 
fishing by spanning a net over the entire width of the river should, Pollen 
argued, be prohibited from September to January.52 
Pollen hoped to gain the confidence of the Dutch by proposing closures 
with clear-cut limitations, in order not to disadvantage the fishermen more than 
necessary. In November the delegates met again, and Pollen’s solution to the 
highly sensitive problem of fishing closures was approved. This approval 
removed the biggest obstacle to unanimity, and the representatives of the ripar-
ian states finally concluded the agreement on 27 November. As in the clearing 
house operations of the CCNR concerning the protection of the freedom of 
navigation on the Rhine, the input of experts proved to be an effective ingre-
dient in balancing out national interests against the more common interest of 
the protection of the salmon stock. 
However, the Dutch parliament rejected the agreement by three votes, upon 
which the other riparian states discarded it as well. The Dutch implemented 
the regulations by means of a Royal Decree anyway, but a uniform interna-
tional fishing regime would only be installed in 1885, in a less restrictive form. 
In 1886 the agreement between the German Empire and the Netherlands was 
ratified, but this was also the first year that the total salmon catch on the 
entire Rhine dropped. In the following decades this decrease continued. The 
riparian cooperation turned out to be too late, too little, and no equilibrium 
was found. By the 1930s the salmon industries on the Rhine had disappeared. 
The CCNR had been careful not to enter the policy field of fisheries formally, 
but it deliberately offered its diplomatic infrastructure to forge consensus 
among the riparian states. Nevertheless, its ambitions were greater than its 
final achievements. 
Continuing Rhine surveys 
With the toll issue settled in 1868, the main focus of the CCNR in the final 
decades of the nineteenth century shifted to the physical improvement of the 
navigable channel. Again, the CCNR had no mandate to improve the channel 
itself, but it was to observe the navigable conditions, consult the respective 
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governments, and urge them to carry out the necessary hydraulic works 
swiftly and in consultation and accordance with the other riparian states. 
The political context in which the CCNR operated changed rather radically 
in these decades. This also touched its very structure. After the French-
German war in 1871, the French commissioner was substituted by a com-
missioner from the newly annexed imperial territories of Alsace-Lorraine. 
After 1871, the CCNR thus consisted merely of six representatives, one Dutch 
and five German. Also, the Commission operated in the context of increasing 
national power politics. The Technical Commission and the Rhine surveys 
proved, therefore, to be an indispensable CCNR tool to align and depoliticise 
the diverging interests of the riparian states in matters of stream ‘corrections’ 
in the long run, especially with regard to the two most disputed sections of 
the river, the Dutch Waal and the German Rheingau. 
German-Dutch rivalries concerning the navigability of the Rhine returned 
time and again, especially after 1889, when a representative of the Prussian 
government had accused the Netherlands in the Landtag of not fulfilling its 
international commitments.53 This verbal sabre-rattling also resulted in an 
emphasis on the problematic Dutch Rhine in historiography.54 However, by 
studying contemporary pamphlets and the protocols of the Technical Com-
mission of the various Rhine surveys, one must conclude that the navigable 
conditions on the German Rheingau were considered as bad or even worse in 
the period around the turn of the century. Again, it was time for the CCNR, 
and the CCNR only, to facilitate changes for the better. 
The 1849 survey had encountered problems with regard to the appropriate 
measuring methods to be carried out and had led to disagreements about how 
to solve the countless navigational obstacles. Nevertheless, the survey was 
regarded as a success as it had resulted in the first general expert impression 
of the conditions for navigation all along the Rhine. Moreover, it had set an 
example of transnational expert cooperation that successfully allowed the 
CCNR to formulate at least three commonly accepted demands of the gov-
ernments of the respective riparian states. The first was that the governments 
involved would turn themselves to all the shortcomings identified with the 
required energy corresponding to the importance and urgency of the matter. 
Furthermore, that wherever riparian states needed to agree on the coordina-
tion and financing of the required works, they would do so as soon as possi-
ble, given the obligation each of them had towards the whole. And finally, 
that the CCNR would receive all information about the progress of the 
works.55 
The 1861 survey was the first opportunity to test the progress of the 
hydraulic works on an international scale. The Technical Commission of 
the Rhine Survey was not impressed. In particular, it observed many sand-
banks on the Waal. Therefore, the Commission announced a new measure to 
determine a ‘normal depth’ for all sections of the Rhine on the basis of 
technical feasibility. As a matter of fact, for the Waal, the Technical Com-
mission demanded a normal depth of 3 metres at average low-water level. 
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Under this and Prussian diplomatic pressure, the Netherlands became aware 
that the regulation of the Waal was not merely necessary in terms of main-
taining the Rhine’s capacity as a transport road, but also technically feasible. 
In the course of the 1860s the Dutch government significantly increased the 
budget for the river regulation works from 1 million to 3 million guilders a 
56year. 
During the subsequent survey in 1874, the Technical Commission was 
more positive about the conditions on the Dutch Rhine. It detected significant 
improvements on the Neder-Rijn and Lek. The depth was still not fully 
satisfactory as it did not correspond to the ‘normal depth’ of 3 metres. How-
ever, the Dutch commissioner of the survey, H.S.J. Rose, argued that this 
branch of the Rhine was mainly used for rafting and the transport of people, 
something that did not require more than the actual depth. Moreover, a fur-
ther increase of the depth implied a further narrowing down of the river, he 
argued, and this in turn would result in high-water conditions that created the 
greatest difficulties for landowners, and which were also not favourable for 
rafting. 
With regard to the more important branch of the Rhine, the Waal, the 
Commission observed significant improvements. Due to the energetic reg-
ulating works that had been carried out since 1861, the overall depth 
increased by 30 centimetres, while on the regulated stretches the depth of the 
navigable channel reached 3.5 metres.57 Shipping on the Waal was boosted 
significantly after the early 1870s, specifically due to increasing mass transport 
of raw materials from and to the German Ruhr industry.58 Nevertheless, 
because the works were not carried out in conjunction with each other and 
over greater lengths, the river was still not regulated consistently. The Tech-
nical Commission concluded that, even though the Dutch government had 
finally shown its commitment to the improvement of the Waal, the full reg-
ulation of this important waterway still required extensive hydraulic works.59 
Critiques of the conditions of the Dutch Waal had been harsh, but criticism 
of the German Rheingau was certainly not less severe. In addition, it found 
an audience that was much wider, while the plans to improve the waterway 
and expand the security ports met with much more resistance. In a pamphlet 
addressed to the CCNR and the Technical Commission some weeks before 
the 1874 survey, the representatives of all the German steam shipping com-
panies on the Rhine sounded the alarm. They acknowledged much had hap-
pened to support navigation on the Rhine; however, to maintain prosperous 
navigation still more was needed. The ‘Rheinschiffahrts-Interessenten’ 
observed sandbanks and unregulated conditions (‘verwilderte Zustand’) that 
either blocked navigation between the Niederrhein and the Oberrhein, or 
caused innumerable transshipments and consequently an enormous loss of 
time and increasing freight rates on this stretch of the Rhine. Recently, the 
pamphlet continued, the water was so shallow that one of the shipping com-
panies had to distribute its 3,000 tons of cargo over 20 instead of the normal 
10 vessels. Other ships had to return or were obliged to transship their cargo 
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to other ships. The shipping industry’s loss, a damage that cannot even be 
calculated they argued, was the railway’s gain. In their eyes, the Prussian-
Hessian agreement after 1866 on the improvement works took the interests of 
the Rheingau dwellers too much into account. In its annual report the Cologne 
Chamber of Commerce also wrote ‘that the general public interest of the 
necessary quick and sufficient improvement of the fairway in the Rheingau can 
no longer be inferior to the private interests and amenities of individual 
landowners.’60 
In addition, on the Prussian part of the Rhine improvements were still to 
be made, especially at Sankt Goar, the notorious Loreley, where accidents 
continued to occur. Deepening the shipping channel could be a most expen-
sive operation, the representatives of all the German steam shipping compa-
nies argued, but it was worth it in order to maintain a prosperous shipping 
industry that would be resistant to the expanding railways. These operations 
would prevent the enormous investments already made in the improvement of 
the Rhine stream from becoming totally worthless. Only after such ‘correc-
tions’ of the stream had been achieved were the boatmen secured of a safe 
fairway and the river could become prosperous again, the pamphleteers 
concluded. 
In a final appeal to the German commissioners specifically, the Rheinschif-
fahrts Interessenten underlined the strategic importance the Rhine had regained 
after 1871. Not only had the river proved its usefulness during the war against 
France, but Deutschlands Strom could also be a fundamental part of the 
nation’s economic interests. These economic interests in turn constructed the 
strongest foundation for 
the expansion of the new German Empire, their protection belongs to the 
most important goals that are set in the empire’s legislation, in order to 
enhance the new empire’s power and prestige to raise national prosperity 
and to secure the peace of the old world.61 
The CCNR immediately submitted the pamphlet to the assessment of the 
Technical Commission, having the politically sensitive allegations checked by 
sound empirical evidence. This shows once again how at this point the Tech-
nical Commission was consistently used as a tool of depoliticisation. In reac-
tion, this Commission concluded that the observations and demands 
expressed in the pamphlet were ‘not unfounded.’ In fact, the Technical Com-
mission acknowledged that it had demanded an integrated approach to the 
regulation of the Rheingau multiple times itself.62 
Even after 1877, when low water levels and the proliferation of sandbanks 
had caused a major shipping crisis on the Dutch Waal, the main concern 
among the German Rhine industrialists remained the German Rhine. This 
appears in yet another pamphlet written by the group of German Rhine 
steam-shipping companies that by then had turned into an official organisa-
tion, the Association for the Protection of Rhine Shipping Interests (Vereins 
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Figure 6.1 The Niederwalddenkmal close to Rudesheim was inaugurated in 1883. It 
commemorates the German unification and the founding of the empire in 
1871. The lyrics of ‘Die Wach am Rhein’ and its location represent the 
symbolic significance of the river for the German unification 
Source: Niederwalddenkmal (2009) Wikipedia, Traveler100. (CC BY-SA 3.0) 
zur Wahrung der Rheinschifffahrts-Interessen).63 The 1877 pamphlet concern-
ing ‘the conditions for navigation on the Rhine’ was addressed to the Federal 
Chancellery in Berlin, the highest authority of the North German Con-
federation. Here, the old Prussian CCNR commissioner, Rudolph von Del-
brück, had only recently been substituted as president by the Hessian 
politician Karl von Hofmann. Invoking article 4, paragraph 9 of the con-
stitution that stipulated that the empire was to supervise ‘Rafting and navi-
gation upon those waters which are common to several States, and the 
condition of such waters, as likewise river and other water dues,’ the Asso-
ciation urged the federal government to act quickly. After all, good working 
waterways were among the basic conditions for a prosperous economy. 
The pamphlet identified several threats to the navigability of the Rhine. 
One of these was too laisser-faire an approach. More supervision of the 
authorities could help reduce the many accidents that had occurred on the 
Rhine in recent years. Furthermore, the Association advocated for stricter 
punishment of those who did not comply with the safety regulations, for 
example, by withdrawing their shipping licence. ‘[We consider] this punish-
ment simply necessary, to prevent anarchy that we would otherwise surely 
encounter.’ In addition, a uniform signposting system would not only serve 
safe navigation, it would also be indispensable in settling liability disputes 
between ship-owners. Finally, the transport of flammable or toxic substances 
needed to be executed with special care and these products should never be in 
contact with consumable goods. 
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Apart from the unsatisfying way the Convention of Mannheim was 
applied, it was mostly the poor condition of the navigability of certain seg-
ments of the Rhine that was worrisome. In particular, the Rheingau, between 
Mainz and Bingen – to which the pamphlet devoted two full pages of its 14 
sheets – urgently needed improvements. This need was recognised by every-
body, but since the first Rhine survey, nothing fundamental had changed. 
Initially, it had been disagreements between the two riparian states involved, 
Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau, that had delayed the works. Eventually, they 
agreed on a correction plan, but then the works were stopped during the 1870 
war against France, and were not picked up by Prussia after the peace settle-
ment, even though Prussia had always advocated for the improvement of the 
Rheingau, and from 1866 also had it in its possession. The explanation here, 
according to the pamphleteers, was that rather than the common interest of a 
well-functioning waterway, Prussia took the interests of the inhabitants of the 
Rheingau too much into account. 
This allegation was spot on. In 1875 the banker and trader in weapons, 
but also an enthusiastic wine producer from Nassau, Heinrich Eduard von 
Lade (1817–1904), convinced the Prussian House of Representatives to act 
reluctantly with regard to the corrections in the Rheingau. The benefits that 
the full correction would yield for a couple of large steam tug companies 
would never outweigh the disadvantages for the local inhabitants. The 
alteration of the landscape made the region less attractive for tourism. 
Moreover, it would affect agriculture and viniculture, as it cut direct access 
to the river and thus to the vital supply of fertiliser and fodder. But more 
importantly, the reduction of the water surface reduced sunlight reflection 
and water evaporation, increasing the risk of freezing and drought in the 
vineyards. Finally, the corrections would expose the local population to the 
risk of floods and the dissemination of diseases from the newly formed 
marshes. 
In an internal evaluation of the memorandum, the CCNR was critical of 
most of the concerns the Association had raised, but it fully endorsed the 
difficulties of the navigability of the Rheingau, as did the Technical Commis-
sion. Yet the CCNR could do very little as long as ‘The negotiations [between 
Hesse-Darmstadt and Prussia] are still pending on this matter.’64 The CCNR 
continued its efforts to bring the diverging interests closer together. However, 
employing the Technical Commission did not result in the desired con-
vergence of national policies regarding the regulation of the Rhine, at least 
not in the short run. 
Simultaneously, while Prussia stood its ground, perspectives in the Nether-
lands shifted. The complete disruption of traffic on the Waal in 1876, with 
more than 700 ships grounded near Rossum, proved the seriousness of the 
situation. The resulting expressions of disapproval from the riparian states 
and the Technical Commission made the Dutch government decide to turn on 
the money tap for river regulations.65 ‘[Only] the benefits that the Netherlands 
derives from its geographical location will have to ensure the resources for 
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the preservation and development of its prosperity for our people,’ the gov-
ernment wrote in a clarification on a new law authorising the construction 
and improvement of the Dutch waterways.66 It was H.S.J. Rose, the Dutch 
Chief Engineer who also had been part of the Technical Commission in 1874 
and now was director of the new department of river management, who was 
to supervise the regulation program.67 
In 1885 the Technical Commission observed that 14 per cent of the Waal 
did not reach a 3-metre depth. While the government was somewhat hesitant 
because of the ensuing costs, the Dutch seaports and shipping industry were 
very much in favour of digging out the Waal. Even the Dutch Rhine com-
missioner, W.F. Leemans – the first Dutch engineer in the CCNR and Chief 
Engineer of the Dutch Authority of Major Rivers – found the demands jus-
tified. The Prussians had successfully dug out the Rhine from Cologne to the 
Dutch border to a depth of 3 metres. The Dutch shipping industry would not 
fully benefit from these conditions if the channel in the Dutch Rhine was not 
as deep. In addition, he found that the Netherlands was morally required to 
comply.68 In the final two decades of the century, the Netherlands, albeit with 
trial and error, heavily invested in clearing the navigable channel in the Waal. 
In 1896 the Commission observed considerable improvements, although at 
some parts the navigable channel still suffered from unsound or unfinished 
conditions, conditions that continued to be problematic after the survey of 
1908.69 
Progress was also made in Germany. In January 1884 Hesse-Darmstadt 
and Prussia concluded an agreement on the correction of the Rheingau. In 
the 1896–1897 Rhine survey the technical commissioners observed that the 
level of improvement was similar to that on the Waal. However, the Rhein-
gau agreement also continued to take the local landowners’ interests to 
heart, resulting in a correction that was not as rigorous as Rhine navigation 
might require. It was true that the removal of sandbanks with ad hoc steam 
dredgers prevented a total stagnation of shipping. However, the Technical 
Commission concluded, these temporary conditions thwarted the full allo-
cation of the loading capacities of vessels on the entire Middle Rhine. With 
this circumstance in mind, the commissioners in the CCNR found it neces-
sary to record in the final protocol that a further improvement of the 
Rheingau was desirable and, according to the Technical Commission, tech-
nically possible. The Prussian and Hessian commissioners gently but decid-
edly disagreed. During the 1908 Rhine survey, the commissioners repeated 
their judgement: if the correction plan was based on purely hydraulic prin-
ciples, the improvement of the fairway would be more favourable and longer 
lasting.70 
In the Netherlands the hydraulic works on the Waal were eventually com-
pleted in 1924. In Germany it was only in the 1960s and 1970s that the 
shipping canal both on the Upper and the Middle Rhine was deepened by an 
additional 40 centimetres and the Binger Loch was enlarged to 120 metres in 
width, which finally secured the continuity of large-scale shipping. 
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Principles, norms, and institutions 
From the previous sections it becomes clear that the ‘correction’ of the Rhine 
was a complicated matter in a hydrotechnical sense. The character of the 
Rhine was different everywhere, making it impossible to design and carry out 
one master correction plan. In addition, it was immersed in a changing socio-
economic environment. After 1849, in general terms, the principal goal of the 
hydraulic works on the Middle Rhine, Lower Rhine, and the Dutch segments 
of the Rhine was to secure the freedom of navigation and eliminate threats to 
individual ships, and the Rhine shipping industry as such, in the context of an 
increasingly competitive railway network. On the Upper Rhine, between 
Basel and Mannheim, the correction works focused on the navigability of the 
fairway rather than on traditional flood prevention, but only at the very end 
of the nineteenth century.71 Looking in more detail, we also saw that the 
diverse and conflicting interests along and beyond the Rhine influenced the 
extent and character of the hydraulic works that were being carried out. 
Sometimes national economic interests stood in the way of transnational 
shipping and commercial interests. At other times, local interests conflicted 
with appeals to moral obligations, or even with the imperial duty of main-
taining peace in the ‘Old World.’ Yet despite these complications and the 
diverse levels of Rhine regulation, we can conclude that the Technical Com-
mission was a major organisational innovation that allowed an integral 
approach to Rhine regulation and was able to generate a coherent set of 
principles, norms, institutions, and practices. 
The Technical Commission of the Rhine surveys constituted an organisa-
tional innovation because it facilitated communication between the main 
water engineers from the respective riparian states within one official body. 
This body informed the CCNR on the nautical conditions of the navigable 
Rhine and controlled whether the promised corrections were indeed carried 
out. In turn, this information enabled the CCNR to make well-informed 
demands from the riparian governments. Furthermore, technical commis-
sioners such as the Prussian Nobiling, the Dutch Rose, and the Baden Hon-
sell, were not only the most respected engineers of their time, they also stood 
at the head of centralised national bodies that dealt exclusively with the 
Rhine. This meant that they were not only in the best position to inform the 
CCNR about the conditions and the development of the works, they could 
also make sure to implement the approved correction plans effectively. 
What is more, the Technical Commission offered solutions to the detected 
problems from an integrated perspective. That means that the solutions 
offered were compatible with the character of, or with the correction works 
on, other parts of the Rhine. It goes without saying that this was also a pro-
cess of trial and error. Technological innovations that were successfully 
applied on one part of the Rhine might or might not be effective on other 
parts of the river. Engineers in the Netherlands, for example, were striking out 
blindly for a long time due to the complex hydromorphological conditions of 
Running an international organisation (1860–1900) 159 
the estuary. Nevertheless, the Technical Commission was an effective body 
that collected and dispersed knowledge in this field of expertise. Con-
temporaries very much appreciated this quality of the Commission. In 1877 
the Association for the Protection of Rhine Shipping Interests made a plea to 
carry out surveys much more regularly, thereby advancing some sort of an 
institutional memory, keeping ‘as long as possible the same hydraulic engi-
neers … entrusted with these investigations.’72 Finally, the Technical Com-
mission and the CCNR were instructive for the shipping industry, not only 
because they warned where the greatest risks were to be expected, but also 
because they spread the news about where the dangers had passed thanks to 
the hydraulic works that had been carried out. 
As a result of knowledge building, the Technical Commission was even-
tually also able to set norms and standards regarding ‘normal depth,’ ‘normal 
width,’ the appropriate number and location of security ports, and sign-
posting. As we have seen above, in 1861 the Technical Commission set the 
standard depth for all the segments of the Rhine. These standards, though, 
were never written in stone and could, as a result of moving technological 
insights, be adapted. This happened, for example, on the Upper Rhine, where 
in 1897 the technical commissioners concluded that the normal depth of 1.5 
metres, as determined in 1861, was, due to all the new technological experi-
ences on the Middle and Lower Rhine, to be regarded as obsolete. These 
standards were not part of an international agreement, and therefore could 
not be forced on the national governments. Nevertheless, the depth standards 
certainly functioned as a diplomatic stick that bore legitimacy as we have seen 
in the Waal and the Rheingau cases. 
In both cases we saw that the interests of navigation were weighted against 
the interests of local landowners, and the interests of the state coffers. In the 
end, it was a combination of national and local interests and relative state 
power that determined what a country would and would not do within an 
international cooperative condominium. Yet the composition of the Technical 
Commission, with one leading engineer from each riparian state, yielded 
credibility and legitimacy to their verdicts, even when based on a majority. 
Van Eysinga claims that the regularity of the surveys resulted in timely 
adjustments of the respective national correction policies that may have ulti-
mately prevented inter-riparian disputes. Indeed, CCNR norms could hardly 
be disregarded as targets beneficial for Rhine navigation and, as such, 
informed the range of national policies and generated a converging pace in 
the long run. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century the Technical Commission 
became a fully institutionalised tool of the CCNR to harmonise, standardise, 
and optimise the Rhine for the benefit of its navigation. Initially, the Techni-
cal Commission was employed for the Rhine surveys only, but it was charged 
with an increasing range of tasks during these decades. It assessed plans for 
bridge building. It was asked to advise on the standardisation of the beacon 
system, on the reform of the ship investigation authorities, on the curriculum 
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of the skippers’ school, and on the construction of a hydro-electric station on 
the navigable Rhine close to Hüningen in 1906.73 More than the local Rhine 
inspectors, these men possessed the technological knowledge and executive 
powers to tackle these problems. As a body, the Technical Commission was 
called in exclusively by the CCNR. Thus, the agenda-setting capacity 
remained with the CCNR and provocative initiatives such as those from the 
Chief Inspector were avoided. 
Conclusion 
Besides mitigating the political tensions within the CCNR, the Technical 
Commission increased the potential of the CCNR to steer the convergence of 
riparian politics regarding Rhine navigation. In fact, even the Franco-Prus-
sian war did not interfere with the depoliticisation of the freedom of its navi-
gation or with the continuing existence and activities of the CCNR itself. 
These activities were only seriously endangered after the turn of the century, 
specifically with the outbreak of the First World War. Indeed, it was at the 
point when the CCNR and the Rhine regime were at the brink of collapse 
that they received new political and academic attention. 
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Conclusion 
Composing a heritage and projecting the future 
of the CCNR (1900–1918) 
W.J.M. van Eysinga 
March 1916. The war in Europe was in full swing, yet the Dutch member of 
the Rhine Commission and professor of law, Willem van Eysinga, could not 
disregard the fact that this year the Commission had its centenary. Van 
Eysinga realised that the situation did not lend itself particularly well to a 
party, but he did not wish to have the anniversary not celebrated at all. In a 
letter to his German colleagues he therefore proposed to compile a book with 
all international and national regulations concerning the navigation of the 
Rhine since 1803. He believed this would be a work of lasting value. Despite 
his positions as full professor both at Leiden University and the Netherlands 
School of Commerce in Rotterdam, van Eysinga fully embarked on the 
undervalued task of realising his book plan. 
It was no surprise that the representatives of the German Rhine states 
showed reticence, but above all restraint. The Baden commissioner, Wiener, 
said he was pleased that his Dutch colleague was willing to take on this work 
on a voluntary basis, but added that ‘it is probably not easy to find people in 
German government circles who are able to participate in such an assignment 
in these times.’ Van Eysinga thought he observed at least some sympathy for 
the idea, and thus started trying to convince the other German commissioners 
by firmly declaring that the work was only a collection of existing formal 
documents, and did not have any critical, historical, or legal pretensions. 
That, and the fact that most of the work would be carried out free of charge 
by the Dutchman, made the Germans decide to eventually accept the idea. 
Together they decided which documents were to be included, what the title of 
the work would be, and what the content of the introduction would look like. 
The publication costs of 5,000 guilders and 200 free copies of the work would 
be shared evenly among the six member states. A year later, in September 
1918, Van Eysinga presented to his fellow commissioners Volume I of the 
Rheinurkunden containing the first 300 documents, spanning the 1803–1860 
period.1 Not surprisingly, the preface was straightforward: it justified the 
selection of documents and pointed at earlier works that collected or 
explained the Rhine’s legal documentation. ‘A work like this was missing so 
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far for the river, which legal system has become the basis for all other inter-
national rivers,’ the preface notes.2 
Van Eysinga’s zeal to complete this task needs, of course, to be regarded in 
the context of world events. The war ravaged most continents and fuelled 
nationalism, interstate rivalry, and the erection of political boundaries. His 
books were not mere documentation of the legal regime of the Rhine, but 
concerned the heritage of the Commission’s efforts. At this point, there was 
no need for a critical, legal, or historical study of the Rhine regime. In this 
book, Van Eysinga pointed to the CCNR as a glimmering beacon in dark 
times. By showing its legal achievements, the CCNR demonstrated to the 
world that it was possible to construct a regional legal community that 
crossed borders; a stepping stone to what Van Eysinga thought of as most 
desirable, that is, a global legal community.3 
The CCNR as part of the European security culture in the 
nineteenth century 
The Rhine and European Security in the Long Nineteenth Century: Making 
Lifelines from Frontlines has told the story of how the frontline of an interna-
tional river was turned into a lifeline due to the cooperative effort of the  respec-
tive riparian states in the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine. 
Thereby, it told the story of the highest state officials, such as Hardenberg, 
Castlereagh, and King Willem I, but also explained the contribution of second-
tier officials such as Clancarty and Humboldt; administrative experts such as 
Eichhoff and Bitter; engineers, merchants, skippers; and of course the commis-
sioners of the CCNR themselves. Together, they negotiated shared interests and 
imagined threats and translated these into the coming about of a new regime on 
the Rhine, based on the modern principle of freedom of navigation. The con-
struction of the Rhine regime consisted not merely of the construction of a legal 
community, but also of an epistemic community of technocrats as well as an 
interest community. The CCNR succeeded, as an international forum and plat-
form of communication and cooperation, by trial and error, largely in recali-
brating respective national interests towards a common interest. 
This book has uncovered the centrality of the concepts of security and 
prosperity, both as contemporary reflections and discursive practices, within 
this process of recalibration. And therefore it claims that the security-
prosperity nexus, the mutual causal relationship between the organised antici-
pation of being unharmed in the future, on the one hand, and the organised 
anticipation of maintaining livelihood, on the other, is key in the study of the 
formation of a European security culture after 1815. Ultimately, the formation 
of this security culture consisted of a shared moral commitment, of finding 
innovative ways of international cooperation and of a sense of imperialist 
optimism. This shared commitment, cooperation, and optimism helped a great 
deal in implementing the principle of freedom of navigation and as a result 
indeed made Europe a more prosperous and more secure place.4 
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Starting with moral commitment, the documents showed that after 1814 
contemporaries were charged with a sense of a new beginning for European 
society, based on a responsible, legitimate, and righteous order advancing the 
common good. In the discussions during the inception phase of the CCNR, a 
wide range of stakeholders used terms such as ‘slavery,’ ‘dependence,’ and 
‘yoke,’ leading to ‘unpredictability,’ ‘anarchy,’ ‘disorder,’ and ‘chains,’ not only 
to describe the conditions of Rhine navigation in the era prior to the new 
order, but also to describe the possible harmful future conditions on the 
Rhine if the parties concerned did not comply with the Allies’ demands. In a 
similar vein, opposing Rhine policies was quickly labelled uncivilised or 
immoral by calling it ‘barbarism,’ ‘feudalism,’ or ‘despotism,’ based on a 
‘spirit of egoism,’ ‘privileges,’ ‘abusiveness,’ ‘arbitrariness,’ and ‘dishonesty.’ In 
other words, opposing and harmful policies belonged to the old, not the 
present, order. The present order, on the other hand, was described as a 
‘moral union’ that consisted of a ‘mild,’ ‘soft,’ and ‘liberal’ system based on 
‘freedom,’ ‘equality,’ and ‘competition’ advancing ‘reciprocal civilisation,’ 
‘development,’ and ‘the European national interest.’ 
That sometimes it was as much about being as it was about appearing 
morally just, is shown by the example of the Dutch strategy in the 1820s. In 
the jusqu’à la mer dispute the Dutch made a great effort to appear law-abid-
ing, rational, soft, and liberal. This resulted in a successful riparian alliance 
against Prussia. However, the strategy also caused the de facto closing off of 
the estuary from the new Rhine regime – thereby limiting the understanding 
of ‘freedom of navigation.’ In addition, during this inception phase of the new 
regime, ‘reciprocity’ became a key concept in the interaction between the 
organised anticipation of maintaining livelihood on the one hand and the 
organised anticipation of being unharmed in the future on the other. Whereas 
in 1814 the Allies projected a Rhine regime benefiting Europe as a whole, by 
1831 the Rhine states realised a regime based on riparian reciprocity, favour-
ing merely each other’s citizens. This restricted notion of reciprocity also 
explains why Prussia and the Netherlands finally agreed to settle the jusqu’à la  
mer dispute between themselves. After all, Great Power interference would 
almost certainly have entailed allowing the other European powers to enjoy 
the liberal Rhine regime as well, possibly affecting emerging German indus-
trialisation along the Rhine. Thus, by 1831 the CCNR had turned from a 
moral union that was to protect European security, into a moral union that 
was to protect riparian prosperity, based on inter-riparian reciprocity, trade 
security, and freedom of navigation. 
The innovative ways of international cooperation that the CCNR embodied 
and produced were the second aspect of this new security culture. Being the 
first intergovernmental organisation in modern history meant that the CCNR 
was advancing into unknown territory from the very beginning. The com-
missioners relied on their administrative experience and managed to establish 
a diplomatic forum, with all its formal and less formal qualities. In the fields of 
geophysics, hydraulics, socio-economic data, and navigation they relied on their 
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young administrative regime that collected local information, but also on often 
politicised reports coming from national authorities and finally on external 
expertise. Technological innovations pushed the CCNR along its course to 
further inter-riparian cooperation and transparency. To counter the accusation 
of being an abusive power, the Netherlands, for example, felt obliged to share 
rather sensitive information on state subsidies for the newly established steam 
tug service on the Waal around the 1830s. But it was, above all, political 
developments that shaped inter-riparian cooperation. In was only after the 
increasing disorder on the Rhine had resulted in a severe legitimacy crisis of the 
CCNR in the 1840s that it started to employ a riparian network of leading 
hydraulic engineers more consistently and regained increasing prominence. 
This network, institutionalised in a Technical Commission, essentially had 
the task of surveying the river for navigability. Thereby, it contributed to 
increasing transparency on local conditions, and generated common norms 
by promulgating uniform indicators of progress, such as the depth of the 
navigable channel, the height of the constructed bridges, the amount of cargo 
transported on the Rhine, and, most importantly, the number of investments 
made by the individual riparian governments in the improvement of the 
navigable stream. With the Technical Commission, the CCNR harnessed its 
regime by implementing a soft compliance mechanism of external expert 
input, internal intermediation, and majority denouncement. This mechanism 
to promote compliance sometimes resulted in converging national policies 
only in the longer run, such as in the case of the stream correction pro-
grammes. Nonetheless, the convergence increased, and sometimes the 
mechanism even resulted in the main riparian state, i.e. Prussia, conforming 
itself to the wishes of the riparian condominium, such as in the case of the 
Cologne bridge construction. 
Finally, the CCNR showed signs of imperialist optimism as well. It stret-
ched its uniform rule over the Rhine with the aim of protecting the principle 
of freedom of navigation and expanding commerce along its banks. Yet 
sometimes its tentacles tried to reach further. In the case of the struggle 
between the sailors and the steam shipping industry in 1848, the CCNR was 
prepared to look away, at least temporarily, from its main responsibility to 
secure the freedom of navigation in favour of the sailors’ survival. Another 
example is the case of the protection of the salmon stock in the Rhine. The 
CCNR was careful not to enter this policy field formally, but it deliberately 
offered its diplomatic infrastructure to forge consensus among the riparian 
states. In these cases, its ambitions were greater than its final achievements, 
but they show how the CCNR assumed responsibilities that went beyond its 
original purposes. The latter point also counts for the CCNR’s ruling over 
standing bridge constructions over the Rhine, thereby assuming an imperative 
role in matters that touched other public interests – such as interregional 
railway construction. 
The CCNR thus gradually became a more technocratic platform, with an 
emphasis on prosperity-enhancing technical interventions for the Rhine, 
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counterbalancing national political interests. This proved essential both for 
successfully mitigating the political tensions regarding the Rhine correction 
programmes and for the very survival of the Commission’s legitimacy. 
Therefore, we can conclude that by the end of the nineteenth century the 
security-prosperity nexus still set in motion the formation of a Rhine regime 
that in turn produced, enabled, and influenced a collective security culture. 
However, we can also observe a major change in the mechanism underlying 
this formation. In 1815 the CCNR had been mainly the product of European 
security considerations. The Great Powers believed that European security 
was contingent on European prosperity, and international cooperation with 
the aim of implementing the principle of freedom of navigation on interna-
tional rivers was the way to go. By the end of the nineteenth century, we can 
observe that the CCNR had become the product of riparian prosperity con-
siderations. Even in the context of ever-expanding railways, the Rhine had 
fully regained its competitive position as a transport road by 1900. The 
CCNR had depoliticised the principle of freedom of navigation as a common 
good and had institutionalised a Technical Commission that produced new 
norms that helped the convergence of riparian Rhine policies and quelled 
inter-riparian conflict regarding the freedom of navigation. From a security 
platform driving prosperity, the CCNR had turned into a technocratic plat-
form driving security. 
Europe and beyond 
As a body the CCNR successfully expanded its authority and impact on the 
Rhine societies in the course of the nineteenth century. But the modern prin-
ciple of freedom of navigation on international rivers itself turned into a 
much more forceful imperative, bringing order and commercial security to the 
outskirts of Europe and beyond as well.5 Constantin Ardeleanu clearly reveals 
how after the Crimean War the European powers applied this European 
principle on the Danube, but in a more far-reaching way than they had done 
in 1815. With the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, the European powers seized the 
opportunity to remove Russia from the Lower Danube, and to establish a 
riparian commission and a European commission. The latter one, the ECD, 
successfully enforced the freedom of navigation of all flags and expanded its 
authority and assumed ambitions that went far beyond the stipulations of the 
1856 Peace Treaty. It applied regulations, tariffs, and hydrotechnical plans. It 
established diplomatic relations with neighbouring states. And, importantly, it 
had significant financial resources, as it levied tolls on the Danube and took 
out loans from international banks. The European powers legitimated their 
far-reaching authority with the argument that the new sovereign on the 
Danube, the Ottoman Empire, could not provide the 
guarantees of order and security which European navigation imperiously 
needed, and so, in order to compensate for its inexperience, its notorious 
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impotence, even its ill-will, the governments deemed it expedient to invest 
their plenipotentiaries with a part of their sovereign rights.6 
As signatory of the Paris Peace Treaty, the riparian government of the Otto-
man Empire was still part of the ECD, yet its interests were subjected to the 
larger European interest of opening up the Danube for European commerce. 
During the Berlin West Africa Conference in 1884–1885, concerns for local 
sovereignties along the Congo were completely absent.7 The conference is gen-
erally understood as a diplomatic attempt to resolve the rising tensions among 
the European powers by creating a legal and political framework that ensured an 
‘orderly’ colonial expansion on the African continent.8 Yet some historians 
emphasise that the conference’s main objective was to secure access and free trade 
in an important prospective market without bearing the costs of colonial admin-
istration.9 The conference was, so historian Ronald Robinson writes, ‘essentially 
the work of diplomats regulating future inter-European relations in African 
commerce, from the standpoint of the balance of power in the world at large.’10 
In the Act of Navigation for the Congo that was adopted during the con-
ference, freedom of navigation was granted for all flags, and also applied to 
the tributaries, lakes, and canals in the entire Congo Basin. Transit rights 
were prohibited, and roads, (future) railways, and canals that were con-
structed to substitute for poorly navigable parts of the river were subject to 
the Act as well.11 An International Congo Commission, consisting of Eur-
opean powers alone, would ensure compliance with, and the implementation 
of, the stipulations of the Act of Navigation.12 With an appeal to the civilis-
ing qualities of the European effort to tame the Congo with a modern river 
regime and turn it into a commercial highway, the European powers legit-
imised a far-reaching inter-imperial intervention that went much further than 
any previous river regime and would advance their material benefits greatly at 
the expense of local communities.13 
However, the inter-imperialist ambitions on the African rivers turned out to 
be more problematic than it might have appeared in 1885. For a new organi-
sation in an unknown continent, it was impossible to find sufficient funding. 
Additionally, King Leopold’s Congo Free State constituted an administrative 
competitor – leaving very little space for independent action. The Commis-
sion, Yao writes, ‘became a diplomatic formality never to leave the pages of 
the legal document.’14 Indeed, the implementation of the principle of freedom 
of navigation on the Congo failed.15 Robinson concludes, therefore, that ‘the 
conference has to be seen as an exercise of the European imagination, a 
typical expression of the contemporary world view,’16 a worldview that also 
turned imperial the principle of freedom of navigation. 
What remained 
In 1919, during the Paris Peace Conference, the European powers took upon 
themselves the task of re-establishing international river regimes as one of 
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their priorities. Before the negotiations started, Van Eysinga published an 
account of the historical evolution of international river law. He deliberately 
pictured the existing Rhine regime as a benign form of international coop-
eration that showed a linear development between 1815 and 1919. Intention-
ally, he did not touch upon the ‘dark’ sides of the encompassing security 
culture. He merely warned that there was much to spoil and suggested that 
the regime deserved to be followed up after the horrors of the First World 
War.17 During the negotiations in October the same year, Van Eysinga 
became the Dutch representative to the International Rivers Conference in 
Paris. There, however, he could not prevent, with Germany and Austria 
absent, the victorious Powers having a free rein in the design of the new 
regimes on the Rhine and the Danube. 
As was to be expected, Britain finally seized the opportunity to adapt both 
regimes in such a way that the rivers became entirely freely navigable for all 
flags. Moreover, the commissions would admit representatives of non-riparian 
states, which provided, according to the French prime minister Clemenceau, 
‘security that the general interest will be considered.’18 Contemporaries wel-
comed the new regimes as the concluding step of a process that had started 
on the Rhine in 1815 and continued with the 1856 example of the Danube 
regime. The 1919 regime finally adhered to the ‘true and international spirit, 
and in opposition to national egoism and bad faith.’19 Yet the new regimes 
were not as progressive and based on rational considerations as these con-
temporaries suggested. In fact, by internationalising merely the German rivers 
and by allowing Germany only a minority vote in the new commissions, while 
Allied states, primarily Great Britain but also France and Italy, gained a larger 
say, these regimes were very much a way to contain Germany’s future economic 
development and political weight. Symbolically, the seat of the CCNR was 
moved from German Mannheim to French Strasbourg, where it still is today.20 
In contrast to 1815, when France was directly – and on an equal footing – 
admitted to the CCNR, the language of legal continuity barely masked the 
victors’ political power play in Versailles.21 It was only in 1963, pushed by the 
growing economic importance of Germany, that the Rhine Commission 
returned to its pre-Versailles constellation and the Mannheim Convention was 
largely restored. The year 1919, therefore, clearly constituted a regime shift on 
the Rhine. In his famous ‘Peace Without Victory’ speech to the Senate, US 
president Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) did call the freedom of maritime 
navigation a ‘sine qua non of peace, equality, and cooperation,’ and he called 
‘The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations … an essential part of 
the process of peace and of development.’22 Moreover, in his Fourteen Points, 
he accorded the principle of freedom of navigation the second place on the 
list. Generally, Wilson considered wealth creation and distribution a pre-
requisite to peace and security. Point III of the Fourteen Points therefore 
called for the removal of economic barriers and the equality of trade condi-
tions among all nations. Yet it was only after the Second World War that 
economic development and peace or the freedom of navigation and security 
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became mainstream, mutual complementing elements in international politics 
again. 
Only after the Second World War was security again understood to be 
inseparable from prosperity. The United States applied the Marshall Plan 
through the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation in order to 
create economic development and economic integration for the sake of 
counterbalancing the expansion of the Soviet Union on the European con-
tinent. In 1950, Robert Schuman launched his plan for a European Coal and 
Steel Community to put the production of the most important commodities 
for warfare under the auspices of a common authority. Just as in 1815, when 
Vienna imposed a river regime that eliminated the imperial abuse of the river 
as a transport resource, sharing coal and steel resources made ‘war not only 
unthinkable, but materially impossible’ after 1952. ‘The mainspring of the 
EU’s founding fathers lay in the link between common economic develop-
ment and sustaining peace on the continent,’ Hans Merket writes.23 
The prerogative to rebuild the European continent and boost its economy 
after the Second World War demanded a high level of international coopera-
tion and coordination. Besides the European Coal and Steel Community, the 
European Economic Community, as founded by the Treaty of Rome in 1956, 
would also be active in the field of international transport and river transport. 
With alternative methods and other participants, these organisations con-
stituted administrative competitors to the CCNR. Yet even the first president 
of the Commission of the EEC, and founding father of the European Union, 
Walter Hallstein (1901–1982), stated in 1961: 
Let us not forget that soon the Mannheim Act governs navigation on the 
Rhine for a hundred years according to principles closely related to those 
of our Treaty of Rome. In both we find the principle of equality of treat-
ment, absence of discrimination and above all freedom, which, as you 
know, we want to employ as the foundation of our transport policy 
within the Community.24 
In the decades following the Second World War, the EEC drew upon and 
worked increasingly with the institutions, norms, laws, and practices of depoliti-
cisation the Rhine Commission had already established in the previous century.25 
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Prussia 
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Heinrich Delius 1822–1833 
von Schütz 1833–1837 
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Grafen von Unruh 1841–1842 
Johann Friedrich Von Pommer-Esche I 1842–1849 
Martin Friedrich Rudolph Delbrück 1849–1860 
Moser 1860–1867 
Graf von Villers 1867–1868 
Herzog 1868–1871 
Jacobi 1873 
Albrecht Wilhelm Jebens 1874–1876 
Wendt 1877–1888? 
Gamp 1892?–1895? 
von der Hagen 1899?–1904 
Walter Eduard Karl von Bartsch 1905–1912 
Franke 1913 
von Meyeren 1914 
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